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ABSTRACT

Author: Chia, Changtze. Ph.D.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Choosing Wickedness: Moral Evil in Kant’s Religion
Committee Chair: Jacqueline Mariña
This dissertation concerns Kant’s doctrine of radical evil. The doctrine consists in the
following two claims: (1) The propensity to evil is a universal propensity, found in every human
being. It is therefore an innate disposition. (2) Every human being is morally responsible for the
propensity to evil found in him. It is therefore a disposition that is freely chosen. The poor reception
Kant’s doctrine of radical evil has received over the centuries can be traced to his insistence on
these two claims. The doctrine has been censured for two reasons: (1) Kant appeals to empirica l
evidence in his argument that the propensity to evil is a universal propensity. But an empirica l
generalization cannot prove that the propensity to evil is universal. Interpreters of Kant have
therefore tried to correct this huge lapse by providing us with Kant’s missing proof for the
universality of radical evil. (2) Kant argues that the propensity to evil is both universal and freely
chosen. But these are not two predicates that really go together. It is objected that the determinis m
necessary to make the disposition universal is logically incompatible with the demands of freedom,
or that it is ridiculously improbable to suggest that every human being freely made the exact same
(evil) choice. Interpreters of Kant have therefore tried to reconcile the two concepts by coming up
with a plausible account of how every human being could have freely chosen evil. This dissertation
will deal with both problems: (1) This dissertation argues that the problem of the missing proof is
a non-problem. Kant’s argument for radical evil has been incorrectly interpreted as an empirica l
generalization. It is not. The examples of human evildoing that Kant gives are not meant to prove
that human beings are universally evil. Kant is using them as counterexamples against the theory
that human beings are universally good. (2) This dissertation argues that the universality of radical
evil can be reconciled with the free choice of radical evil. The human being makes the noumena l
choice of a fundamental maxim, which thereby determines his moral orientation. If he chooses to
wholeheartedly embrace the moral law, he would have made the noumenal choice of a good
fundamental maxim. Anything less than such a wholehearted and unconditional embrace of the
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moral law represents a noumenal choice for the evil fundamental maxim. For he has thereby made
his obedience of the moral law conditioned upon something else. It is then argued that for a human
being to so wholeheartedly embrace the moral law is not a logical impossibility, but it is, however,
a real impossibility. In these two responses, this dissertation presents solutions to concerns that
surround Kant’s doctrine of radical evil; concerns that are collectively labeled as the “problem of
radical evil”.

1

INTRODUCTION

The initial publication of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in 1792 was
greatly anticipated by the Enlightenment milieu of the day. It proved to be a bitter disappointme nt.
Kant’s contemporaries reviled the work, seeing the condemnation of human nature as evil as a
betrayal of the Enlightenment values of freedom and human progress. Their reactions to the
doctrine of radical evil were captured in Goethe’s letter to Herder in 1793, in which he had written:
“Kant required a long lifetime to purify his philosophical mantle of many impurities and
prejudices. And now he has wantonly tainted it with the shameful stain of radical evil, in order that
Christians too might be attracted to kiss its hem” (Fackenheim 1954, p. 340). But the Religion
fared little better in the eyes of the Prussian censors. Kant’s insistence that the human being was
himself responsible for the evil of his nature led him to dismiss the Biblical account of original sin
with the scathing words: “Whatever the nature, however, of the origin of moral evil in the human
being, of all the ways of representing its spread and propagation through the members of our
species and in all generations, the most inappropriate is surely to imagine it as having come to us
by way of inheritance from our first parents; for then we could say of moral evil exactly what the
poet says of the good: genus et proavos, et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ex nostra puto” (6:40).1 The
doctrine of radical evil turned out to be an anathema to both sides. The Enlightenment progressives
despised it because they considered the universality of radical evil an affront to the freedom of
choice that every human being has in determining his own moral character. The conservative
Prussian bureaucrats censured it because they considered the adoption of radical evil through the
free power of choice a danger to the universality of the evil of human nature. By ascribing to

This is translated as: “Race and ancestors, and those things which we did not make ourselves, I scarcely
consider as our own” (Ovid, Metamorphoses, XIII: 140-141).
1
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radical evil the characteristics of freedom and universality, Kant pleased precisely no one, but
instead created a conceptual tension in the very idea of radical evil that has persisted to this day as
the problem of radical evil.

The Problem of Radical Evil
What, precisely, is the issue with radical evil being both universal and free? Here is one
formulation of the problem of radical evil: Radical evil can be universally present in every human
being, or it can be freely adopted by every human being that has this propensity, but it cannot be
both universally present in every human being and freely adopted by every human being with this
propensity. This would be a logical inconsistency. Quinn gives us an example of the reasoning at
work here in the following passage:
If a characteristic is innate to a person, then it would seem that person is no more
accountable for it than for anything else he or she got in the natural lottery. Innate
attributes, even if they are accidental rather than essential to their possessors, seem
to be things which are themselves neither morally good nor morally evil. If a
characteristic of a person is morally evil, then it would seem that person acquired
in through some particular free act or acts rather than possessing it antecedent to all
such particular acts. Characteristics which are morally evil and for which one is
accountable seem not to be the things which could be innate in an agent. Outright
inconsistency seems to be lurking just around the corner (Quinn 1984, p. 193).
The issue here has to do with Kant’s claim that the evil in human beings is innate. It is because
this evil is innate that radical evil can be said to be universal, that is, present in every human being:
“Whenever we therefore say, “The human being is by nature good,” or, “He is by nature evil,” this
only means that he holds within himself a first ground (to us inscrutable) for the adoption of good
or evil (unlawful) maxims, and that he holds this ground qua human, universally – in such a way,
therefore, that by his maxims he expresses at the same time the character of his species” (6:21-22).
But, as Quinn notes, if a characteristic is innate to a person, then he cannot be held accountable for
having that characteristic. And, this line of reasoning continues, if radical evil is innate to the
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human being, then it cannot be imputed to any human being that has it, because it cannot have an
origin in freedom – it must have its origins somewhere other than freedom, such as in the laws of
nature.
This formulation of the problem of radical evil therefore reprises the age-old conflict
between freedom and thoroughgoing causal determinism described in the Third Antinomy. It is
represented as a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma is this: Insofar as radical evil is free, it
can only be produced through a special kind of causality, namely a faculty of absolutely beginning
a state, and hence also a series of its consequences (A445/B473). And the second horn of the
dilemma is this: Insofar as radical evil is innate, it can only be produced through the laws of nature,
where everything that happens presupposes a previous state, upon which it follows without
exception according to a rule (A444/B472). It is therefore contradictory to hold both to be true,
because radical evil cannot have an origin in freedom if it is innate, and radical evil cannot be
innate if it is to have an origin in freedom. This is the problem with radical evil that Michalson hits
upon when he points out the logical conflict between freedom and innateness (universality) in the
following passage: “Moreover, because Kant thinks that the propensity to evil is universal (“this
propensity can be considered as belonging universally to mankind…”), he is finally led to the
seemingly paradoxical judgment that evil is both freely elected and “innate”, a view that would
appear to robe either “freedom” or “innateness” of its point” (Michalson 1990, p. 46). If understood
in this way, there is no special problem of radical evil. The problem of radical evil is merely a
different way of formulating the problem of the Third Antinomy.
But there is another formulation of the problem of radical evil: Radical evil can be
universally present in every human being, and it can be freely adopted by every human being that
has this propensity, but it seems highly unlikely that radical evil is both universally present in every
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human being and freely adopted by every human being that has this propensity. This would be
improbable, perhaps even to the point of being a statistical impossibility. Here again we have
Quinn to give us an example of the reasoning at work here in the following passage:
But it seems very improbable that a propensity to moral evil should be both a
product of freedom and universal among mankind. Because the adoption of an evil
supreme maxim is an absolutely spontaneous exercise of the will, it is antecedently
likely that some people would have freely adopted a morally good supreme maxim
while others adopted a morally evil supreme maxim. Even if it is impossible to
assign numerical values to the prior probabilities of the various alternatives, it
seems clear enough that the prior probability of all human beings choosing freely a
morally evil supreme maxim must be quite low (Quinn 1984, p. 194).
The issue here is the remarkable coincidence that Kant is asking us to accept. Suppose we were
talking about a coin-toss. If we flip a coin, we can expect it to come up heads about half the time
and tails about half the time. Imagine, then, if we flipped the coin a thousand times in a row, and
the coin came up heads every time. Even though it is mathematically possible for the coin to come
up heads a thousand times in a row, the likelihood of such an event happening is infinitesima lly
small, and it would be wholly unreasonable for either of us to assume that there is no trickery afoot.
The universal presence of radical evil in every human being confronts us with the same problem.
Here we are being asked to believe that every human being spontaneously exercises his freedom
in the exact same way – to choose the evil fundamental maxim. It would be no more reasonable
for us to believe Kant’s assertion that all these choices were made freely and without external
compulsion, than for you to believe my assertion that these thousand coin tosses that came up
heads were the result of chance. If understood in this way, there is a special problem of radical
evil. For Kant must be able to explain precisely what it is about the moral psychology of human
beings that compels them, but does not determine them, to freely choose the evil fundame nta l
maxim without exception. And this explanation has a high hurdle to overcome: It must persuade
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us that it is reasonable to believe that billions upon billions of human beings spontaneously made
the same free choice.

Investigating Radical Evil
In this essay, the problem of radical evil will be treated primarily as a problem of moral
psychology. That is, we will treat the problem of radical evil as having to do with the psychologica l
processes that lead a human being to freely choose radical evil, and determine whether this process
can plausibly be thought to occur in every human being in order to produce a universal propensity
to evil. Let us do this by breaking down the problem that lies before us into several parts: First,
we must ask ourselves how the doctrine of radical evil relates to the rest of Kant’s practico philosophical writings. For these writings are the source of the moral concepts on the basis of
which Kant posited the doctrine of radical evil. Second, we explain what is this something that
Kant calls radical evil. From earlier, we know that he ascribes to radical evil the characteristics of
freedom and universality. But this cannot be the entire story, since it does not tell us what radical
evil is, that is, we have not specified what it means for radical evil to be described as a propensity,
or as a fundamental maxim. Third, a solution to the problem of radical evil as a problem of moral
psychology must be provided. That is, we must in some way make it reasonable to believe that
every human being to have ever lived freely chose the evil that has taken root in his heart.
Therefore, this essay will be structured in accordance with the following four questions:
1. What is the place of freedom in Kant’s practical philosophy?
2. What is radical evil?
3. What makes the universal propensity to evil a real possibility?
4. What solutions have other authors given for the problem of radical evil?
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In Chapter 1, we will be considering the place of freedom in Kant’s practical philosophy.
This chapter is structured around the Kantian distinction between the Wille and the Willkür. For
Kant, the Wille is the legislative aspect of the will, and the Willkür is the executive aspect of the
will. It is the Wille that provides us with the moral law, and it is the Willkür that then makes the
choice whether to obey or to disobey this law. Freedom, then, means something very different for
the Wille than it does for the Willkür, because the Wille is free insofar as it is an autonomous
lawgiver, whereas the Willkür is free insofar as it is a spontaneous decider. The main discussio ns
of this chapter will consist in the following: First, the problem of imputation. Put briefly, the issue
is this: Kant asserts that we are morally responsible for the evil that we do. This can only be the
case if we freely chose to perform those evils. Freedom is a necessary condition for those acts to
be imputed to us, otherwise we would not be able to take responsibility for them. But Kant also
asserts that freedom and morality reciprocally entail each other. If so, this means that the concept
of the moral law entails that of freedom, and vice versa. And since evil acts are by definitio n
contrary to the moral law, it would seem that we must deny that they are free. This leaves us with
the intolerable conclusion that our evil acts, being unfree, cannot be imputed to us for the purposes
of moral responsibility. This sets up the discussion of freedom as it relates to the Wille and the
Willkür, which comes second. We begin by considering freedom in the sense of spontaneity. This
distinction pertains to freedom as it relates to the Willkür. When the will is free in the sense of
spontaneity, it is free to perform an action and it is also free to refrain from performing said action.
This means, in the case of evil acts, a will that is spontaneously free has the capacity to subordinate
the moral incentives to incentives that are unmoral, thereby making the maxim of the deed (and
the deed itself) evil, and the same goes for good acts, mutatis mutandis. It is because we performed
the evil act when we could have refrained that makes the deed blameworthy. Moral evil is therefore
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imputable to us because we have a free Willkür. This may be contrasted with freedom in the sense
of autonomy. This distinction pertains to freedom as it relates to the Wille. The freedom of the
Wille is autonomy, and it has to do with the will’s own self-legislation. A will that is unfree in this
sense does not self-legislate. It is a Wille that is heteronomous. And this means that the will is not
a law unto itself, but instead obtains its laws from sources outside itself. It is freedom in the sense
of autonomy that implies and is reciprocally implied by the moral law. Third, we will turn to
consider the Reciprocity Thesis more closely. This is Kant’s idea that freedom and morality
reciprocally entail each other. Here we will argue that Kant’s idea is that autonomy and morality
reciprocally entail each other, and not that spontaneity and morality reciprocally entail each other.
Thus, the solution to the problem of imputation will take place along these lines: Evil acts are
unfree as they relate to the Wille, because they are the product of heteronomy rather than autonomy.
But evil acts are free as they relate to the Willkür, because we could have done otherwise, and this
makes us responsible for the evil acts that we perform.
In Chapter 2, our discussion shifts to the topic of radical evil. It is concerned with the
following cluster of problems: What is a propensity to evil? What does it mean for a fundame nta l
maxim to be evil? Are they one and the same thing? We need to ask these questions because Kant
describes radical evil in many ways. In some places, he describes radical evil as the propensity to
evil in human beings. This way of describing radical evil makes it an innate disposition, albeit an
innate disposition that may be represented as either acquired or brought by the human being upon
himself (6:29). In other places, however, radical evil is described as the evil fundamental maxim
that is found in every human being. And this way of describing radical evil makes it the subjective
first ground of our maxims, that is, the ground of all our maxims that deviate from the moral law
(6:22). First, we turn to discuss radical evil in terms of an evil fundamental maxim. The argument
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that leads Kant to posit the existence of such a maxim turns on the way maxims are connected to
each other in his practical philosophy. For Kant, a maxim can only be grounded by another maxim.
And once it is understood that every one of our maxims are grounded in some way or the other,
this leads us to conclude that there must be a hierarchy of maxims.

Second, we consider the

anthropological evidence for radical evil that Kant provides in the Religion. In this section, it is
argued that Kant’s argument for the universality of the propensity to evil has been misunderstood.
The point of these examples he provides is not to serve as an inductive proof that human beings
are by nature evil. Rather, they are examples used to falsify the thesis, popular in Kant's day, that
human beings are by nature good. Third, we explain how the anthropological evidence from
before can be used to prove that the propensity to evil is universal. Briefly put, the anthropologica l
evidence of widespread evil suffices to prove that evil is possible for every human being. And a
condition for this possibility is the actual presence of a dispositional property in every human
being that would activate if the conditions were just right, in accordance to which the human being
would commit evil. Fourth, we consider the gradations of evil that Kant introduces in the Religion,
specifically the evils of frailty and depravity. Insofar as the evil of frailty seems to involve no
maxim, it can only be produced through a subjective first ground for the possibility of an
inclination, that is, through the propensity to evil. The evil of depravity, by contrast, does involve
a maxim. Indeed, it cannot take place except through a maxim. As such, it must have been produced
through the subjective first ground for the adoption of a maxim, that is, through an evil fundame nta l
maxim. Thus, it is difficult to see how the propensity to evil and the evil fundamental maxim can
ever be one and the same thing, that is, radical evil. And even though there is an argument that
establishes a universal propensity to evil, it seems to be an equivocation to say, on this basis, that
radical evil is universal.
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In Chapter 3, our topic remains fixed on the nature of radical evil. Here, however, our
interests are slightly different, because we are asking: What are the conditions that make the
universal propensity to evil a real possibility? Prima facie, the intelligible world is the ground of
the sensible world and its laws, from which it follows that the intelligible character of an individ ua l
is the ground for the empirical individual and the laws of his behavior (his empirical character). If
the propensity to evil is universal, then it follows that every human being chooses not to
incorporate the moral law in the construction of his fundamenta l maxim. This solution to the
problem of radical evil leaves precisely no one satisfied. It provides a solution that is merely formal
– a trivial metaphysical corollary of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism – and not a solution
in terms of Kant’s moral psychology. In the end, we still would not know what it means for Kant
to say that every human being makes the choice of evil in the constitution of his fundame nta l
maxim. By delving into the real possibility of radical evil as an evil fundamental maxim, we can
begin to flesh out the moral psychology involved in the making of this choice. First, we ask how
it is possible to adopt a fundamental maxim that is evil when we, as atemporal first causes, are
making our decisions in the noumenal realm? This seems impossible. Moral evil, Kant tells us, is
only possible when we subordinate the moral incentive in favor of other incentives that are
nonmoral. These other incentives that are nonmoral are not available to us in the noumenal realm.
Ipso facto, we cannot adopt fundamental maxims that are evil. And yet there is a universa l
propensity to evil, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, and this would be impossible if we had
not all selected a fundamental maxim that was evil. Second, assuming that we have no choice but
to incorporate the moral incentive into our fundamental maxim, then either we are not morally
responsible for our choice of fundamental maxim, or we have a choice in how we incorporate the
moral incentive into our fundamental maxim. In this section, we will be opting for the latter option.
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The difference in the way we incorporate the moral incentive into our fundamental maxim
determines whether our will is fallible or infallible. If the moral law is something we have
steadfastly incorporated into our hearts, then the will would be infallible, because there are no
circumstances under which it can be led astray. But if the moral law is compromised in us, then
the will would be fallible, and it will go astray the moment an opportunity arises for it to. Third,
the fallibility or infallibility of a will is a matter of its moral strength. Kant calls this moral strength
virtue (6:380). Every individual has incorporated the moral incentive into his fundamental maxim,
and therefore has moral strength to some degree or the other. But only in an infallible will is this
moral strength perfected (maximally present), whereas in a fallible will, the moral strength is
lacking, and the degree to which the fallible will lacks moral strength is called moral weakness.
This moral weakness is only a potential for going astray, because there is nothing in the noumena l
realm that can actually lead the will astray. Afterwards, we will conclude this chapter with a
discussion of frailty and depravity. These gradations of evil arise from necessary phenomenal
structures that determine the nature of the human being. These are original predispositions that are
present in every human being. The predisposition of animality is the source of the human being’s
mechanical self-love. Every human being is embodied, and insofar as he is embodied, every human
being is subject to sensible desires and inclinations. The self-love that aims at the satisfaction of a
human being’s animal desires is mechanical self-love. The moral weakness of a human being,
insofar as it is unable to withstand these sensible desires and inclinations when they oppose the
moral disposition in him, gives rise to the evil of frailty. Likewise, the predisposition of humanity
is the source of the human being’s comparative self-love. Out of (comparative) self-love, every
human being is determined to gain worth in the opinion of others (6:27) But this self-love gives
way to self-conceit, because this desire to gain equal worth in the opinion of others gradually
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becomes “an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others” (6:27). This transitio n
from self-love to self-conceit is depravity, and the moral fault for it lies with the human being, for
he could have prevented this slide into depravity had he not been morally weak in character. In
conclusion, by demonstrating how the choice of a fundamental maxim interacts with the necessary
phenomenal structures that are a part of human nature, we explain how the evil that is grafted onto
processes that occur in every human being is able to produce a universal propensity to evil. In so
doing, we provide an account of radical evil in terms of Kant’s moral psychology.
In Chapter 4, we will review a limited selection of the extensive literature on radical evil.
We will be asking the following question: How have other authors understood (and provided their
own solutions to) the problem of radical evil? Each of the proposals we will be examining attempt
to make sense of Kant's assertion that radical evil is both universal to the human species and freely
chosen by every human being. First, we consider the proposal put forth by Firestone and Jacobs
in their book In Defense of Kant's Religion. There they appeal to the distinction between primary
substance and secondary substance from Aristotle's metaphysics, where the individual and the
species it belongs to are both considered substances by virtue of their being subjects of predication.
The idea here is that, although it would be hard to imagine multitudes of individuals all making
the same free choice to adopt radical evil, this is not what happens. Instead, it is the human species,
as a (secondary) substance, that makes this free choice to adopt radical evil, and the propensity to
evil is universal by fact of our participation in the human species. Second, we turn to the proposal
put forth by Morgan in his article “The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity's Radical Evil in Kant's
Religion”. Morgan interprets the choice between radical evil and the original good in terms of a
choice between two different conceptions of freedom. Negative freedom is the autonomy of a will
that has freed itself from determination by external causes. Such a will would, according to Kant,
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legislate to itself the universal law of reason. For Kant, negative freedom is supposed to lead to
positive freedom. But the desire for negative freedom can also be corrupted into a desire for
untrammeled freedom, that is, a freedom that is beholden to no law, not even the moral law. And
it is the desire for negative freedom in this sense that leads us to embrace radical evil. Third is
Allison's argument proving the universality of radical evil. Allison contrasts the propensity to evil
with the propensity to good. Per ethical rigorism, the human being has to have one or the other.
By unpacking the propensity to good in terms of Kant's concept of the holy will, Allison interprets
the propensity to good as a spontaneous obedience to the dictates of the moral law. The finite will,
being incapable of ignoring completely the demands of inclination, can therefore never be called
holy. And since the holy will and the propensity to good are one and the same, it must be concluded
that the propensity to evil must be present in every finite will. Fourth, we finally arrive at the
anthropological account of radical evil. The version we will be dealing with here is Wood's.
According to Wood, every human being tends towards unsociable sociability, that is, they make
comparisons and compete amongst themselves for self-worth. The human being finds himself in a
society of human beings, and he instinctively works to gain worth in the opinions of others, not
allowing anyone else superiority over himself for the sake of self-protection. This gradually gives
way to an unjust desire to acquire superiority over others for oneself, and it is this that Wood
identifies as the propensity to evil. But each of these attempts at a solution to the problem of radical
evil contain a flaw: they all trace the genesis of radical evil to a sufficient condition in the nature
of humanity. This methodology is inconsistent with the way Kant characterizes radical evil. He
writes: “He is evil by nature” simply means that being evil applies to him considered in his species;
not that this quality may be inferred from the concept of his species (from the concept of a human
being in general, for then the quality would be necessary)…” (6:32). In providing radical evil with
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a sufficient condition, these authors turn radical evil into a quality that may be inferred from the
concept of his species. They make radical evil a universal certainty by sacrificing its freedom.

14

CHAPTER 1. FREEDOM IN KANT’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate,
I am the captain of my soul.
William Ernst Henley, Invictus.
Introduction
The Critical period of Kant’s philosophical career began with the publication of the
Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. In this work, Kant hoped to “deny knowledge in order to make
room for faith” (Bxxx). For he had been troubled by the advancement of dogmatic metaphys ics
that purported to explain the world so exhaustively and completely that there was no longer space
to assume the existence of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, even for the practical
use of reason. This practical use of reason can be seen in Kant’s insistence that moral evil, as
opposed to physical evil, has to be the product of our freedom: “… A physical propensity (one
based on sensory inducements) to whatever use of freedom, be it for good or evil, is a contradictio n.
Hence a propensity to evil can only attach to the moral faculty of choice. Nothing is, however,
morally (i.e. imputably) evil but that which is our own deed” (6:31). As this passage makes clear,
whether or not we are morally responsible for our actions hinges on whether it was a matter of our
choice. For if we were not free in performing those actions, then they cannot be imputed to us, and
we bear no moral responsibility for either the action, or the consequences that arise from it. But it
is also through freedom that the moral law is given to us. Freedom, after all, is the ratio essendi of
the moral law, and the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, as Kant had declared in the
famous passage from the Preface of the Critique of Practical Reason (5:4n). Freedom and the
moral law reciprocally imply each other: “For, had not the moral law already been distinctly
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thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as
freedom (even though it is not self-contradictory). But were there no freedom, the moral law would
not be encountered at all in ourselves” (5:4n). These are two distinct concepts that both attach to
Kant’s idea of freedom, and each of these concepts need to be clearly and distinctly explained, as
they will be here, otherwise we would arrive at no precise understanding of why Kant was so
insistent that radical evil had to be freely chosen by every human being.

Theoretical Freedom
In the First Critique, Kant’s discussion of freedom is featured most prominently in the
Third Antinomy. The Third Antinomy introduces the opposition between fatalism and freedom.
Fatalism is described in the Third Antinomy in terms of a thoroughgoing causal determinis m:
“Assume there is no causality than that in accordance with the laws of nature: then everything that
happens presupposes a previous state, upon which it follows without exception according to a
rule” (A444/B472). The fatalist position can be contrasted with that of freedom, which is described
in the Third Antinomy as the idea of an uncaused cause: “Suppose there were a freedom in the
transcendental sense, as a special kind of causality in accordance with which the occurrences of
the world could follow, namely a faculty of absolutely beginning a state, and hence also a series
of its consequences; then not only will a series begin absolutely through this spontaneity, but the
determination of this spontaneity itself to produce the series, i.e., its causality, will begin
absolutely, so that nothing precedes it through which this occurring action is determined according
to constant laws” (A445/B473). In this passage, freedom is described as the capacity to absolutely
begin a causal series, that is, both the state and the series of consequences that are supposed to
follow from it. The Thesis of the Third Antinomy makes the case for freedom through a reduction
ad absurdum of fatalism. And the Antithesis of the Third Antinomy makes the case for fatalis m
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by doing the same to freedom. This makes the antinomial conflict between fatalism and freedom
intractable: Each side of the disjunction has a knock-down argument against the other.
Kant’s solution to the antinomial opposition between fatalism and freedom was to argue
that there is a way for both reductios to be correct: “If, on the other hand, appearances do not count
for any more than they are in fact, namely not for things in themselves but only for mere
representations connected in accordance with empirical laws, then they themselves must have
grounds that are not appearances. Such an intelligible cause, however, will not be determined in
its causality by appearances, even though its effects appear and so can be determined through other
appearances” (A537/B565). In this way, the argument of the Thesis and the argument of the
Antithesis can be reconciled with each other. Insofar as the category of causality is to be limited
in application to only those objects intuited in time and space, the appearances are determined
without exception in accordance with the laws of nature. Kant is therefore well within his rights to
assert that every state that happens is preceded by a state from which it follows according to a rule,
because the only causality present in the world of appearances is this causality of nature. But this
does not force him to give up on the existence of a causality of freedom that is distinct from the
causality of nature. For there can be a world beyond the sensible world, and the intelligible world
would be governed by laws of its own, distinct from the laws of nature that govern the sensible
world. If so, then there could well be an entire world that is governed, not by the laws of nature,
but by the law of morality, and the determinations that are the result of this law’s operation would
be brought about through a special kind of causality that Kant calls the causality of freedom. Thus,
it is in no way inconsistent that an appearance has a sensible cause, in which it is determined by
another appearance in accordance with the laws of nature, and also an intelligible cause, in which
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it is determined from the side of the things themselves by a power that is able to absolutely begin
a state, and hence also a series of its consequences.
But this solution is a negative one. It attempts to show that fatalism and freedom are not
inconsistent, given the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. This is a far cry from showing that
there actually is such a faculty of absolutely beginning a state. In his writings circa the First
Critique, Kant made attempts to provide positive arguments for the existence of freedom that were
disjunctive in nature, in which he focused on disproving (or making untenable) the fatalist position
detailed in the Third Antinomy. Hence, in his review of Schulz's Sittenlehre of 1783, Kant writes:
“Although he would not himself admit it, he has assumed in the depths of his soul that
understanding is able to determine his judgment in accordance with objective grounds that are
always valid and is not subject to the mechanism of merely subjectively determining causes, which
could subsequently change; hence he always admits freedom to think, without which there is no
reason” (8:14). The thrust of Kant’s argument in the Review rests on the practical incoherence of
the fatalism that Schulz advocated. Fatalism here refers to Schulz’s denial of the reality of freedom,
a position against which Kant writes: “... The most confirmed fatalist, who is a fatalist as long as
he gives himself up to mere speculation, must still, as soon as he has to do with wisdom and duty,
always act as if he were free, and this idea also actually produces the deeds that accords with it
and can alone produce it. It is hard to cease altogether to be human” (8:13). In other words, the
problem with the fatalist's denial of freedom is that it is self-undermining.
To see why, consider what the fatalist position entails: there is no freedom, and all the
actions of the will are determined by the laws of nature, all appearances to the contrary. This means
that the fatalist must regard his actions to be, one and all, the product of natural necessitation. Even
so, the fatalist is prepared to give arguments in defense of his fatalistic commitments, and assumes
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that he will be able to convince his skeptical colleagues of their rationality. This attitude does not
square with the fatalist's denial of freedom. For fatalism considers the fatalist's belief of fatalis m
to itself be the product of the necessitation of causal laws. And similarly, however brilliantly the
fatalist makes his case, his colleague's positions for or against fatalism cannot be the result of his
convincing arguments, but must also be the product of necessary causal laws. In other words, the
fatalist's actions belie his commitment to fatalism, because what the fatalist does is indeed the
opposite of what he should do, if his commitment to fatalism was genuine. Thus, according to
Kant's approach in the Review, the fatalist's denial of freedom is contradicted by his own actions
every time he uses reason to try to persuade himself and others to adopt fatalism.
This line of reasoning resurfaces in the next major work of Kant’s corpus, the Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). There, the argument Kant provides takes on the following
form:
Now, one cannot possibly think of a reason that would consciously receive direction
from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, since the subject would then
attribute the determination of his judgment not to his reason but to an impulse.
Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien
influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it
must be regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will
of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a practical
respect thus be attributed to every rational being (4:448).
Like before, Kant’s argument in the Groundwork sets up a contrast between freedom and fatalis m.
In this argument, Kant is not focusing on reason in its practical use, but on reason in its speculative
use. This means that he is focusing on the ability of reason more generally to make judgments. For
a judgment to be rationally justified, reason must have determined that it had objective valid ity
and was universally valid, and hence necessary, for everyone. This determination, however, would
be meaningless if it was not made on the basis of universal rational principles, but on the basis of
sensible impulse, “since the subject would then attribute the determination of his judgment not to
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his reason but to an impulse” (4:448). The fatalist that denies freedom believes that everything is
“determined to activity by the influence of alien causes” (4:446). Because this includes the power
of judgment, this means that the fatalist must consider judgment to be an activity that is determined
by the influence of alien causes. But a judgment that is determined by the influences of alien causes
(the impulses of sensibility) would no longer be rationally justified in any meaningful sense. Even
if this judgment has necessary universal validity, this necessary universal validity does not come
because everyone has examined the judgment on the basis of universal rational principles and
arrived at universal agreement. Rather, it comes about because everyone was determined by
sensible impulse and the relevant laws of nature to arrive at universal agreement. In this sense,
Kant’s claim that “reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien
influences” echoes the claim he made in the Review that the fatalist (secretly) regards himself as
the author of his principles independently of alien influences.2 Hence: “Although he would not
himself admit it, he has assumed in the depths of his soul that understanding is able to determine
his judgment in accordance with objective grounds that are always valid and is not subject to the
mechanism of merely subjectively determining causes, which could subsequently change; hence
he always admits freedom to think, without which there is no reason” (8:14).
The argument Kant deploys against fatalism in the Review and the Groundwork focuses on
showing that reason in its speculative use must be considered free. If it is not, then the claim to

In his analysis of this reasoning, Wood notes that it is structurally similar to Kant’s argument that humanity
is an end in itself. For this reason, the two arguments are problematic in the same way: “Neither is a deductively valid
argument for its conclusion. All the premises of each argument, and even the proposition consisting in their
conjunction, are quite consistent with the falsity of the conclusion. It may be impossible for you to do what you must
represent yourself as doing when you act, judge, or even think, except by presupposing that you are free. But that is
consistent with your not being able to do these things, and therefore with your not being free. In the same way, it may
be impossible for you to set ends according to reas on without presupposing that rational nature is an end in itself, but
that is also entirely consistent with rational nature’s not having this value, and even with nothing’s having such a
value” (Wood 2008, p. 133). Kant’s argument, as Wood observes, is not meant to place the falsity of its conclusion
outside the realm of possibility, but to place it “out of reach for anyone to rationally deny the conclusion, or even to
decline to assent to it” (Wood 2008, p. 133).
2
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objectivity made in every judgment can no longer be epistemically justified. It would turn out that
something is judged to be true, not based on rational principles, but because we were causally
determined by sensible impulse to judge it to be true. The fatalist position that considers everything
to be determined in their activity by natural causes is therefore incoherent in the sense that the
fatalist can never practice what he preaches. But then Kant extends his argument to cover all
rational beings, which he did not do in the Review: “Reason must regard itself as the author of its
principles independently of alien influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a
rational being it must be regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will
of its own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a practical respect be attributed
to every rational being” (4:448). It is at this point that the argument shifts from a “first person”
standpoint to a “third person” standpoint (Wood 2008, p. 133). For Kant is no longer arguing that
a rational being cannot coherently deny his own freedom, but that a rational being cannot
coherently deny freedom to any rational being. The reasoning for this shift is not clear, but Wood
has suggested the following thought: “If I am going to reason with others, even about any
theoretical matter, I must presuppose in them the same capacity to govern their judgments by
rational norms that I must presuppose in myself” (Wood 2008, p. 133). 3 This idea goes back to our
earlier point about what it means for a judgment to be rationally justified. In principle, every
rational being can assent to the judgment because it was made on the basis of universal rational

Wood cites a passage from the First Critique to justify this line of reasoning: “Reason must subject itself to
critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging
itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. Now there is nothing so important because of its utility,
nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for
persons. The very existence of reason depends on this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is
never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed
even his veto, without holding back” (A738/B766). The interaction with others as rational beings for the purpose of
coming to a judgment’s necessary universal validity “is a necessary condition for the very existence of reason” (Wood
2008, p. 133). And this interaction would be impossible unless we attribute freedom of spontaneity to their reason,
otherwise any necessary universal validity we arrive at would be hollow and meaningless.
3

21
principles – it has necessary universal validity. This condition is not met when we regard only our
own reason as free, because the necessary universal validity of the judgment would be a sham if
other rational beings besides us made their determination not based on reason but because of an
impulse. Therefore, if we think of judgment in terms of its necessary universal validity, then it
becomes evident that the “first person” standpoint of the Review is inadequate, and Kant’s
argument in the Groundwork had to move beyond it to adopt the “third person” standpoint. 4

Ought-Implies-Can
The principle that ought-implies-can asserts that, if there is a particular action that we ought
to perform, then we have the ability to perform that action. Kant has traditionally been credited as
the originator of this principle. Examples of this principle at work can be seen in the Religion: “...
But if a human being is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about
this revolution by his own forces and become a good human being on his own? Yet duty commands
that he be good, and duty commands nothing but what we can do” (6:47). And also in the following
passage from the Metaphysics of Morals: “Impulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles

4

Following Ameriks, we consider Kant to have abandoned his attempts to provide a theoretical proof of the
existence of freedom after the Groundwork . According to Ameriks: “… The clear insistence that the representation of
spontaneity in our thought does not yield knowledge of the self in itself gives Kant for the first time a consistently
Critical theory of self-knowledge and simultaneously undercuts the first and third steps of the Foundations’s
deduction: now our rationality cannot get us to a free noumenal self, and whatever noumenal side the self is allowed
to have, the restrictions on ascribing any personal character to it eliminate even the possibility of arguing from freedom
to morality on the basis of what is (supposedly theoretically) known to be one’s ‘proper self’. Thus, by the time of his
latest work, Kant had totally abandoned the distinctive points of the last section of the Foundations” (Ameriks 2003,
p. 183). This sets up the practical proof of the existence of freedom that becomes prominent in the Second Critique,
in which “freedom is to be argued for only after morality is accepted” (Ameriks 2003, p. 183). From this time onwards,
the starting-point for Kant’s proofs of the existence of freedom no longer rested on the spontaneity of our thought, but
on a Fact of Reason: “Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason
it out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from cons ciousness of freedom (since this is not antecedently given
to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based on any
intuition, either pure or empirical…” (5:31). And having determined the existence of the moral law in us, Kant is able
to establish the existence of freedom as a postulate of pure practical reason, because “had not the moral law already
been distinctly thought in our reason, we would never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom
(even though it is not self-contradictory)” (5:4n).
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within the human being's mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes powerful) forces opposing
it, which he must judge that he is capable of resisting and conquering by reason not at some time
in the future but at once (the moment he thinks of duty) he must judge that he can do what the law
tells him unconditionally that he ought to do” (6:380). These passages serve a twofold purpose:
Not only are they proof that this principle has its origins in Kant's practical philosophy, but they
also demonstrate the relevance of the principle to the core issues of moral imputability and
practical freedom.
Now whence comes this “ought” in the principle that ought-implies-can? For Kant, oughtstatements are imperatives: “All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this the
relation of an objective law of reason to a will that is by its subjective constitution is not necessarily
determined by it (a necessitation)” (4:413). This is because the finite will is constituted in such a
way that its free power of choice cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so
far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (6:24). Therefore, when the objective
law of reason represents an end to such a will as something that is (morally) good, it is given an
incentive to adopt a particular course of action. But merely having an incentive does not by itself
lead to action – the incentive has to be incorporated into a maxim in order for an action to happen.
And if the incentive given to us by the objective law of reason is not incorporated into a maxim,
then no action determined by the thought of duty would result. By contrast, a will that is necessarily
in accord with the moral law is not subject to imperatives: “A perfectly good will would, therefore,
equally stand under objective laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as
necessitated to actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can
be determined only through the representation of the good” (4:414). Therefore, the objective law
of reason prescribes actions to holy wills and finite wills alike, but it is only in the latter that these
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prescriptions are mere incentives to action and not sufficient determining grounds of action. And
therefore it is only in a finite will that these prescriptions take the form of imperatives, that is, as
oughts.5
If freedom were to be denied, then there would be no sense in which what ought to be is
something that can be. Practical freedom has traditionally been understood in terms of the princip le
of alternate possibilities. According to the principle of alternate possibilities, an action is only free
if the agent that performed it could have done otherwise. Kant describes freedom in terms of the
principle of alternate possibilities in the following passage from the Religion: “... According to
freedom, the action, as well as its contrary, must be in the control of the subject at the moment of
happening” (6:50n). The principle that ought-implies-can features prominently in Kant’s
discussion of freedom. This is because Kant thinks that there is a divergence between what is and
what ought to be. This is evident in the following passage from the First Critique: “... Reason does
not give in to those grounds that are empirically given, and it does not follow the order of things
as they are presented in intuition, but with complete spontaneity it makes its own order according
to ideas, to which it fits the empirical conditions and according to which it even declares actions

Another issue would be how we are to understand the “can” of the principle that ought -implies-can. Meyer
writes in his homily on Ecclesiastes 8:4 (1894): “Whatever He bids you to do by his word, be sure that He will enable
you to do it by his power. He works in us to will and to work of his good pleasure; that is, He never directs us in any
path of obedience or service without furnishing a sufficient supply of grace. Does He bid you to renounce some evil
habit? The power to renounce it awaits you. Claim it. Does he bid you to walk on the water? The power by which to
walk only waits for you to claim it.” Kant himself seems to share this sentiment when he writes: “Granted that some
supernatural cooperation is also needed to his becoming good or better, whether this cooperation only consist in the
diminution of obstacles or be also a positive assistance, the human being must nonetheless make himself antecedently
worthy of receiving it; and he must accept this help (which is no small matter), i.e. he must incorporate this positive
increase of force into his maxim: in this way alone is it possible that the good be imputed to him, and that he be
acknowledged a good human being” (6:44). Does the “can” of the principle that ought-implies-can refer to what we
can do through our power alone, or does it refer to what we can do through the supernatural assistance provided by
grace, if only we accept this help from God? If it is the former, then we are left with the implication that God’s divine
commands are not identical with the imperatives of morality, because the principle holds for the moral law but not for
God’s divine commands, contra Kant’s statement later in the Religion that true duties must be represented as at the
same time divine commands (6:99). But if it is the latter, then we are left with the implication that there can be an
entire class of actions that we ought to perform, even though they are miraculous in nature, and therefore completely
outside the natural order.
5
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to be necessary that have not occurred and perhaps will not occur” (A548/B576). Therefore, if
there was no freedom, then there are actions that reason declares to be necessary that cannot occur
given the order of things as they are presented in intuition. Insofar as the order of things as they
are presented in intuition would then be the only possible order of things, it follows that the order
of things that reason comes up with would have to be dismissed as mere fantasy. It is not an
alternate possibility because it is a nomological impossibility. Freedom, as the power to make
alternate possibilities actual, has the role of making what ought to be into what is. Without
freedom, we would have to give up the princip le that ought-implies-can, because we would have
no way of reaching those alternate possibilities that are specified by the “ought” in the princip le
that ought-implies-can.
This would be to the detriment of moral imputability. Moral imputability is the idea that
immoral actions can be imputed to, or blamed on, the agents that are responsible for them, and the
same goes for moral actions, mutatis mutandis. It is evident that Kant subscribes to the idea of
moral imputability, as we can see from the following passage: “... But this subjective ground must,
in turn, itself always be a deed of freedom (for otherwise the use or abuse of the human being's
power of choice with respect to the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or
evil in him be called “moral”)” (6:21). This passage shows that the human being is to be blamed
when he abuses his power of choice with respect to the moral law and praised in the proper use of
his power of choice with respect to the moral law. The principle that ought-implies-can features
prominently in this argument for the moral imputability of our actions. For Kant, it is the moral
law that prescribes to us what we ought or ought not do, and we are to be praised or blamed
depending on whether we have performed our duty. And this means that, if the principle that oughtimplies-can does not hold true, it would be possible for the moral law to prescribe to us a duty that
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we do not have the ability to fulfill. Insofar as we did not fulfill our duty, it is imputed to us as an
abuse of our power of choice with respect to the moral law, and the end result is that we would be
blamed for something that is outside our control. But surely we cannot be justifiably blamed for
something that is outside our control. Therefore, the moral imputability of our actions must
presuppose the principle that ought-implies-can.
The denial of freedom would therefore result in a disconnect between the moral law and
moral responsibility. For it entails that there are actions that we ought to perform, but do not have
the ability to perform. The moral law dictates the actions that we ought or ought not to perform.
When we neglect to perform these actions, we act contrariwise to the moral law, and we bear moral
responsibility for our actions. Freedom determines what we can or cannot do. It is by the actions
we perform that we are able to depart from the order of things as they are presented to us in
intuition. If the principle that ought-implies-can is affirmed, then the moral law dictates the actions
that we ought or ought not perform, and freedom allows us to depart from the order of things in
intuition to perform these actions. Hence, by neglecting to perform these actions, we have failed
to properly exercise our freedom. And when something ought to have happened (but did not), or
ought not to have happened (but did), we are rightfully blamed for the result, because it followed
from this failure to properly exercise our freedom. But if we are forced to give up the princip le
that ought-implies-can, the moral law still dictates the actions that we ought or ought not perform.
But when we neglect to perform these actions, this does not represent a failure to exercise our
freedom. For there was nothing we could have done to alter the order of things that was presented
to us in intuition. And when we are blamed for something that ought to have happened (but did
not), or something that ought not to have happened (but did), we are being blamed for something
we had no power to prevent, because it did not follow from a failure to exercise our freedom. Prima
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facie, this disobedience to the moral law should not be imputed to us, because our disobedience
was not freely willed by us.

The Imputation Problem
The problem of imputation is concerned with precisely this sort of disconnect between the
moral law and moral responsibility. Beck describes the problem of imputation in the following
terms: “Consider the following dilemma which has embarrassed many defenders of Kant, who
have accepted the conclusion that a good will is a free will. If there is evil, it must be a result of a
failure to be free. Therefore, either there is no moral evil, all evil being natural and therefore not
imputable to human responsibility, or goodness of will is not equivalent to moral freedom” (Beck
1960, p. 203). The reason that there is a problem of imputation is because Kant maintains, as a
central precept of his practical philosophy, that a free will and a moral will are one and the same.
To this end, we find him writing in the Groundwork: “… Since the concept of causality brings
with it that of laws in accordance with which, by something that we call a cause, something else,
namely an effect, must be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in
accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an
absurdity” (4:446). By defining the will as a causality, Kant assumes that there is a law that
determines the will and the effects that follow its exercise (4:446). The causality of a will that is
naturally necessitated is determined by the law of nature and thereby not free. For Kant, the only
other law that can possibly determine the causality of the will is the moral law, hence he concludes
that the free will is a moral will because it must be determined “in accordance with immutab le
laws but of a special kind” (4:446). In having its causality be determined by the moral law, it seems
that the free will can only be the cause of moral actions. And this means that moral evil is not to
be explained by a will that is determined by the moral law, but by a will that is determined by the
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laws of nature. Moral evil, as Beck argued, would therefore be the product of natural necessity,
and not freedom.
But Beck was hardly the first to point out this problem.6 In Anglo-American literature,
Sidgwick was influential in his objection to this identification of the good will and the free will in
his paper, “The Kantian Conception of Free Will” (1888). There, he accuses Kant of equivocating
between two notions of freedom. The first notion, which Sidgwick calls Good Freedom, is “the
Freedom that is only realized in right conduct, when reason successfully resists the seductions of
appetite or passion” (Sidgwick 1888, p. 405). The second notion, which Sidgwick calls Neutral
Freedom, is “the Freedom to choose between right and wrong, which is, of course, equally realized
in either choice” (Sidgwick 1888, p. 405). According to Sidgwick, when Kant identifies the will
as pure practical reason, “this identification obviously excludes the possibility of Will’s choosing
between Reason and non-rational impulses”, because pure practical reason, as noumena, is
undetermined by empirical conditions and therefore also undetermined by sensible desires
(Sidgwick 1888, p. 411). The result is that “the will, qua free, acts in accordance with these [moral]
laws; – the human being, doubtless, often acts contrary to them; but then, according to this view,
its choice in such actions is determined not “freely” but “mechanically”, by “physical” and
“empirical” springs of action” (Sidgwick 1888, p. 411). As such, Sidgwick thinks that Kant must
either give up the idea of the heteronomy of the will, in which the will yields to empirical or
sensible impulses, or he must give up the idea that we can maintain moral responsibility and moral
imputation for evil acts (Sidgwick 1888, p. 412). 7 And this conclusion of Sidgwick’s sounds very

Allison records Reinhold as one of the earliest critics of Kant’s identification of the good will and the free
will: “In the second volume of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy (Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie),
Reinhold, like many subsequent critics, objected to Kant’s identification of the will with practical reason and freedom
in the positive sense with autonomy on the grounds that it makes it inconceivable how one could freely violate the
moral law” (Allison 1990, p. 133).
7
For a two-aspect interpretation spin of the problem of imputation, consider Sullivan: (1) Kant’s
transcendental idealism is best understood in terms of a two -aspect interpretation “in order to defend the claim that
6
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much like the dilemma faced by the defenders of Kant who have “accepted the conclusion that a
good will is a free will” (Beck 1960, p. 203).
This interpretation of Kant is not without textual support. As we had mentioned earlier,
Kant is adamant in the Groundwork that the freedom of the will entails “a causality in accordance
with immutable laws but of a special kind” (4:446). Insofar as the laws of nature are specifica lly
excluded by a will that has freedom as a property, because “freedom would be that property of
such causality that it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it” (4:446), it
follows that these immutable laws that Kant is referring to can only be the laws of reason (the
moral law). And this is taken as an indication that Kant himself accepts the conclusion that “a good
will is a free will” (Beck 1960, p. 203). But the most suggestive passages for this interpretation are
found in the Second Critique, where Kant argues that the concept of the moral law entails the
concept of freedom, and vice versa. Allison has named this the Reciprocity Thesis: “This is the
claim that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts, henceforth termed the Reciprocity Thesis.
Its significance stems from the fact that it entails that freedom of the will (transcendental freedom)
is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition of the moral law” (Allison 1990, p. 201).
The argument of the Reciprocity Thesis is divided into two stages. The first stage, under the
heading Problem I, tries to show that a moral will would also have to be a free will. This aims to

freedom (and so also morality) is at least not incompatible with nature” (Sullivan 1989, p. 281). (2) “For our theoretical
purposes we must take the viewpoint that every phenomenal agent is completely bound by causal natural laws; for our
moral purposes, we must take the viewpoint that all human agents have pure practical reason, enabling them to be
transcendentally free” (Sullivan 1989, p. 281). (3) Therefore, heteronomous action is seen from the viewpoint of
phenomena, since “we must regard that agent as being causally determined as the movements of a clock” (Sullivan
1989, p. 282). And autonomous action is seen from the viewpoint of noumenal, because “an act of freedom cannot
(like a natural effect) be derived and explained according to the natural law of the connection of e ffects with their
causes, all of which are appearances” (Sullivan 1989, p. 281). The idea seems to be that, since we must regard the
noumenal as the ground of the phenomenal, it is inconsistent to regard the noumenal agent as “influenced by
phenomenal desires so as to act immorally, thereby losing noumenal freedom” (Sullivan 1989, p. 283). But it seems
the following problem also presents itself: If, as the two -aspect interpretation claims, every action is causallydetermined from the phenomenal viewpoint (heteronomy) and free from the noumenal viewpoint (autonomy), then it
follows that every action would be heteronomous behavior from the phenomenal viewpoint and autonomous behavior
from the noumenal standpoint, rather than being a case of either heteronomy or autonomy.
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prove that the moral law is a sufficient condition for freedom. The second stage, under the heading
Problem II, tries to show that a free will would also have to be a moral will. This, in turn, proves
freedom to be a sufficient condition for the moral law. Taken together, the results of Problem I and
II show that freedom and the moral law are reciprocal concepts. Therefore, if Kant’s argument in
the Second Critique succeeds as intended, then it seems to follow immediately from the
Reciprocity Thesis that “a good will is a free will” (Beck 1960, p. 203).

Spontaneity
What does it mean for the human being to be free in the sense of spontaneity? In the First
Critique, Kant describes freedom in the following way:
Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the power of choice from
necessitation by impulses of sensibility. For a power of choice is sensible insofar
as it is pathologically affected (through moving-causes of sensibility); it is called
an animal power of cause (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically
necessitate. The human power of choice is indeed an arbitrium sensitivum, yet not
brutum but liberum, because sensibility does not render its action necessary, but in
the human being there is a faculty of determining oneself from oneself,
independently of necessitation by sensible impulses (A534/B562).
Now if it is assumed that there is no causality other than that in accordance with the laws of nature,
it then follows that the human being’s power of choice is determined solely in accordance with the
laws of nature. This power of choice would be pathologically necessitated, because the “movingcauses of sensibility” are necessary and sufficient to determine the power of choice. The human
being’s power of choice would therefore have to be an arbitrium brutum. But if it is assumed that
the human being’s power of choice could be determined by something other than the “movingcauses of sensibility,” then the power of choice would not be pathologically necessitated but
merely pathologically affected. And a power of choice that is pathologically affected would not be
an arbitrium brutum, but an arbitrium liberum. According to Kant, the human being’s power of
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choice could indeed be determined by something other than the “moving causes of sensibility”,
because in the human being is a faculty that is capable of “determining oneself from oneself,
independently of necessitation by sensible impulses” (A534/B562). And because the human being
has such a faculty, this entails that his power of choice can be determined by something other than
the “moving-causes of sensibility”. The human being is therefore an arbitrium liberum, and not an
arbitrium brutum.
The concept of a maxim is given in two separate locations in the Groundwork.8 It is
explained first in Section I, where Kant writes: “A maxim is the subjective principle of volitio n;
the objective principle (i.e., that which would also serve subjectively as the practical principle for
all rational beings if reason had complete control over the faculty of desire) is the practical law”
(4:400n). It is then explained again in Section II, where Kant writes: “A maxim is the subjective
principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the objective principle, namely the practical
law. The former contains the practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions
of the subject (often his ignorance or also his inclinations), and is therefore the principle with

For an overview of the different interpretations of what maxims are, see Gressis in “Recent Work on Kantian
Maxims I” and “Recent Work on Kantian Maxims II”. This paper has remained relatively ambivalent on the nature of
maxims, but the relevant interpretations to consider would be Bittner and Höffe’s interpretations of maxims as
Lebensregeln and Allison’s interpretation of maxims as hierarchically arranged principles. According to Bittner and
Höffe, maxims are Lebensregeln (life-rules). This means that they are general principles that “denote the manner in
which one lives his life as a whole” (Gressis 2010a, p. 219). And Gressis indicates that this conception of maxims as
Lebensregeln gives them a particular form: “So, maxims are principles of the form, ‘wh en in general circumstances
C, I should perform action A’ adopted on the basis of an outlook like, ‘the world is M’, where M is a descriptive
evaluation (e.g., ‘a bad place for people who are nice’)” (Gressis 2010a, p. 219). According to Allison, maxims are
hierarchically arranged principles. To be precise, he writes: “A maxim may be characterized as a self-imposed,
practical principle or rule of action of the form: When in S-type situations, perform A-type actions” (Allison 1990, pp.
89-90). Because these S-type situations can be more or less general, this leads Allison to conclude that maxims can be
“arranged hierarchically, with the more general embedded in the more specific” (Allison 1990, p. 93). These
interpretations of the nature of maxims are proffered because they both consider maxims to be principles which have
several rules under them. And this makes them a better fit for the Religion’s introduction of the fundamental maxim
of an agent: “Now, the term “deed” can in general apply just as well to the use of freedom through which the supreme
maxim (either in favor of, or against, the law) is adopted in the power of choice, as to the use by which the actions
themselves (materially considered, i.e. as regards the objects of the power of choice) are perfo rmed in accordance with
that maxim. The propensity to evil is a deed in the first meaning (peccatum originarium), and at the same time the
formal ground of every deed contrary to law according to the second meaning…” (6:31).
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which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and the
principle in accordance with which he ought to act, i.e., an imperative” (4:421n). In both cases,
the concept of a maxim is contrasted with the concept of a practical law as a subjective, as opposed
to an objective, principle. But, according to Allison, there is a significant difference between the
two formulations that is not readily apparent.
The formulation in 4:400n describes the practical law as an objective principle that could
“also serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational beings if reason had complete
control over the faculty of desire” (4:400n). In this formulation, both maxims and practical laws
are considered to be first-order principles, as Allison observes: “The first suggests that objective
practical principles could also be subjective and, a fortiori, serve as maxims, at least for that subset
of rational agents in whom reason is fully in control” (Allison 1990, p. 87). 9 The formulation in
4:421n describes the maxim as the principle by which we act, in contradistinction to the practical
law as the principle by which we ought to act. In this formulation, maxims are exclusively firstorder principles, whereas practical laws are exclusively second-order principles. Allison provides
two reasons for preferring the second formulation. First, he observes that the maxim is subjective

9

Working off the distinction between maxim and practical law given in 4:400n, Beck has proposed that Kant
had in mind “a trichotomy, not a dichotomy, to wit: (a) mere maxim, (b) law, (c) law which is also a maxim” (Beck
1960, p. 82). Note that in the first formulation, the distinction between subjective and objective consists in whether it
is a principle acted on by a subject, or a practical principle that all rational subjects can in principle act on, if reason
had complete control over the faculty of desire (Allison 1990, p. 87). From this, we can establish the followin g
possibilities, according to Beck. The first possibility is this: “A rational man acting according to some maxim while
holding it to be valid only for him, and for him only because its condition is the actual state of h is own motives” (Beck
1960, p. 81). This possibility represents the mere maxim. The rational man has no difficulty acting on the practical
principle, but the practical principle is not one that can “also serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational
beings if reason had complete control over the faculty of desire” (4:400n). The second possibility is this: “A rational
man recognizing a condition valid for, though not necessarily effective in, all rational beings” (Beck 1960, pp. 81-82).
This possibility represents the practical law. The rational man recognizes the practical principle he is supposed to act
on, but due to his subjective condition, finds himself unable to act on it. The last possibility is this: “A rational man
recognizing a condition as present and effective in all rational beings as such and therefore as valid for and applicable
to himself” (Beck 1960, p. 82). This possibility represents the practical law that is also a maxim. The rational man
recognizes the practical principle he is supposed to act on, and on this basis, he adopts the practical principle as his
maxim of action.
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in a way that involves a condition of the subject (ignorance or inclination) in the second
formulation, and this is a “distinct and stronger sense of subjectivity than the one operative in the
first formulation, where it means simply acted upon by a subject” (Allison 1990, p. 87). Second,
he observes that when Kant identified the moral law with an imperative, this precludes the practical
law from serving as a maxim: “Imperatives, whether hypothetical or categorical, are of the wrong
logical type to be maxims. They are second-order principles, which dictate the appropriate firstorder principles (maxims), rather than themselves being maxims. Consequently, according to this
formulation, maxims could conform (or fail to conform) to imperatives or practical laws, but they
could never themselves become such laws” (Allison 1990, p. 89).
Allison develops his distinction between maxim and practical law based on the formula tio n
given in 4:421n. In this formulation, maxims can only be first-order principles, and the practical
law can only be a second-order principle. Allison’s argument hinges on Kant’s identification of
the practical law with imperatives in the 4:421n formulation. For Kant defines an imperative (or
command) in the following way: “All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this
the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is not
necessarily determined by it (a necessitation). They say that to do or to omit something would be
good, but say it to a will that does not always do something just because it is represented to it that
it would be good to do that thing” (4:413). From this, it follows that imperatives are prescriptive.
They say that to do or to omit something would be good. But, as Kant notes, they say it to a will
that does not always do something just because it is represented to the will that it would be good
to do or to omit something – they are principles that prescribe ways in which a rational subject
ought to act and not the principles according to which the rational subject actually acts (4:421n).
The basis for their prescriptions depends on the nature of the imperative that is involved. If the

33
imperative is hypothetical, then it will prescribe only those actions that “would be good merely as
a means to something else” (4:414). Whereas an imperative that is categorical would prescribe
actions that are “represented as in itself good” (4:414). Imperatives, therefore, provide princip les
for evaluating maxims (subjective principles of actions) with an eye toward certain criteria of
goodness (as either being good merely as a means to something else or good in themselves). Ipso
facto, imperatives are principles of the second-order.
Allison’s reason for calling the practical law a second-order principle is applicable to both
imperatives that are hypothetical and imperatives that are categorical. But a practical law is an
objective principle, and as “the objective principle valid for every rational being”, it can only be a
categorical imperative. Kant provides the derivation of the categorical imperative in the following
passage from the Groundwork:
When I think of a hypothetical imperative in general I do not know beforehand what
it will contain; I do not know this until I am given the condition. But when I think
of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. For, since the
imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the maxim be in
conformity with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it would be
limited, nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform but the
universality of a law as such; and this conformity alone is what the imperative
properly represents as necessary.
The derivation proceeds from the concept of the categorical imperative (and compares it to the
concept of a hypothetical imperative). The hypothetical imperative represents that an “action
would be good merely as a means to something else” (4:414). 10 If this something else (the end)
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Hill has argued for the existence of a general hypothetical imperative (the Hypothetical Imperative) that
states: If a person wills an end and certain means are necessary to achieve that end and are within his power, then he
ought to will those means (Hill 1973, p. 429). This Hypothetical Imperative may be contrasted with the particular
hypothetical imperatives that Kant discusses in the Groundwork , and indeed underlies them: “The Hypothetical
Imperative serves as a general, though rarely articulated, premise in arguments for various nonmoral “ought”
judgments. The pattern of such arguments would be as follows:
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was not considered to be good, then the means for achieving this end would not be considered
good either. The end is therefore the condition for the means to be considered good, and since this
end is completely contingent, we cannot know what a hypothetical imperative will prescribe
without first knowing what is the end that has been adopted. Furthermore, because this end is
completely contingent, not all rational subjects will have the same ends, and anything prescribed
by a hypothetical imperative to a rational subject would not be binding unless he has adopted the
relevant end.
The categorical imperative is a different story. In a categorical imperative, “the action is
represented as in itself good” (4:414). What Kant means by this is that the action is not conditione d
on anything else as a means to an end – it is unconditionally good. And this, he reasons, entails
that “nothing is left with which the maxim of action is to conform but the universality of the law
as such” (4:421). But what is the basis for Kant’s thinking that the unconditional nature of a
categorical imperative is captured by the demand that the maxim conform to the universality of a
law as such? Kant seems here to subscribe to the idea that, since the hypothetical imperative is
conditionally practically binding on the basis of empirically given ends, then abstracting from any
and all empirically given ends would leave us with an imperative that is unconditionally practically
binding. This is because, having abstracted from any and all empirically given ends, all that

1.
2.

3.

Whoever wills an end also wills the sole means which are in his power if he is fully rational.
Whoever wills an end ought to will the sole means which are within his power. Or, in other words, if a person
wills an end and certain means are necessary to achieve that end and are within his power, then he ought to
will those means.
A is the sole means to B and is generally available (within everyone’s power).

Therefore:
4. If one wills B, one ought to will A.
5. Q (a person) wills B.
Therefore:
6. Q ought to will A” (Hill 1973, pp. 431-432).
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remains is a principle that is practically binding, that is, has the character of being universal and
necessary.11 The categorical imperative bids maxims to conform with the law by commanding that
we act only on those maxims that have the same character of being universal and necessary, hence
Kant writes: “There is, therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal

Aune and Wood both argue that a gap arises at this point in Kant’s derivation of the categorical imperative.
They say that Kant illegitimately moves from the requirement that the maxim has to conform to “the universality of a
law as such” to the requirement to “act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law”, that is, the requirement that the maxim conform to the categorical imperative. As Allison
explains it, “In order for the gap to be filled, we would need a premise to the effect that a maxim that conforms to
universal law just in case that maxim can include itself as universal law. But whereas a maxim that can include itself
as universal law, for example, the maxim of honesty, clearly conforms to universal law, the converse does not hold.
A maxim might very well conform to universal law (indeed, a law produced through the generalization of a maxim)
without being able to include itself as universal law” (Allison 1991, p. 8). The example of a maxim that conforms to
universal law without being able to include itself as universal law that Allison had in mind is th e example of false
promising (Allison 1991, p. 8). The maxim of false promising has “universality of applicability” insofar as it is
perfectly rational for everyone to act on that principle and make a false promise in order to escape a difficult situation.
But the maxim of false promising cannot include itself as universal law – because the advantage that the false promise
was intended to secure would never materialize if the principle was universally adopted. Therefore, a gap between the
weaker requirement of universality of applicability and the stronger requirement that maxims be able to include
themselves when regarded as universal laws arises in Kant’s derivation of the categorical imperative.
In response, Mariña has pointed out that meta-level principles like Kant’s categorical imperative and Wood’s
requirement that maxims possess universality of applicability are both capable of selecting between maxims, but only
the former can correctly be called unconditioned, whereas the latter only seems unconditioned. The categorical
imperative dictates that we are to act only in accordance with those maxims that we can at the same time will that it
become universal laws (4:421). It is concerned with whether a contradiction would arise, should everyone adopt a
given maxim as their principle of action at the same time. In the case of false promising, where a person in financial
difficulty makes a false promise in order to secure a loan, this does not happen, because “the universality of a law that
everyone, when he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping
it would make the promise and the end one might have in itself impossible, since no one would believe what was
promised but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses” (4:422). This may be contrasted with the
requirement that maxims possess universality of applicability. According to this requirement, we are to act only in
accordance with those maxims that are rational for any other agent to adopt in relevant circumstances. But the
universality requirement of the categorical imperative is unconditioned in a way that the universality requirement of
applicability is not: “Yet while the stronger universalizability requirement is capable of throwing out those maxims
having only conditioned worth, the weaker is not, but only throws out maxims that do not specify means adequate to
their end. This tells us that the former requirement is independent of given ends adopted on account of sensuously
conditioned desires in a way that the latter is not. In fact, the latter requirement cannot select among ends precisely
because it is not really unconditioned but only seems so; the given end upon which it depends corresponds to a secondorder desire, that is, the des ire to fulfill one’s desires. It thus has the form of a hypothetical imperative: if you desire
to fulfill your desires, then your means should be objectively practically sufficient to your end. The fact that it depends
on such a second order desire is what makes it seem unconditioned, since adoption of the principle would not seem to
depend upon any particular end” (Mariña 1998, pp. 176-177). Thus, only the stronger universalizability requirement
gives us the unconditionality necessary for a categorical imp erative, whereas the weaker universalizability requirement
remains conditional in nature, and therefore has only the form of a hypothetical imperative.
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law” (4:421). And this makes the categorical imperative a principle that is valid for every rational
being, i.e. objective.
The human being is an arbitrium liberum if he is pathologically affected to action by his
incentives, but not pathologically necessitated to action by them. Kant expands on his account of
how the power of choice is determined to action through a maxim with the introduction of the
Incorporation Thesis, which Kant describes in the following passage: “… Freedom of the power
of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through
any incentive except insofar as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it
into a universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself)” (6:24).
According to the Incorporation Thesis, the power of choice is determined to action through the
adoption of a maxim. The mere presence of an incentive does not determine the power of choice
to action, but must be incorporated into the maxim in order for it to be efficacious.12 As a matter
of fact, the human being does not incorporate only the moral incentive into his maxim, but he
incorporates the nonmoral incentive as well. Kant writes in this regard: “The law rather imposes
itself on him irresistibly, because of his moral predisposition; and if no other incentive were at
work against it, he would also incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient determina tio n

Baron, in her article “Freedom, Frailty, and Impurity”, has pointed out a difficulty with the Incorporation
Thesis. The Incorporation Thesis, remember, states that the human being’s power of choice cannot be determined to
action through any incentive unless the human being has incorporated the incentive into his maxim. This assumes that
it is possible for the human being who is faced with a moral and a nonmoral incentive to choose to incorporate one
(and not the other) into his maxim. Baron is skeptical that this is actually possible: “… Of course I can, on Kant’s
view, decide not to do x, despite my intense desire to do x. But suppose I want to do x, but for a shameful reason. I
realize that the reason is shameful, and also see that there are better reasons for doing x. Can I choose to do x, but not
for the shameful reason? Think of it this way. It is part of our freedom that we are not simply buffeted about by our
inclinations. But there are two ways we might do this. One is to refrain from acting as the inclination directs; this is
something that we clearly can, on Kant’s view, do. The other is to act as t he inclination directs, but not from that
inclination – for we do not incorporate that inclination into our maxim” (Baron 2008, p. 432). Baron’s point is not that
the motives from which we act are often inscrutable, and we don’t know whether it is the nonmoral or the moral
incentive that we have incorporated into the maxim in a situation like this. It is that the only way for us to not act as
the inclination directs is by refraining from the action completely (Baron 2008, p. 432). It does not seem possible for
us to simply decide to act as the inclination directs, but not from the inclination but another one (Baron 2008, p. 432).
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of his power of choice, i.e. he would be morally good. He is, however, also dependent on the
incentives of his sensuous nature because of his equally innocent natural predisposition, and he
incorporates them too into his maxim (according to the subjective principle of self-love)” (6:36).
It follows from this that every maxim is identical with respect to their material (6:36). And because
the moral incentive and the nonmoral incentive have both been incorporated into every maxim,
they cannot form the basis for distinguishing between the maxims that are good and the maxims
that are evil.13
The moral bent of the maxim, whether it is good or evil, is determined by the way the moral
incentive and the nonmoral incentive are related to each other, that is, by the form of the maxim
and not the material of the maxim. Kant therefore writes: “Hence the difference, whether the
human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he
incorporates into his maxim (not in the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the
form of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other” (6:36). If it is the
nonmoral incentive that is subordinated to the moral incentive, then the maxim is considered
morally good. And if it is the moral incentive that is subordinated to the nonmoral incentive, then
the maxim is considered morally evil. Because the human being naturally incorporates both the
moral incentive and the nonmoral incentive, it follows that one of the incentives would necessarily

13

Note that the discussion of the Incorporation Thesis in 6:24 makes no mention of the human being naturally
incorporating both the moral incentive and the nonmoral incentive. There, the agreement or disagreement of the power
of choice with the moral law seems to depend on whether the moral incentive is incorporated into the maxim. Insofar
as the moral law is itself an incentive, dis agreement of the power of choice with the moral law requires “a positive
ground antagonistic to the good, = ˗a” (6:22n). Hence Kant writes: “Now, if the law fails nevertheless to determine
somebody’s free power of choice with respect to an action relating to it, an incentive opposed to it must have influence
on the power of choice of the human being in question; and since, by hypothesis, this can only happen because the
human being incorporates the incentive (and consequently also the deviation from the moral law) into his maxim (in
which case he is an evil human being), it follows that his disposition as regards the moral law is never indifferent
(never neither good nor bad)” (6:24). From this, it seems that either the moral incentive or the nonmoral incentive is
incorporated into the maxim in a spontaneous act of reason, and never both. And this is because Kant’s ethical rigorism
dictates that a maxim is either good or it is bad, and never partly good and partly bad (6:24).
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have to be subordinated to the other in the process of incorporation, otherwise the maxim would
have no moral bent: “… Since he naturally incorporates both into the same maxim, whereas he
would find each, taken alone, of itself sufficient to determine the will, so, if the difference between
maxims depended simply on the difference between incentives (the material of the maxims),
namely, on whether the law or the sense impulse provides the incentive, he would be morally good
and evil at the same time – and this is a contradiction” (6:36). That is, if the mere act of
incorporating the moral incentive into the maxim makes the maxim morally good, and the mere
act of incorporating the nonmoral incentive into the maxim makes the maxim morally evil, then
the fact that the human being naturally incorporates both the moral incentive and the nonmoral
incentive into the maxim would make the maxim morally good and morally evil at the same time.
And this, Kant argues, is a contradiction.
The point of the Incorporation Thesis is to restrict the effect incentives can have in
determining the power of choice to action.14 According to Allison, it does so in the following way:
First, it makes it clear that for Kant an inclination or desire does not of itself
constitute a reason for acting. It can become one only with reference to a rule or
principle of action, which dictates that we ought to pursue the satisfaction of that
inclination or desire. Moreover … the adoption of such a rule cannot itself be
regarded as the causal consequence of the desire or, more properly, of being in a
state of desire. On the contrary, it must be conceived as an act of spontaneity on the
part of the agent” (Allison 1990, p. 40).
For Kant, the incentive can be the cause of neither the maxim nor the action. It is not the cause of
the action (or does not determine the power of choice to action), because it is the maxim that

14

Note that Frierson disagrees with Allison on this point. Frierson argues that the incorporation thesis holds
only for the higher desires. With respect to the lower desires, however, he writes: “For Kant, contra Allison, human
beings can, sometimes, act purely from ins tinct or inclination, without incorporating such instincts or inclinations into
any principles of the understanding. Kant’s language to describe such “actions” fits the lack of true agency implied
by their failure to fit Allison’s account of incorporation. He refers to them as actions proceeding from “stimuli” or
“impulse”. Most actions, even those that are not guided by morality, are free in the sense that they are associated with
the higher faculty of desire, where one acts on principles or maxims, even if these maxims take the satisfaction of
inclination as their end. But one can also “act” directly from lower desires” (Frierson 2005, p. 16n).
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determines the power of choice to action. In order to be efficacious, the incentive first has to be
made into a rule or principle of action, that is, a maxim. And the incentive is not the cause of the
maxim either, because it has to be made into a rule or principle of action, and this construction is
a spontaneous act on the part of the rational agent. The rational agent incorporates both the moral
incentive and the nonmoral incentive into his maxim. During this process of constituting the
material of the maxim, it becomes necessary for him to determine its form: Either the moral
incentive or the nonmoral incentive must be subordinated to the other. The rational agent has to
either incorporate the nonmoral incentive as his condition for complying with the moral law
(subordinating the moral incentive) or incorporate the moral incentive as his condition for
complying with the law of self-love (subordinating the nonmoral incentive) (6:36). These acts are
spontaneous, and represent the absolute beginning of a state and the series of its consequences by
the Willkür. And because a maxim and the action that proceeds from it are morally good or bad
depending on the incentive that is incorporated (or subordinated) in the construction of the maxim,
the spontaneity that the rational agent exercises to decide which incentive to incorporate (or
subordinate) in the maxim is freedom in the sense relevant to the assignment of moral
responsibility and moral imputation.

Autonomy and Heteronomy
In the Groundwork, Kant describes the will as having the property of being heteronomous
or the property of being autonomous. The will has the property of being heteronomous in the
following circumstances: “If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the
fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law – consequently if, in going beyond itself,
it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects – heteronomy always results” (4:441). This
indicates that the will has the capacity to give itself the law, but it fails to exercise this capacity
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when it places itself in subservience to objects that determine it according to the laws of nature. In
so doing, the will gives up its independence from nature, and this is what makes the heteronomous
will unfree. As Beck puts it, “The will can “obey” laws of nature in the sense of intentionally using
them in the form of means-end statements, in seeking men’s goals in nature” (Beck 1960, p. 196).
This is contrasted with the autonomy of the will, which Kant describes so: “Autonomy of the will
is the property of the will which is a law to itself (independently of any of the objects of volitio n) ”
(4:440). When the will exercises its capacity to give itself the law, this is an exercise of the Wille,
which Kant uses to refer to the legislative aspect of the will in his later writings. This is described
by Beck in the following passage: “It gives a law to Willkür which it has freely legislated –
legislated by the necessity of its own nature. The faculty of lawgiving is will in the sense in which
pure practical reason is will, and its legislation is “freedom in the positive sense”, or autonomy”
(Beck 1960, p. 197).15 This act of self-legislation can be contrasted with heteronomy, where the
will allows itself to be legislated to by outside sources. In being “legislated by the necessity of its
own nature”, the will accepts no outside source for its laws, and this self-determination makes the
will autonomous, that is, free.
For an example of heteronomy, let us turn to Hume’s theory of moral motivation. Hume,
who had famously declared that reason is, and ought to be, only the slave of the passions, can be
considered a representative of the passions-based theory of moral motivation (Treatise 2.3.3.4).
For Hume, the power of choice can only be determined by our desires and inclinations, which he
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Note that there is disagreement in the literature on this point. Allison does not consider the freedom of the
Wille to be autonomy, as we can see in the following passage: “… It is Wille in the narrow sense that provides the
norm and Willkür that chooses in light of this norm. Similarly, this distinction allows us to speak of the will as giving
the law to, or even as being the law for, itself, since this is just a matter of Wille giving the law to, or being the law
for, Willkür. Strictly speaking, then, it is only Wille in the broad sense that can be characterized as a law to itself”
(Allison 1990, pp. 130-131). When Beck argues that Wille, as the legislative aspect of the will, has freedom in the
sense of autonomy, he has in mind what Allison would call “Wille in the narrow sense”. Allison, on the other hand,
uses “Wille in the broad sense” to denote the will, and this is subdivided into an executive aspect (Willkür) and a
legislative aspect (Wille in the narrow sense).
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labels the passions in the following passage: “Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion,
but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must
have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of
volition” (Treatise 2.3.3.4). Reason has no influence over our power of choice because Hume
considers the province of reason to be restricted to demonstration and probability (Treatise
2.3.3.2). But demonstration has to do with the relation of ideas, and therefore “its proper province
is the world of ideas, and as the will places us in that of realities, demonstration and volition seem,
upon that account, to be totally remov’d, from each other” (Treatise 2.3.3.2). In other words, the
abstract reasoning involved in mechanics and mathematics have no place in determining the power
of choice. Likewise, for Hume, probability has to do with the relation of cause and effect.
Therefore, probabilistic reasoning does nothing to determine our power of choice either. This is
because merely knowing that an object is related to another as cause to effect is not sufficient to
bring about action. It is only when these causal connections are further connected to the feelings
of pleasure and pain that we can be determined to action as a result. But absent this connection to
the feelings of pleasure and pain, we would be completely indifferent to the knowledge that a
particular object is related to another as cause to effect (Treatise 2.3.3.3).
Because Hume thinks the power of choice can only be determined by our passions, and not
by reason, it also follows that reason is powerless to prevent the determination of the will by the
passions. He argues this point by means of a simple denial of the consequent: “Nothing can oppose
or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises
from reason, that latter must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as
well as hinder any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence, 'tis impossible it can
withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or even keep the mind in suspence a moment”
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(Treatise 2.3.3.4). Insofar as the will can only be determined by an original influence, it follows
that passion has an original influence on the will that allows it to determine the will. Likewise, it
follows that reason would need to be an original influence in order to similarly determine the will.
But it is not. From Hume's earlier arguments, reason is restricted to demonstrating the relation
between ideas and relating objects to each other as cause to effect, neither of which provides reason
with any original influence on the will. Therefore, reason does not have any way to prevent the
determination of the will by the passions. The only way to prevent the determination of the will
by a passion is by counteracting its original influence with the original influence of another
passion. If the power of choice has been determined in a particular direction, the only way to
determine the power of choice otherwise is by means of a contrary passion that determines the
power of choice in the opposite direction. In a situation like this, where the power of choice is
being pulled in different directions by opposing passions, the direction in which the power of
choice ends up heading is a function of the passion with the stronger pull. It is for this reason that
the metaphor most often used to describe a passions-based theory of moral motivation like Hume's
tends to appeal to the sum of vector forces or of mechanical forces acting on the object.
There are strong parallels between this and Kant’s account of the lower faculty of desire.
According to Kant, the faculty of desire rests upon the following principle: I desire nothing but
what pleases, and avoid nothing but what displeases (29:894). 16 The desire for an object is always
connected to the pleasure we take in the object, and aversion for an object is always connected to

For a comprehensive account of the empirical side of Kant’s moral psychology, see Frierson’s “Kant’s
Empirical Account of Human Action” (2005). In particular, he notes that Kant’s concept of desire is not identical to
the concept of desire as it is used in Anglo-American philosophy: “Because desires simply are representations insofar
as those representations are directed towards action, Kant’s notion of desire is more closely connected to choice and
action than the customary English sense of desire, whereby one can desire something without actually pursuing it.
Once one has a desire in this general sense, one is committed to action, and action follows necessarily in the absence
of unforeseen hindrances. One might, for example, desire a mango and then find oneself unable to climb the tree, but
one’s representation will not count as a desire unless it prompts one to action. In contrast to customary English usage,
Kantian desires mark an end to deliberation, not factors taken into account in deliberation” (Frierson 2005, p. 10).
16
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the displeasure we take in the object.17 The desires themselves are divided by reference to their
origins in cognition. The ones Kant calls the lower desires have their source in sensibility, whereas
the ones Kant calls the higher desires have their source in the understanding, either in whole or in
part. The passage where Kant provides a detailed explanation of these distinctions is in the
Metaphysik L2 :
The intellectual impelling cause <causa impulsiva intellectualis> is either purely
intellectual without qualification <simpliciter talis, mere intellectualis>, or in some
respect <secundum quid>. When the impelling cause <causa impulsiva> is
represented by the pure understanding, it is purely intellectual <mere
intellectualis>, but if it rests on sensibility, and if merely the means for arriving at
the end are represented by the understanding, then it is said to be in some respect
<secundum quid> (28:589).
From this passage, we can ascertain that there are three types of desires for Kant. Lower desires
have their source entirely in sensibility, and the understanding plays no part in the formation of
these desires. The lower desires are moved by the stimuli of the senses, and a power of choice that
is moved in this way is the brute power of choice (arbitrium brutum). The higher desires can be
divided into those that are purely intellectual and those that are mixed, that is, desires that are
partly intellectual and partly sensible. Higher desires that are purely intellectual have their source
entirely in the understanding, and sensibility plays no part in the formation of these higher desires.
As such, the ends that are set by a higher desire that is purely intellectual have to be objective ends.
But higher desires that are merely “intellectual in some respect” have their source in both
sensibility and the understanding. The ends that are desired are provided by sensibility, like in the

17

Note that the converse is not true. According to Kant, it is possible to have a feeling without having the
corresponding desire: “… There can be a pleasure that is not connected with any desire for an object but is already
connected with a mere representation that one forms of an object (regardless of whether the object of the representation
exists or not)” (6:211). The exception that Kant is making here has to do with the case of aesthetic pleasure. The
pleasure we take in a beautiful sculpture is unrelated to our desire for the sculpture, that is, our desire to possess the
sculpture. And it would indeed be possible to take pleasu re in the beauty of the same sculpture if it only existed in our
imagination (5:204-205).
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lower desires.18 And because the ends that are desired are produced by sensibility, these ends are
subjective ends, and hold only for the subject. But understanding plays a role in determining the
means to achieving these ends. The fact that the understanding plays a role in the formation of
these desires leads Kant to classify them as higher desires, rather than lower desires. And this
makes Kant’s account of higher desires that are partly intellectual and partly sensible reminisce nt
of Hume’s declaration that reason is the slave to the passions: “Reason is, and ought only to be the
salve of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”
(Treatise 2.3.3.4).
Reason is subservient to the passions when the ends of an action are determined by passion,
and reason prescribes the means by which these ends may be achieved. Because the ends of an
action are determined by passion, it may be characterized in terms of receptivity: “Pleasure arising
from the representation of the existence of a thing, insofar as it is to be a determining ground of
desire for this thing, is based on the receptivity of the subject, since it depends upon the existence
of an object…” (5:22). Insofar as the passions depend on the receptivity of the subject, there must
be an external object to inflame the passions. Absent an object to be passionate about, there would
be no occasion for reason to prescribe anything to the subject. In addition, the presence of an

Mariña notes that a shift occurs in Kant’s attitude towards these material practical principles. These are
principles that are “constructed in order to achieve given desired ends; as such their content depends upon those ends.
Their adoption thus hinges upon the existence of contingent desires making up what Kant dubs “the lower faculty of
desires” (Mariña 2001, p. 184). Now Kant had, in the Groundwork , declared actions having their origins in the
inclinations to be without moral worth (4:398). By the Second Critique, Kant had moved beyond this position, stating:
“All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general
principle of self-love or one’s own happiness” (5:22). This means that the actions of the sympathetically -attuned soul
from the Groundwork are not only without moral worth, but also done out of self-love or his own happiness. Mariña
explains the basis for making this stronger claim in the following way: “… The issue rather lies in that in acting in
such a way one makes one’s causal history the basis of the ultimate criterion determining one’s choices. In doing so
one makes the self and its specific particularities the locus of the determination of what is of value. To act on the
principle of satisfying those desires one simply happens to have is to act on the principle of self-love because to do so
is to validate the choices of the self qua particular individual. Attitudes toward the other stemming from these desires
alone, however other-directed they may seem (as in the case of the friend of man), cannot genuinely be directed toward
the other qua other, that is, as an individual having a claim o n our regard toward him or her irrespective of our likes
and dislikes” (Mariña 2001, p. 188).
18
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external object would inflame no passions if the subject itself were not receptive towards it. Absent
the proper internal dispositions in the subject, the subject would be incapable of being passionate
about the object, and there would again be no occasion for reason to prescribe anything to the
subject. These factors combined entail that the principles prescribed by a reason subservient to the
passions would have to be empirical principles: “Empirical principles are not at all fit to be the
ground of moral laws. For, the universality with which these are to hold for all rational beings
without distinction – the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed upon them –
comes to nothing if their ground is taken from the special constitution of human nature or the
contingent circumstances in which it is placed” (4:442). This means that, for Hume, only
hypothetical imperatives are possible.
For Hume, reason is always subservient to the passions. These passions can be divided into
two kinds. There are the calm passions, of which Hume writes: “Now ‘tis certain, there are certain
calm desires and tendencies, which, tho’ they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind,
and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation” (Treatise 2.3.4.8).
And these calm passions are pitted against the violent passions: “Besides these calm passions,
which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have
likewise a great influence on the faculty. When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a
violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all
considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself” (Treatise 2.3.4.9). Both these passions can be
said to seek their law in a property of their object. This is because what moves the Humean will is
the prospect of pain and pleasure, and “when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any
object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or embrace
what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction” (Treatise 2.3.3.3). But consider the Humean will
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in relation to the definition of heteronomy that Kant gives in the Groundwork: “If the will seeks
the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of
universal law – consequently if, in going beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its
objects – heteronomy always results” (4:441). Insofar as passion is the only influence capable of
determining the Humean will in any way whatsoever, it follows that heteronomy is the only
possible basis of the Humean will.
Because there is no such thing as an autonomous will for Hume, he does not consider
freedom in terms of autonomy, but in terms of spontaneity and indifference: “Few are capable of
distinguishing betwixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is call’d in the schools, and the liberty of
indifference, betwixt that which is oppos’d to violence, and that which means a negation of
necessity and causes” (Treatise 2.3.2.1). For Hume, freedom means either liberty of spontaneity
or liberty of indifference. Liberty of spontaneity has to do with the power we have to act or not act
according to the determinations of our will. Therefore, an act is spontaneous (and therefore free)
if it originates from internal causes rather than from an external compulsion. For Hume, the
freedom that is necessary for the purposes of moral responsibility and moral imputation is liberty
of spontaneity, as he makes clear in the following passage: “Actions are by their very nature
temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and
disposition of the person, who perform’d them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither
redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil” (Treatise 2.3.2.6). By contrast, liberty of
indifference is defined as the power to act independently of the laws of nature – that our actions
are not necessitated or caused by the laws of nature. But besides the laws of nature, Hume thinks
there is no other law that is capable of determining our actions. Hence he denies liberty of
indifference in the following passage: “According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential
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part of causation; and consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the
very same thing with chance” (Treatise 2.3.1.18).
The resemblance of this line of reasoning to Kant’s in the Groundwork is worth noting.
Remember that Kant writes in the Groundwork: “Since the concept of causality brings with it that
of laws in accordance with which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an
effect, must be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with
natural laws, is not in accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free
will would be an absurdity” (4:446). Hume and Kant share a similar starting-point on this matter.
They both agree that there is a conception of freedom that can be understood as the power to act
independently of the law of nature. In addition, their shared conception of the will as a causality
entails that there must be a law that determines the exercise of its causal power. But the two
philosophers part ways past this point. For Hume, there is no law capable of determining the will
other than the law of nature. Therefore, a will that has the power to act independently of the law
of nature would be lawless, and to call such a will a free will would be an absurdity. Kant, by
contrast, believes that a will that is not determined by the law of nature would still be determined
by “immutable laws but of a special kind”, that is, the moral law. Therefore, a will that has the
power to act independently of the law of nature would not be lawless – it would be a will that acts
in accordance with the moral law. Such a will would possess freedom in the sense of indiffere nce,
which would be a characterization of its freedom in only the negative sense. For a will whose
causality is determined by the moral law would also be free in the positive sense, in the sense
which Kant calls autonomy.19

Neither Hume’s liberty of spontaneity nor his liberty of indifference can be considered autonomy. Hence, the
Humean will, for whom it is impossible to prescribe pure principles in the form of the categorical imperative, is
incapable of self-determination in the full sense needed for autonomy. For Hume, self-determination is compatible
with being causally determined to act according to laws that govern our inner representations, and this is precisely the
19
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The Reciprocity Thesis
We have seen earlier that there are interpreters that take the Reciprocity Thesis as
establishing for Kant the conclusion that a free will is a moral will. They argue that a free will has
to at least have freedom in the negative sense. 20 It is a will that is free from the influence of alien
causes. The Reciprocity Thesis then uses this negative freedom to prove the independence of the
will from the law of nature, which leaves only the moral law to determine it. But this negative
freedom is also proof that the will has the power to do otherwise, and this being the case, it is a
will that can be assigned moral responsibility. Sidgwick points out the bearing negative freedom
has on moral responsibility when he discusses the “metaphysical doctrine of a double kind of
causation in human actions” in the following passage: “According to Kant, every such action,
regarded as a phenomenon determined in time, must be thought as a necessary result of
determining causes in antecedent time – otherwise its existence would be inconceivable – but it
may also be regarded in relation to the agent considered as a thing-in- itself, as the “noumenon” of
which the agent so considered in relation to his phenomena” (Sidgwick 1888, p. 409). The import
of this doctrine is that the law of nature is applicable only to the phenomenal agent, but the agent,

manner of self-determination that Kant condemns as the freedom of a turnspit: “Here one looks only to the necessity
of the connection of events in a time series as it develops in accordance with natural law, whethe r the subject in which
this development takes place is called automaton materiale, when the machinery is driven by matter, or Leibniz
spirituale, when it is driven by representations; and if the freedom of our will were none other than the latter (say,
psychological and comparative but not also transcendental, i.e. absolute), then it would at bottom be nothing better
than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself” (5:97).
Therefore, freedom of spontaneity means something different for Hume than it does for Kant. For Kant, freedom of
spontaneity would be freedom in the transcendental sense. Hume, on the other hand, would consider freedom of
spontaneity to be freedom in the psychological or comparativ e sense instead.
20
For Kant, negative freedom is “that property of such causality that it can be efficient of alien causes
determining it” (4:446). Allison has noted that there is a stronger sense and a weaker sense to negative freedom. In its
stronger sense, negative freedom is “independence of determination by desire or inclination überhaupt” (Allison 1990,
p. 65). This may be contrasted to a weaker sense of negative freedom, which “involves independence of determination
by any particular desire or inclination” (Allison 1990, p. 65). Allison’s point is that the practical freedom for the
purposes of moral responsibility and moral imputation only presupposes this weaker sense of negative freedom:
“Consequently, even without this [stronger] independence, practical freedom would involve a genuine, albeit limited ,
spontaneity and, therefore, a capacity to act on the basis of imperatives, alth ough the incentives for obeying these
imperatives would ultimately be traceable to our sensuous nature” (Allison 1990, p. 65).
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considered as a thing-in- itself, is independent from these laws. That is, the agent, considered as a
thing- in-itself, is free from the influence of alien causes. This is freedom in the negative sense. It
turns out, therefore, that negative freedom is at once necessary for both the identification of the
free will with the moral will and also for the assignment of moral responsibility and moral
imputation to the agent. And because a will to which we can assign moral responsibility and moral
freedom is free whether or not it disobeys the moral law, a free will such as this cannot be identica l
with the moral will. Thus, it seems that Beck is right: either there is no moral evil, all evil being
natural and therefore not imputable to human responsibility, or goodness of will is not equivale nt
to moral freedom (Beck 1960, p. 203).
But there is a way out from this unhappy conclusion, and that is by showing that the
Reciprocity Thesis has to do with freedom as autonomy, that is, it asserts that autonomy and
morality are reciprocal concepts. In examining Problem I, we see that Kant intends to show that
the moral will has to be a free will: Supposing that the mere lawgiving form of maxims is the only
sufficient determining ground of a will – to find the constitution of a will that is determinable by
it alone (5:28). From our discussion of the categorical imperative earlier, we know that “the mere
lawgiving form of the maxims” refers to the characteristics of universality and necessity that make
a maxim lawlike when they are present in a maxim. And the categorical imperative bids us to act
only on those maxims that have these characteristics, and to refrain from acting on maxims in
which these characteristics are absent. Now a will that obeys the categorical imperative is a will in
which the mere lawgiving form of maxims is a sufficient determining ground of a will, but this is
not what Kant is interested in here – he wants to discover the constitution of a will for whom the
mere lawgiving form of maxims is its only sufficient determining ground. As Hudson observes,
both the matter and the form of the maxim can serve as the sufficient determining ground of the
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will. But this would be a will that obeys both hypothetical imperatives (when the matter of the
maxim is the sufficient determining ground of the will) and categorical imperatives (when the form
of the maxim is the sufficient determining ground of the will). 21 If the mere lawgiving form of the
maxim is the only sufficient determining ground of the will, then this excludes the matter of the
maxim as a possible determining ground of the will, and this would be a will that only obeys the
categorical imperative (Hudson 1991, pp. 192-193).
Having shown what it means for the mere lawgiving form of maxims to be the only
sufficient determining ground of a will, Kant goes on to argue that such a will has to have a
particular constitution, namely that of a free will: “But if no determining ground of the will other
than the universal lawgiving form can serve as a law for it, such a will must be thought as altogether
independent of the natural law of appearances in their relations to one another, namely the law of
causality” (5:29). By definition, a will that can be determined by the law of causality would not be
a will for whom the only sufficient determining ground is the moral law. The contrast that Kant
sets up is between a will that is determined by the law of causality and a will that is determined by
the moral law. For a will that is determined by the law of causality has goals that are given to him
by nature, because it seeks the law that is to determine it in its objects, rather than in the fitness of
its maxims for its own giving of universal law. And that means a will that is determined by the law
of causality is heteronomous. But a will that is determined by the moral law obeys a law that is

Hudson puts it slightly differently: “Wille as [negatively free] can give an empirical practical law which can
determine Willkür, but it is not sufficient to do so by itself; rather an antecedent desire is required as an additional
necessary condition for this determination (Hudson 1991, p. 193). For Hudson, a Wille that is free is the lawgiver of
both empirical practical laws and pure practical laws. In this, he follows Meerbote in subdividing the Wille into
empirical practical reason and pure practical reason (Hudson 1991, p. 185 – see also Meerbote 1983, pp. 69-84).
Therefore, he understands the freedom of Wille in the negative sense as “the freedom of the Wille to give empirical
practical laws – also called heteronomy of the will” (Hudson 1991, p. 191). And freedom of the Wille in the positive
sense is understood as “freedom of the Wille to give the moral law – also called autonomy of the will” (Hudson 1991,
p. 191). Therefore, he reads Kant in Problem I as stating: If we assume freedom of the Wille in the positive sense
(autonomy) and not freedom of the Wille in the negative sense (heteronomy), then the will also has freedom of the
Willkür in the negative sense, that is, freedom in the transcendental sense (Hudson 1991, p. 194).
21
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legislated by the necessity of its own (rational) nature. It seeks the law within itself, and not in an
outside object. Therefore, a will that is determined by the moral law is autonomous. Problem I of
the Reciprocity Thesis must therefore be interpreted as: A will for which the mere lawgiving form
of a maxim can alone serve as a law is an autonomous will.
Turning to Problem II, Kant intends to demonstrate here that a free will has to be a moral
will: Supposing that a will is free: to find the law that alone is competent to determine it necessarily
(5:29). Freedom is defined in terms of an independence from empirical conditions in the following
passage: “Since the matter of a practical law, that is, an object of maxim, can never be given
otherwise than empirically whereas a free will, as independent of empirical conditions (i.e.,
conditions belonging to the sensible world), must never be determinable, a free will must find a
determining ground in the law but independently of the matter of the law” (5:29). This definitio n
of freedom is negative, because the assignment of moral responsibility and moral imputation is
also made on the basis of the will’s independence from empirical conditions. But this would mean
that negative freedom of the will is (1) the sufficient condition for assigning moral responsibility
and moral imputation to its actions, and (2) the sufficient condition for being a moral will (i.e. a
will that finds its determining ground in the mere lawgiving form of the law). The dilemma that
Beck describes arises at this point, once we notice that a will that is free for the purposes of moral
imputation need not be a moral will (i.e. it only needs to be a will that can either act morally or act
immorally). But a will that finds its determining ground in the mere lawgiving form of the law has
to be a moral will (i.e. it would be a will that cannot act immorally). The way out of this dilemma,
however, is to realize that negative freedom is applicable to both the freedom of the Wille and the
freedom of the Willkür. The Wille needs to be free in the negative sense in order to “find a
determining ground in the law but independent of the matter of the law” (5:29). And the Willkür
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needs to be free in the negative sense in order for the assignment of moral responsibility and moral
imputation to take place.
And why does the Wille need to be free in the negative sense in order to “find a determining
ground in the law but independently of the matter of the law”? Kant’s argument in Problem II
relies on his earlier distinction between the matter and the form of the law. He defined the matter
of the law in the following terms: “The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This
is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. If it is the determining ground of the will,
then the rule of the will is subject to an empirical condition (to the relation of the determining
representation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure), and so is not a practical law” (5:27). But
if the will is a will that is independent of empirical conditions, then the rule of the will is not subject
to an empirical condition (not subject to the relation of the determining representation to the feeling
of pleasure and displeasure), and so the determining ground of the will is not the matter of the
practical principle (or law). But besides the matter of the practical principle, there is only the form
of the practical principle: “Now, all that remains of a law if one separates from it everything
material, that is, every object of the will (as its determining ground), is the mere form of giving
universal law” (5:27). It is the legislative aspect of the will (the Wille) that is responsible for the
giving of the moral law. For this, freedom of the negative sense is necessary but not sufficie nt,
because the act of lawgiving by the Wille is an exercise of self-determination, and this is freedom
in the positive sense (or autonomy). Hence: “… The sole principle of morality consists in
independence from all matter of the law (namely, from a desired object) and at the same time in
the determination of choice through the mere form of giving universal law that a maxim must be
capable of. That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, whereas this lawgiving
of its own on the part of pure and, as such, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense” (5:33).
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Autonomy is this freedom in the positive sense that entails a will determined by the moral law.
Problem II of the Reciprocity Thesis must therefore be interpreted as: Supposing that the will is
autonomous, the lawgiving form, insofar as this is contained in the maxim, is therefore the only
thing that can constitute a determining ground for such a will.
Thus, the solution to the problem of imputation can be found in Kant’s distinction between
the Wille and the Willkür: “We have distinguished two meanings of will: Wille as practical reason,
the legislative function, and Willkür, as the executive faculty of man” (Beck 1960, p. 202). This is
because the concept of a free will in Kant can be ambiguous. It can mean a free Wille, that is, the
freedom of practical reason. But it can also mean a free Willkür, that is, the free executive functio n
of man. And the freedom that Kant ascribes to a free Wille is not the same as the freedom that Kant
ascribes to a free Willkür, as Beck notes: “The freedom of the former [Wille] is autonomy; it gives
a law to Willkür. This law is determined by the nature of the Wille and not by anything else in the
world, including human nature or the will of God” (Beck 1960, p. 202). This can be contrasted to
the freedom of the Willkür: “The freedom of the latter [Willkür] is spontaneity, the faculty of
initiating a causal series in nature” (Beck 1960, p. 203). The problem of imputation arises due to
the misleading way in which freedom is talked about in some of Kant’s earlier writings. Freedom
of the will is treated as a singular thing, and this obscures the distinction between having a free
Wille and having a free Willkür, and thereby leads to the unhappy conclusion that we are morally
responsible for our moral actions, but not for our immoral actions. But the problem goes away if
the expression “freedom” could somehow be taken in two different senses, as either freedom of
the Wille or freedom of the Willkür. Then we can see that Kant’s insistence that only moral actions
can be considered free is to be understood as a statement about autonomous actions, which does
not imply that we are only morally responsible for our moral actions, and not for our immoral ones.
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The reason being that moral responsibility for an action is imputed to us because they are free in
the sense of spontaneity.22

Conclusion
This chapter deals with freedom and its relation to moral evil. In particular, it was
concerned with two types of Kantian freedom – the spontaneity of the free Willkür and the
autonomy of the free Wille. The spontaneity of the free Willkür relates to moral evil in the
following way: the incorporation thesis states that an incentive has to be incorporated into a maxim
in order to determine the power of choice to action. This act of incorporation is spontaneous, and
so the Willkür freely determines the way in which the moral incentive and the nonmoral incentive
are related to each other in the maxim. Insofar as the moral bent of the maxim is determined by
whether we had subordinated the moral incentive or the nonmoral one, it follows that this decision
was free in the sense necessary for moral responsibility. The autonomy of the free Wille relates to
moral evil in the following way: it does not. Autonomy is the “property of the will by which it is
a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (4:440). The law that is
legislated by such a will is always the moral law, and the maxims of a will under the moral law
will always be morally good. Heteronomy is what happens “if the will seeks the law that is to

22

This is an imprecise formulation of the freedom of spontaneity. Kant does not co nsider freedom to consist in
the power to do otherwise per se, as evidenced by the following passage: “But freedom of choice cannot be defined –
as some have tried to define it – as the ability to make a choice for or against the law (libertas indifferentiae), even
though choice as a phenomenon provides frequent examples of this in experience. For we know freedom (as it first
becomes manifest to us through the moral law) only as a negative property in us, namely that of not being necessitated
to act through any sensible determining grounds” (6:226). It might be said that this negative property of not being
necessitated to act through any sensible determining grounds entails the positive property of being able to act for or
against the law, but this entailment would only hold for phenomena. For Kant considers God to have the negative
property of not being necessitated to act through any sensible determining grounds, but not the positive property of
being able to act for or against the law, because God cannot act on the basis of any sensible determining grounds
whatsoever. Hence Wood explains freedom of spontaneity in Kant in the following way: “For Kant, freedom consists
in the ability to act autonomously even when we do not, but it does not consist in the poss ibility of acting
heteronomously, even if this possibility always does exist for us” (Wood 1984, pp. 80-81).
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determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its own maxims for its own giving of universa l
law” (4:441). A will that seeks the law that is to determine it in its objects would be heteronomous,
and only the maxims of such a will can be morally evil. From this, it follows that moral evil is free
in the sense of spontaneity, but it is not free in the sense of autonomy. And this allows Kant to
escape the problem of imputation, because the rational agent who does a moral evil is free in the
sense needed for moral responsibility and moral imputation, despite not being perfectly rational
(insofar as a being that is perfectly guided by reason is, according to Kant, incapable of moral
evil). Now radical evil is also a moral evil, even though Kant describes it as the formal ground of
every deed contrary to law that is given in time (6:31). Therefore, if radical evil is to be ascribed
to us as a moral evil (rather than a physical evil), then it is necessary that we are free in the sense
needed for moral responsibility and moral imputation – we would need to have freedom of the
Willkür in the form of spontaneity. And if radical evil is to be ascribed to us as a moral evil, then
it is necessary that we are unfree in the sense needed to be a heteronomous will, because the will
that chooses radical evil is unfree in that it “does not give itself the law; instead the object, by
means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it” (4:441).
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CHAPTER 2. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF RADICAL EVIL

The tears began to flow and sobs shook him. He gave himself up to them now for
the first time on the island; great, shuddering spasms of grief that seemed to wrench
his whole body. His voice rose under the black smoke before the burning wreckage
of the island; and infected by that emotion, the other little boys began to shake and
sob too. And in the middle of them, with filthy body, matted hair, and unwiped
nose, Ralph wept for the end of innocence, the darkness of man’s heart…
William Golding, Lord of the Flies.
Introduction
What is radical evil? This is the most basic question we can ask on the matter. But the
answer is not that straightforward. There are places in the Religion where Kant describes radical
evil in terms of a propensity: “By propensity (propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the
possibility of an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is
contingent for humanity in general” (6:29). And there are other places in the Religion where he
describes it in terms of a fundamental maxim: “The disposition, i.e. the first subjective ground of
the adoption of maxims, can only be a single one, and it applies to the entire use of freedom
universally. This disposition too, however, must be adopted through the free power of choice, for
otherwise it could not be imputed” (6:25). It is not the least bit clear whether the conception of
radical evil as a propensity is supposed to be identical to or distinct from the conception of radical
evil as a fundamental maxim. There are authors who follow the language of the Religion and
identify the two: “Construed in dispositional terms as a deliberative tendency to rank in a certain
way the basic incentives of morality and self-love in their incorporation into first-order maxims,
the meta-maxim may be viewed as a propensity. Since evil has already been located in the
subordination within a maxim of moral requirements to those of self-love, it follows that by a
propensity to evil must be understood the meta-maxim to order the incentives in just this way in
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the adoption of an agent’s first order maxims” (Allison 2002, p. 340). But there are others who
argue that the two are distinct, because the fundamental maxim belongs to the noumenal world
and the propensity belongs to the phenomenal world: “Gesinnung is a constant, an atemporal
orientation providing us with the fundamental model for the regulation of our particular temporal
choices. So even were we to take Hang to be a technical term badly translated by the English word
‘propensity’, there still seems to be no conceptual sphere for any distinction between having such
a Hang, however we might conceive it, and simply being evil, if having it is taken to be equivale nt
to possession of an evil disposition” (Morgan 2005, p. 97).
This essay comes down on the side of those who consider this conception of radical evil as
a propensity and the conception of radical evil as a fundamental maxim to be distinct. For if we
compare the basis for positing radical evil as a propensity, we will find them to be very differe nt
from the basis for positing radical evil as a fundamental maxim. The basis for positing radical evil
as a fundamental maxim lies in the nature of maxims. By their nature, maxims are able to be
arranged hierarchically, and the maxim that is positioned at the apex of the hierarchy is the
fundamental maxim. If radical evil is to be the first subjective ground of the adoption of maxims,
it would have to be an evil fundamental maxim. By contrast, the basis for positing radical evil as
a propensity lies in the nature of a disposition. It is needed to explain the existence of moral evil
in the world, because moral evil is a possibility of every human being, and a propensity to evil is
needed to ground this possibility for moral evil in every human being. But the distinction between
the conception of radical evil as a propensity and the conception of radical evil as a fundame nta l
maxim is most evident when it comes to the discussion of the gradations of evil and their grounding
in the evil of human nature. Insofar as the two conceptions of radical evil have not been distinctly
separated by Kant in his writing, the role it is supposed to play is the grounding of frailty and
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depravity is ambiguous. For frailty has as its ground a subjective ground for the possibility of an
inclination. The relevant concept of radical evil with respect to frailty is the conception of radical
evil as a propensity. By contrast, depravity has as its ground the first subjective ground of the
adoption of maxims. The evil of depravity consists not in an inclination but a maxim. The relevant
concept of radical evil with respect to depravity is the conception of radical evil as a fundame nta l
maxim. Insofar as the distinction between frailty and depravity collapses if the distinction between
the conception of radical evil as a propensity and the conception of radical evil as a fundame nta l
maxim is not maintained, we must be careful to keep the two conceptions of radical evil separate.

Radical Evil as Fundamental Maxim
Radical evil has to be free – but is the freedom that Kant assigns to radical evil the freedom
of the Wille or the freedom of the Willkür? From our earlier deliberations, it seems that radical evil
cannot be free in the sense of a free Wille. The Wille is the legislative aspect of the will. 23 In this
capacity, it prescribes practical principles according to which the human being chooses to act.
These practical principles can either be pure, or they can be empirical. For Kant, a Wille that
prescribes pure practical principles would be a law unto itself. Insofar as it is a law unto itself, it
would be a self-determining Wille, and this Wille would therefore be free in the sense of autonomy.
By contrast, a Wille that turns to outside sources would prescribe practical principles that are
empirical. This would not be a self-determining Wille, and it would therefore be unfree in the sense

In his discussion, Allison explains the legislative function of the Wille in the following way: “… To begin
with, all of the formulations agree in equating Wille, or will in its legislative function, with practical reason. Considered
as such, Wille is the source of laws that confront the human Willkür as imperatives. Although Kant is silent on the
point, it seems clear that this must include both the categorical and hypothetical imperatives or, more generally, moral
and prudential principles. Both are higher-order rules for governing our selection of maxims and both are products of
practical reason. Both, therefore, must be attributed to Wille. Correlatively, it is Willkür, or will in its executive
function, that can be said to act, that is, to decide, choose, and even wish under the governance of Wille” (Allison
1990, p. 130).
23
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that Kant calls heteronomy. Now radical evil cannot be represented by a pure practical princip le,
otherwise we would have to say that radical evil is not evil, which would be absurd. But an
empirical practical principle is always conditioned upon something else, and this implies that the
Wille must turn to outside sources in its construction of the practical principle. Therefore, the
freedom ascribed to radical evil cannot be freedom in the sense of autonomy. This leaves freedom
in the sense of a free Willkür. The Willkür is the executive aspect of the will. In this capacity, it
chooses between the practical principles that the Wille prescribes to it. Freedom in the sense of the
Willkür is therefore pertinent to the ascription of moral responsibility, because it is the Willkür that
chooses and is responsible for the practical principles that we adopt. Now radical evil is considered
free for the purposes of moral responsibility: “… But otherwise the use or abuse of the human
being’s power of choice with respect to the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the
good or evil in him be called “moral”)” (6:21). And this shows that the freedom ascribed to radical
evil has to do with the freedom of the Willkür.
Because radical evil is freely chosen by the Willkür, it follows that radical evil has to take
the form of a maxim. This is because the Willkür makes its choices by subordinating either the
moral incentive or the nonmoral incentive that is present in the maxim. And it is therefore up to us
whether to subordinate the moral incentive or the nonmoral incentive in our maxim. Because this
is a choice that we have to make in order for any action to be possible, it is reasonable to ask for
the grounds upon which this selection was made. 24 Kant believes that there are only two candidates

In the Preface, Kant explains this in the following manner: “Yet it is one of the inescapable limitations of
human beings and of their practical faculty of reason (perhaps of that faculty in all other worldly beings as well) to be
concerned in every action with its result, seeking something in it that might serve them as an e nd and even prove the
purity of their intention – which result would indeed come last in practice (nexu effectivo) but first in representation
and intention (nexu finali)” (6:7n). Kant’s point in this passage is that, unless we represent to ourselves the end of the
action, the action itself cannot be represented, insofar as the action is the means by which we accomplish this end.
And once we have represented to ourselves an end towards which our actions may be directed, the existence of this
representation and intention provides us with an incentive to action.
24
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available: either the selection was made on the basis of a maxim or it was made on the basis of a
natural impulse. If the selection of the maxim was made on the basis of a natural impulse, then it
could not have been free. But if the selection of the maxim was made on the basis of another
maxim, then this selection would involve a choice between the moral incentive and the nonmoral
incentive. This would in turn allow us to ask once again for the grounds upon which the selection
was made. If that selection was made on the basis of a natural impulse, however, then the entire
series of grounds subsequent to it would have been the result of the determination of natural causes,
in which case the evil deed would not be imputable to us because it would not have been free. In
the series of grounds leading up to an imputable act, none of these grounds can turn out to be a
natural impulse. For otherwise, we would have a deed that is performed from a sensory
inducement, which is a contradiction (6:31). Insofar as radical evil must be a part of this series of
grounds, and indeed the origin of this series, if it should turn out that radical evil was not chosen
through a fundamental maxim, then not one member of this entire series could possibly be the
product of the absolute spontaneity of the power of choice. This would mean, whatever the deed
that results, it would not be a deed that can be imputable to us. Thus, whichever the incentive we
choose to subordinate in the maxim, this choice must be made on the basis of a practical princip le,
not on the basis of natural impulses. And this means that the Willkür freely chooses the ordering
of the moral incentives and the nonmoral ones in the maxim.
This idea that there is an entire series of grounds for our free actions is prominent in
Allison’s discussion of maxims. For Allison, maxims are arranged in a hierarchical order: “… One
might think of maxims, in analogy with concepts (considered intensionally), as arranged
hierarchically, with the more general embedded in the more specific, like genera in species”
(Allison 1990, p. 93). We can see why this is so, given a proper understanding of what maxims are
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for Kant. The maxim is defined in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals as the subjective
principle of acting (4:421n). It contains the incentives that move the subject to action, be they
moral incentives or nonmoral ones, and once the subject has incorporated them into his maxim,
the maxim becomes a universal rule for the subject, according to which the subject wills to conduct
himself (6:24). These incentives are the grounds that the subject is motivated to act on. If these
incentives were not present, it would be impossible for any reference to an end to be made (and in
the absence of all reference to an end no determination of the will can take place in human beings
at all) (6:4). And once we see that maxims are principles that contain the grounds for an action in
them, it becomes easier to understand how our maxims are supposed to relate to each other. For
the grounds that we have for acting can have different degrees of generality, as Allison writes: “…
As rules dictating action types rather than particular actions, maxims, like concepts, are general
with respect to the number of possible items that fall under them. Accordingly, there are always
(in principle at least) a number of distinct ways in which an agent can act upon a maxim, just as
there are a number of different ways in which one can attempt to realize an end that one has chosen
for oneself” (Allison 1990, p. 90). Therefore, the hierarchy of maxims is formed based on the
grounds that are contained in them. The more general the ground contained in a maxim, the higher
its place in the hierarchy, and the more maxims (with less general grounds) that fall under it.
Let us put this discussion in more concrete terms. For example, consider a student who is
reading a book in order to prepare for a test the next day. The desire to do well in that test motivates
him to read the book, and it constitutes the material for a maxim which he makes into a universa l
rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself. But the student might also be
reading the book in preparation for a future career as a lawyer. And the desire for fame and fortune
also motivates him to read the book, and it constitutes the material for a maxim which he makes
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into a universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself. There is no reason
why both these grounds cannot be operative on the student at the same time. Each of these grounds
motivate the student to read the book. Their difference consists mainly in this: The desire to do
well in the test motivates the student to read the book, and little else. By contrast, the desire for
fame and fortune motivates the student to read the book, but it also motivates him to a great many
other things besides. In other words, the student's desire for fame and fortune explains his desire
to do well in the test. This is what Caswell had in mind when he observed that maxims can be
general to different degrees:
Note that maxims always express a certain level of generality. For while non-free,
irrational beings such as animals might determine their behavior according to
particular representations, rational agency is a power of determining desire through
concepts, or general discursive representations. This means that the same maxim
can govern a number of actions that take place in different times and places, but it
also means that maxims, like concepts, can be fit under another maxim's broader
'extension'. Thus, an agent's maxims form a hierarchy, with more particular
principles fitting under the more general. Indeed, it must be the case that each
maxim has its place within a hierarchical system of maxims, for its location in that
season provides the rational constraints which constitute the formal conditions of
willing the maxim (Caswell 2006, p. 193).
The fact that an agent's motives fit together in this way gives us the reason as to why there
needs to be a highest place, or fundamental maxim, and the reason is this: What it means for the
adoption of a maxim to be grounded in a higher maxim is, most straightforwardly, that the maxim
derives its practical justification from the higher maxim. This reason is taken from a parallel case
in the field of epistemology. For beliefs, too, form a similar hierarchy, in which beliefs are held on
the basis of their grounding in other beliefs. Here we might say: What it means for a belief to be
grounded in another belief is, most straightforwardly, that the belief is inferentially justified by the
other belief.

From this, we are able to construct the regress argument for epistemic

foundationalism, which Aristotle first proposed in the Posterior Analytics (PA 72b5-35). For if we
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hold on to a belief A because it is inferentially justified by the belief B, then the belief B had better
be a belief we hold, and are justified in believing. After all, if we are not justified in believing B,
then it seems impossible for the belief A to be inferentially justified by the belief B. But how would
we be justified in believing B? If we say that we believe B because it is inferentially justified by
the belief C, then an infinite regress is in the making, because we will soon be forced to posit a
belief D to inferentially justify the belief C, and so on and so forth. In order to avoid an infinite
regress, Aristotle believed that we would need to accept epistemic foundationalism.25 That is,
Aristotle believed that there needed to be beliefs that are basic – beliefs that are able to justify
other beliefs and are not themselves justified by other beliefs.
Returning to the discussion at hand, we may say that when a lower maxim derives its
practical justification from the higher maxim, this means that the higher maxim explains why the
agent has the lower maxim that he has – and it does so by reference to the motives that constitute
the material of the respective maxims. This higher maxim must itself be grounded in a still higher

25

This conclusion skips a few steps. Aristotle’s is a disjunctive argument, in which he considers the different
positions that may be taken with respect to this infinite regress of beliefs. Then he eliminates the other positions until
he is left with the position of epistemic foundationalism. First, we might simply accept that the regress is infinite.
Aristotle describes this position as skepticism when, after accepting that the regress is infinite, the conclusion that is
drawn is that there are no justified beliefs whatsoever: “The first school, assuming that there is no way of knowing
other than by demonstration, maintain that an infinite regress is involved, on the ground that if behind the prior stands
no primary, we could not know the posterior through the prior (wherein they are right, for one cannot traverse an
infinite series)” (PA 72b8-12). Second, we might accept that every belief needs to be inferentially justified, but deny
that this entails an infinite regress. Instead, beliefs become justified insofar as they inferentially justify each other, a
position known as coherentism. This solution to the regress problem was rejected by Aristotle because he considered
it to be circular reasoning: “Now demonstration must be based on premisses prior to and better known than the
conclusion; and the same thing cannot simultaneously be both prior and posterior to one another: so circular
demonstration is clearly not possible in the unqualified sense of demon stration” (PA 72b25-30). Third, we might
accept that there are basic beliefs, that is, beliefs that can inferentially justify other beliefs without being justified by
inference themselves. Insofar as the regress of inferential justifiers halts at these beliefs, the regress of inferential
justifiers never goes infinite, and hence there is no regress problem. This is the position known as foundationalism, as
Aristotle writes: “Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, know of the immediat e
premisses is independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must known the prior
premisses from which the demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in immediate truths, those truths
must be indemonstrable)” (PA 72b18-24). By process of elimination, Aristotle and other defenders of epistemic
foundationalism argue that the only tenable position is that of foundationalism, hence the regress problem is oftentimes
considered an argument for foundationalism.
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maxim, however, otherwise the maxim would not have any practical justification, and the lower
maxims that fall under this higher maxim would also be deprived of their practical justificatio n,
insofar as their being practically justified presupposes a source that is itself practically justified.
Because this process can be repeated at every stage of the analysis, we are faced with a regress of
practical justifiers, and this puts us in a position similar to what we described in the previous
paragraph, in the parallel case of epistemic justification. The regress of practical justifiers is halted
in much the same way.26 That is, we must admit that the regress of practical justifiers has to come
to an end at a certain point in order to avoid an infinite regress, and this entails that there must be
a highest maxim that grounds the adoption of all other maxims: “… But there cannot be any further
cognition of the subjective ground or the cause of this adoption (although we cannot avoid asking
about it), for otherwise we would have to adduce still another maxim into which this dispositio n
would have to be incorporated, and this maxim must in turn have its ground” (6:25). 27

26

Following Aristotle, we might therefore proceed using a disjunctive argument. In other words, it must be the
case that either this regress of practical justifiers is endless or that this regress of practical justifiers circles back upon
itself or that this regress of practical justifiers ends at a certain point, that is, the same three options from the parallel
case of epistemic justification. The first option, where we admit that the regress of practical justifiers is endless, entails
that for every maxim that is practically justified, there is a higher maxim that practically justifies it, and this process
proceeds unto infinity. The problem is that this solution does not seem to reflect the realities of the way we reason,
since we do not have acces s to an infinite chain of grounds, and we would not be able to provide such an infinite chain
if asked, given our finite natures. The second option, where we admit that the regress of practical justifiers circles back
upon itself, entails that a maxim ultimately derives the practical justification it has from itself, but that this circularit y
is acceptable so long as the circle of practical justification is large enough. The problem is that this solution is an
endorsement of circular reasoning, because no matter how large the circle of practical justifications might be, a maxim
that needs to be grounded by another maxim cannot, by this logic, ground itself. Therefore, only the third option
remains. This would be the foundationalist position detailed earlier. But instead of basic beliefs that justify other
beliefs without needing another belief to justify it, we have here a practical justifier that is basic. That is, a practical
justifier that justifies other practical justifiers without needing another practical justifier to justify it. This could be a
belief, but in Kant’s case, the practical justifier is a maxim, which would be a practical principle and not a belief.
27
Regarding the evil fundamental maxim, Kant writes: “This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all
maxims; as natural propensity, it is also not to be extirpated through human forces; for this could only happen through
good maxims – something that cannot take place if the subjective supreme ground of all maxims is presupposed to be
corrupted” (6:37). This follows from the discussion about the hierarchical nature of maxims. The presence of a lower
maxim in an agent’s hierarchy of maxims is explained by reference to higher maxims in that hierarchy. If, then, there
is to be a change to a lower maxim in an agent’s hierarchy of maxims, this change is also to be explained by reference
to higher maxims in that hierarchy. Insofar as the fundamental maxim is the highest maxim there is, there is no higher
maxim above it, and therefore no maxim that is capable of bringing about a change of the fundamental maxim. In
order to change from an evil fundamental maxim to a good fundamental maxim, divine intervention would be needed.
This requires the type of grace that Mariña is describing in the following passage: “An explanation of the very change
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The regress argument proves that the hierarchy of maxims has to be grounded in a
fundamental maxim. And this fundamental maxim has to be either good or evil. This is due to the
position known as ethical rigorism. According to Kant, ethical rigorism is opposed by the position
known as ethical latitudinarianism, which comes in two forms: indifferentism and syncretism. The
former portrays human actions (and nature) as neither good nor evil, whereas the latter portrays
human actions (and nature) as partly good and partly evil. Even though Kant admits that experience
points to a middle position between the two extremes of good and evil, and therefore to ethical
latitudinarianism, he goes on to write: “It is of great consequence to ethics in general, however, to
preclude so far as possible, anything morally intermediate, either in actions (adiaphora) or in
human character; for with any such ambiguity all maxims run the risk of losing their determina tio n
and stability” (6:22).28 This is because maxims are the subjective principles of an action (4:401).

in the fundamental disposition itself in terms of divine activity implies that God’s action affects the most fundamental
desires of the person, including the person’s desires about the kinds of desires he or s he wants to have. This means
nothing less than God changing the whole character of the person. Kant does not deny that God may have such an
effect on persons, and he even tells us that this kind of action on God’s part may, for all we know, be able to coexist
side by side with freedom. Yet he correctly insists that we cannot make any practical use of such an idea. We cannot,
because this kind of action of God bypasses the personhood of the agent” (Mariña 1997, pp. 386-387).
28
There is an issue with the account of adiaphora that Kant has presented here. In the Religion, Kant brings up
adiaphora in his discussion of ethical rigorism, where he writes: “It is of great consequence to ethics in general,
however, to preclude, so far as possible, anything morally in termediate, either in actions (adiaphora) or in human
characters; for with any such ambiguity all maxims runs the risk of losing their determination and stability. Those who
adhere to this strict way of thinking are commonly called rigorists (a name intended to carry reproach, but in fact a
praise); so we can call latitudinarians those at the opposite extreme” (6:22). Insofar as Kant identifies himself as an
ethical rigorist, it stands to reason that he intends to preclude anything morally intermediate, in order to avoid causing
the maxims to lose their determination and stability. Therefore, Kant must preclude moral intermediacy in actions and
in human characters. This seems to be inconsistent with the account of adiaphora given in the Doctrine of Virtue,
where adiaphora is mentioned in Kant’s criticism of “fantastic virtue”: “… But that the human being can be called
fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as
with mantraps; it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine, supposing that both agree
with me. Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details which, were it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn
the government of virtue into tyranny” (6:409). Here Kant chides the fantastically virtuous for allowing nothing to be
morally indifferent. For there are actions that are morally indifferent – it does not matter whether I eat meat or eat fish,
supposing both agree with me. Therefore, the fantastically virtuous are misguided in thinking that it makes a moral
difference whether I eat meat or I eat fish. These actions are morally indifferent, and are called adiaphora in the
Metaphysics of Morals.
There is a way to resolve this inconsistency. It is to acknowledge that Kant uses adiaphora in the two passages
without making a distinction between adiaphora as something that is morally intermediate in the Religion and
adiaphora as something that is morally indifferent in the Doctrine of Virtue. In order to explain this distinction more
clearly, consider it in the context of the following passage from the Metaphysics of Morals: “… If the law can prescribe
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In order to determine the deontic status of an action, we are supposed to evaluate the action's
maxim in light of the categorical imperative – an action is permissible when its maxim can be
willed as a universal law and is forbidden if its maxim cannot be willed as a universal law (4:402).
But if ethical latitudinarianism is true, then it would be possible for there to be actions that are
neither good nor evil, or for there to be actions that are partly good and partly evil. Insofar as the
basis of these judgments can only be made by evaluating the action's maxims, it follows from
ethical latitudinarianism that it would have to be possible for the maxims themselves to be neither
good nor evil, or for the maxims themselves to be partly good and partly evil, and the determina tio n
and stability of the maxims would be lost.
Kant appeals to the incorporation thesis in order to disprove this result. The incorporatio n
thesis consists in the following statement: “… Freedom of the power of choice has the
characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive
except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universa l
rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself)” (6:24). Now there are two types
of ethical latitudinarianism,

according to Kant. Indifferentism is the species of ethical

latitudinarianism in which actions are neither good nor evil (morally neutral). Whereas syncretis m

only the maxim of actions, not actions themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom (latitudo) for free choice in
following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how
much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty. – But a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to
make exceptions to the maxim of actions but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of
one’s neighbor in general by love of one’s parents), by which in fact the field for the practice of virtue is widened”
(6:390). Kant makes a distinction in his philosophy between perfect and imperfect duties, where perfect duties are
duties which admit of no exceptions, and imperfect duties are duties that can be fulfilled in a multiplicity of different
ways. If the fantastically virtuous attempts to dictate the way in which I am to pursue my imperfect duties (e.g. in my
duty to take care of my animal needs, he dictates that I eat meat, and not fish, even though both agree with me), then
this would turn the “government of virtue into tyranny” (6:409). For it is morally indifferent how I fulfill my imperfect
duties, so long as I do perform them. This does not mean, however, that these acts that are morally indifferent are also
morally intermediate. It does not matter whether I eat meat or I eat fish, as long as both agree with me, because doing
either would be a fulfillment of my imperfect duty. But in fulfilling an imperfect duty, my actions here are not morally
intermediate, because I am still fulfilling a duty of mine. And if this is so, then there is no danger of ambiguity in this,
and therefore no risk of the maxims “losing their determination and stability” (6:22).
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is the species of ethical latitudinarianism in which actions are partly good and partly evil (of mixed
morality). But the maxim of an action that is neither good nor evil would have to itself be neither
good nor evil, and the maxim of an action that is partly good and partly evil would have to itself
be partly good and partly evil. This is impossible. For a maxim is good or evil depending on the
way the moral incentive or the nonmoral incentive has been incorporated into the maxim. If the
nonmoral incentive is subordinated to the moral incentive during the process of incorporation, then
the maxim is good. And if the moral incentive is subordinated to the nonmoral incentive during
the process of incorporation, then the maxim is evil.
For the action to turn out neither good nor evil, as the indifferentist asserts, the human
being would have had to avoid subordinating either the moral incentive or the nonmoral incentive
when incorporating them into his maxim, which is impossible. As Kant writes: “In us, however,
the law is incentive, = a. Hence the lack of the agreement of the power of choice with it (= 0) is
possible only as the consequence of a real and opposite determination of the power of choice, i.e.
of a resistance on its part, = –a; or again, it is only possible through an evil power of choice”
(6:22n). There can be no such thing as an action that is neither good nor evil, because an action
that is not determined by the moral law would, by definition, be evil. It entails the elevation of the
nonmoral incentive over the moral incentive in the maxim. And this results in a maxim that is evil.
Likewise, for the action to turn out partly good and partly evil, as the syncretist asserts, the human
being would have to subordinate both the moral and the nonmoral incentive when incorporating
them into his maxim, which is impossible. For Kant writes: “Nor can a human being be morally
good in some parts, and at the same time evil in others. For if he is good in one part, he has
incorporated the moral law into his maxim, and were he, therefore, to be evil, in some other part,
since the moral law of compliance with duty in general is a single one and universal, the maxim
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relating to it would be universal yet particular at the same time: which is contradictory” (6:24-25).
This reasoning applies to actions as well. If an action is good, this means the human being has
subordinated the nonmoral incentive to the moral incentive during the process of incorporatio n,
resulting in a good maxim. And if an action is evil, this means the human being has subordinated
the moral incentive to the nonmoral incentive during the process of incorporation, resulting in an
evil maxim. For an action to be partly good and partly evil, then, both of these must be true: the
human being has subordinated the nonmoral incentive to the moral incentive and he has
subordinated the moral incentive to the nonmoral incentive in the same maxim. And this is absurd.
Ethical latitudinarianism is therefore an untenable philosophical position, and this fact tells against
ethical latitudinarianism and for ethical rigorism.
And Kant extends this argument for ethical rigorism to cover human nature or human
character also. If ethical latitudinarianism is true, then it would be possible for a person’s character
to be neither good nor evil (indifferentism), or for his character to be partly good and partly evil
(syncretism). And the person’s fundamental maxim would have to reflect this fact: he would either
have a fundamental maxim that is neither good nor evil, or he would have a fundamental maxim
that is partly good and partly evil. Yet the same considerations as before are applicable to the
fundamental maxim also. The fundamental maxim is either good or evil depending on whether the
moral incentive is subordinated to the nonmoral incentive during the process of incorporation by
the Willkür, or vice versa. But a fundamental maxim cannot be morally indifferent (neither good
nor evil), as explained previously. For there can be no such thing as a character that is neither good
nor evil, because a character that is not determined by the moral law is, by definition, evil. It entails
the elevation of the nonmoral incentive over the moral incentive in the fundamental maxim. And
this results in a fundamental maxim that is evil. Nor can a fundamental maxim be of mixed morality
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(partly good and partly evil). For this would mean that the human being has subordinated the
nonmoral incentive to the moral incentive and he has subordinated the moral incentive to the
nonmoral incentive in the same fundamental maxim. And this is absurd. For, as Allison has argued,
a person’s character and his fundamental maxim are one and the same: “If one is to avoid regarding
an agent’s Gesinnung as a product of nature rather than freedom, which would effective ly
undermine morality by reducing goodness and badness of will to a matter of constitutive moral
luck, then it is necessary to consider it as itself chosen. But as chosen, this Gesinnung must itself
be conceived as a maxim, albeit one of the highest order, that provides a direction or orientatio n
for the moral life of the agent viewed as a whole” (Allison 1990, p. 141). And this would mean
that a person’s character could no more be neither good nor evil, or be partly good and partly evil,
than a person’s fundamental maxim be neither good nor evil, or be partly good and partly evil.
And this fact tells against ethical latitudinarianism and for ethical rigorism.
But even accepting Kant’s ethical rigorism, what reason do we have for assuming that this
fundamental maxim is evil rather than good? After all, experience tells us that every human being
acts from both good maxims and bad ones, and there seems to be no reason to assume that, as we
traverse the hierarchy of maxims, the maxim at the apex of this hierarchy would be evil, rather
than vice versa. For consistency’s sake, it seems that, if we assume that evil maxims must
ultimately be grounded in a fundamental maxim that is evil, then we must also assume that good
maxims must ultimately be grounded in a fundamental maxim that is good. But Kant rejects this
line of reasoning. This is because the categorical imperative consists in the following command:
act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become
a universal law. If the hierarchy of maxims is grounded in a fundamental maxim that is good, we
would see a consistent application of the categorical imperative to the maxims within the hierarchy.
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Every maxim in the hierarchy would be determined to have the form of universal law. But if the
hierarchy is grounded in a fundamental maxim that is evil, we would not see the consistent
application of the categorical imperative to the maxims within the hierarchy. There will be some
maxims that are determined to have the form of universal law, and others that are not. This leads
Allison to observe that the evil fundamental maxim consists in an inconsistency: “… It can be
more properly described as the fundamental or ruling maxim to license exceptions to one’s own
case to moral requirements (“moral holidays”, as it were) while still acknowledging the general
validity of these requirements” (Allison 1990, p. 151). The asymmetry between the two cases,
wherein anything less than the consistent application of the categorical imperative to one’s
hierarchy of maxims is a sign that the fundamental maxim at the apex of this hierarchy has been
corrupted by evil, is at the root of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil. For it is by appeal to this criteria
(that anything less than the consistent application of the categorical imperative to the maxims in
one’s hierarchy is a sign that the fundamental maxim at the apex of this hierarchy has been
corrupted by evil) that Kant judges human nature to be evil, because all have fallen short when it
comes to complete compliance with duty in general.

The Anthropological Evidence for Radical Evil
But how does Kant defend his assertion that every human being has fallen short of complete
compliance with duty in general? There is a point in his discussion of radical evil where Kant
seems like he is about to prove to us his assertion that human beings are by nature evil. But then
he abruptly stops and writes this instead: “We can spare ourselves the formal proof that there must
be such a corrupt propensity rooted in the human being, in view of the woeful examples that the
experience of human deeds parades before us” (6:32). The first set of these woeful examples that
the experience of human deeds parades before us is the savagery exhibited by the human beings
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in the so-called state of nature. And here Kant describes the cruelty of the tribesmen of New
Zealand in their ritual murders and the wanton slaughter that the Arathapescow and Dog Rib
Indians of northwestern America engage in. The second set of these woeful examples that the
experience of human deeds parades before us is the ressentiment that civilization breeds in human
beings. And so Kant describes the way prudence prescribes mistrust between even the closest
friends, the propensity to hate those we are indebted to, and the schadenfreude that we secretly
derive from the misfortune of others. The third set of these woeful examples that the experience
of human deeds parades before us is the behavior of nation-states in their international affairs. And
this prompts Kant to bemoan the state of constant war between nation-states that makes the
philosophical chiliasm of a perpetual peace an absurd fantasy. These three sets of woeful examples
that the example of human deeds parades before us are supposed to prove the universal existence
of the propensity to evil in human beings. As such, a natural way of interpreting Kant’s argument
here is to construe it as an empirical generalization. Thus, we find Wood writing in Kant’s Moral
Religion: “When Kant says that man is evil “by nature”, he does not mean to explain evil, but only
to point out the universality of evil in man. Kant thus looks for evidence supporting the claim that
all men, without exception, exhibit a propensity to evil; and he finds such evidence in “the
multitude of crying examples which the experience of the actions of men puts before our eyes”
(Wood 1970, p. 225).29

Wood’s position on Kant’s argument for radical evil changed drastically between the publication of Kant’s
Moral Religion (1970) and the publication of Kant’s Ethical Thought (1999). In Kant’s Moral Religion, Wood
interpreted Kant’s argument for radical evil as an empirical generalization from the anthropological evidence that was
provided. The multitude of woeful examples that Kant provides are meant to show that “in spite of the differing
conditions in which we find man, a propensity to evil, to lie, to kill his fellows, or to enslave and exploit them, to
adopt any course of action which leads to the satisfaction of personal wishes, is always characteristic of him” (Wood
1970, p. 226). By the time of Kant’s Ethical Thought, Wood had turned to the interpretation put forth by Sharon
Anderson-Gold: “… The doctrine of radical evil is based on Kantian anthropology, that is, on his theory of the
purposive development of the human race’s collective predispositions, which nature has brought about through the
human trait of unsociable sociability. This makes radical evil an empirical thesis without reduc ing it to a mere
inductive generalization. On this interpretation, radical evil would pertain to us insofar as we are social beings; the
29
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This solution has drawn the ire of almost every interpreter that has written on the topic of
radical evil. Their frustration with Kant is understandable. As Morgan observes: “… Lacking as
he obviously does empirical acquaintance with the behavior of each and every human being past,
present and future, Kant will need to present an a priori argument in order to earn the right to
assert that all human beings have such a propensity. Indeed, since he thinks that this characteristic
is necessary, even if we were per impossibile to have such an acquaintance, this would still not
underwrite the modality of the claim” (Morgan 2005, p. 62). And Kant seems to be perfectly well
aware of this, because when he asserts that human beings are by nature evil, he leaves no doubt as
to the epistemological status of this assertion. The assertion that human beings are by nature evil
must be a priori in nature: “In order, then, to call a human being evil, it must be possible to infer
a priori from a number of consciously evil actions, or even from a single one, an underlying evil
maxim, and, from this, the presence in the subject of a common ground, itself a maxim, of all
particular morally evil maxims” (6:20). But this a priori assertion cannot be an analytic a priori
statement about human nature. This is because Kant considers radical evil to be a moral propensity,
and this means that radical evil must therefore be the product of our freedom of choice. Hence
Kant explains that the assertion that human beings are by nature evil “simply means that being evil
applies to him considered in his species, not that this quality may be inferred from the concept of
his species (from the concept of a human being in general, for then the quality would be
necessary)” (6:33). Taken together, these two facts indicate that Kant's assertion is a synthetic a
priori proposition, as opposed to an analytic a priori proposition or a synthetic a posteriori

evil in our nature is closely bound up with our tendencies to compare ourselves with others and compete with them
for self-worth” (Wood 1999, p. 287). This led Wood to repudiate his 1970 interpretation of Kant’s argument for radical
evil in the following passage: “… The confusion engendered by these remarks [6:32-33] explains the wide
disagreement among commentators, whose opinions run all the way from my own naïve conjecture long ago that the
doctrine of radical evil is intended simply as an empirical generalization to Henry Allison’s equally implausible
proposal that it is not a far-reaching indictment of the human will but only a trivial practical corollary of our finitude”
(Wood 1999, p. 287).
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proposition. But the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades
before us can only ever amount to an a posteriori proposition. Hence Morgan’s criticism: “All that
the woeful parade of human deeds can show us is that there are evil people, or at most, that evil is
common and widespread. It would be an entirely reckless generalization to conclude from the
undeniably extensive litany of the crimes that human beings have carried out that every single
human being has a propensity to evil, and indeed actually is evil, and that the root of this evil lies
in human nature” (Morgan 2005, pp. 62-63). For the examples Kant gives fall far short of what he
needs to prove his assertion that human beings by nature evil, and interpreters have been wont to
pass over the anthropological discussion of radical evil in near-silence ever since.
In this section, let us delve into the multitude of woeful examples that the experience of
human deeds parades before us. The intention here is to provide some context for the three sets of
examples that are given, so that we can see why Kant would have wanted to include them in his
proof that human beings are by nature evil. First are the evils that occur in the state of nature. Kant
writes the following indictment:
If we wish to draw our examples from that state in which many a philosopher
especially hoped to meet the natural goodliness of human nature, namely from the
so-called state of nature, let one but compare with this hypothesis the scenes of
unprovoked cruelty in the ritual murders of Tofoa, New Zealand, and the Navigator
Islands, and the never-ending cruelty (which Captain Hearne reports) in the wide
wastes of northwestern America from which, indeed, no human being derives the
least benefit, and we find vices of savagery more than sufficient to distance us from
any such opinion (6:33).
The first thing to notice is that Kant had a specific target in mind when he cited these examples of
evil happening in the state of nature: the philosophers that assert the goodness of the human being
in the state of nature. This is the philosophical position of Rousseau, who had written: “Everything
good comes from the hand of the author of things; everything degenerates between the hands of
man” (Emile 4:35). For Rousseau, the social condition has a corrupting effect on human nature,
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and it is the reason why human nature is evil. But he posits a time prior to human society, when
human beings lived in the state of nature, and these human beings living in the state of nature had
a natural goodliness to them.30 It is in response to this hypothesis that the human being is good in
the state of nature, and only becomes evil due to the detrimental effects of society, that Kant cites
the ritual murders of Tofoa and the never-ending cruelty of the wide wastes of northwestern
America. In other words, these woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before
us are being used by Kant as evidence to disprove the Rosseauian hypothesis about the goodness
of the human being in the state of nature.
The next set of examples have to do with the human being in his civilized state. Objecting
to the idea that civilization brings out the goodness of the human being, Kant writes the following
indictment:
If we are however disposed to the opinion that we can have a better cognition of
human nature known in its civilized state (where its predispositions can be more
fully developed), we must then hear out a long melancholy litany of charges against
humankind – of secret falsity even in the most intimate friendship, so that a restraint
30

Rousseau discusses this further in the Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men (1754).
The hypothetical nature of the discussion in the Discourse is evident when he writes: “The investigations we may
enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and
hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin; just like
the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world” (Rousseau 1754, pp. 175-176).
The Discourse is divided into two parts. Part I of the Discourse is concerned with the original state of man. It is here
that Rousseau expounds on his thesis that man was originally good when he was still in the state of nature. Hence he
rejects the Hobbesian thesis that man in the state of nature must be naturally wicked: “Hobbes did not reflect that the
same cause, which prevents a savage from making use of his reason, as our jurists hold, prevents him also from abusing
his faculties, as Hobbes himself allows: so that it may be justly said that savages are not bad merely because they do
not know what it is to be good: for it is neither the development of the understanding nor the restraint of law that
hinders them from doing ill; but the peacefulness of their passions, and their ignorance of vice” (Rousseau 1754, pp.
196-197). And Part II of the Discourse is concerned with how the wickedness of man’s current state came to be. This
Rousseau traces to its origins in the malignant influence of human society: “… I think I have shown man to be naturally
good. What then can have depraved him to such an extent, except the adva nces he has made, and the knowledge he
has acquired? We may admire human society as much as we please; it will be none the less true that it necessarily
leads men to hate each other in proportion as their interests clash, and to do one another apparent services, while they
are really doing every imaginable mischief” (Rousseau 1754, pp. 239-240). Together, these two theses are used by
Rousseau to confirm the downward trajectory of the moral development of man. In denying the thesis that man was
originally good when he was still in the state of nature, Kant rejects the idea that there is a downward trajectory to the
moral development of man. The anthropological evidence he has provided, in the wickedness of both the savage and
the civilized man, shows that there has been little development, morally speaking, in the character of the species
throughout the ages.
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on trust in the mutual confidence of even the best friends is reckoned a universa l
maxim of prudence in social dealings; of a propensity to hate him to whom we are
indebted, to which a benefactor must always heed; of a hearty goodwill that
nonetheless admits the remark that “in the misfortunes of our best friends there is
something that does not altogether displease us”; and of many other vices yet
hidden under the appearance of virtue... (6:33).
Here again, notice that Kant has a specific target in mind when he cites these examples of evil: the
philosophers that assert the goodness of the human being in his civilized state. This is the
philosophical position held by many of Kant’s Enlightenment contemporaries. Lest we forget,
Kant's doctrine of radical evil drew the condemnation it did from his contemporaries precisely
because of the way it ran counter to this dogma of Enlightenment thinking, an attitude that Goethe
captured in his criticism of the Religion in the following passage: “Kant required a long lifetime
to purify his philosophical mantle of many impurities and prejudices. And now he has wantonly
tainted it with the shameful strain of radical evil, in order that Christians too might be attracted to
kiss its hem” (Fackenheim 1954, p. 340). For Enlightenment thinkers, human life in the state of
nature can only be described as “nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan 1:13:9). It is only by coming
together in civil society that we are able to escape the state of war of all against all (Leviatha n
1:13:13). And it is only once we have escaped this state of war of all against all that there is an
opportunity for any human goodness to flourish. 31 It is in response to this hypothesis that the
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Besides Hobbes, there are a number of Enlightenment figures that shared this optimistic perspective on
history. In England, Adam Smith’s treatises The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and The Wealth of Nations (1776)
featured the idea of an “invisible hand” that guides the economic development of society towards ever -greater
production. In so doing, they create societies that are increasingly wealthy, a s these advances in the means of
production benefit both rich and poor alike: “The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable.
They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though th ey mean only
their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labors of all the thousands whom they
employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their
improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessitites of life, which
would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without
intending it, without knowing it, advance the interests of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the
species” (Smith 1759, p. 163). And the French Enlightenment produced Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot and Nicolas de
Condorcet, both of whom believed that the scientific and philo sophical developments taking place in Europe would
eventually spread across the globe. Thus we find Condorcet, writing in his Outlines of an historical view of the
progress of the human mind (1795), declaring:
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human being is good in the civilized state that Kant brings up the examples of secret falsity among
friends, of ressentiment, and of schadenfreude. The point Kant is making here is that these evils
are no improvement compared to the savage cruelties of the state of nature. If the evils of the state
of nature are vices that are grafted onto our predisposition to animality (6:26), these evils are vices
of culture that are grafted onto our predisposition to humanity (6:27). Far from being any sort of
improvement of the human condition, these vices simply represent the corruption by evil of a
different aspect of the human condition. In other words, these woeful examples that the experience
of human deeds parades before us are being used by Kant as evidence to disprove the
Enlightenment hypothesis about the goodness of the human being in the state of civilizat ion.
The last example Kant gives deals with nation-states in their relations to each other. Here
is the indictment that Kant writes against them:
So long as a state has a neighboring one which it can hope to subdue, it strives to
aggrandize itself by subjugating it. It thus strives for a universal monarchy – a state
constitution in which all freedom would necessarily expire, and, together with it,
virtue, taste, and science (which follow upon freedom). Yet after this monster (in
which the laws gradually lose their force) has swallowed up all its neighbors, it
ultimately disintegrates all by itself. It divides through rebellion and factiona lis m
into many smaller states which, instead of striving after a union of states (a republic

… We shall find the strongest reasons to believe, from observation of the progress which
the sciences and civilization have hitherto made, and from the analysis of the march of the human
understanding, and the development of its faculties, that nature has fixed no limits to our hopes.
If we take a survey of the existing state of the globe, we shall perceive, in the first place,
that in Europe the principles of the French constitution are those of every enlightened mind. We
shall perceive that they are too widely disseminated, and too openly professe d, for the efforts of
tyrants and priests to prevent them from penetrating by degrees into the miserable cottages of their
slaves, where they will soon revive those embers of good sense, and rouse that silent indignation
which the habit of suffering and terror have failed totally to extinguish in the minds of the oppressed.
If we next look at the different nations, we shall observe in each, particular obstacles
opposing, or certain dispositions favoring this revolution. We shall distinguish some in which it will
be effected, perhaps slowly, by the wisdom of the respective governments; and others in which,
rendered violent by resistance, the governments themselves will necessarily be involved in its
terrible and rapid motions.
Can it be supposed that either the wisdom or the senseless feuds of European nations, co operating with the slow but certain effects of the progress of their colonies, will not shortly produce
the independence of the entire new world; and that then, European population, lending its aid , will
sail to civilize or cause to disappear, even without conquest, those savage nations still occupying
there immense tracts of country (Condorcet 1796, pp. 252-254).
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of free federated peoples), in turn begin the same game all over again, so that war
(that scourge of the human race) will not cease (6:34n).
This example differs from the previous ones. It seems to be a continuation of the discussion of the
goodness of human beings in their civilized state. Hence Kant writes: “And if we are not satisfied
yet, we need but consider a state wondrously compounded from both the others, namely that of a
people in its external relations, where civilized peoples stand vis-à-vis one another in the relation
of raw nature (the state of constant war) and have also firmly taken it into their hands not to get
out of it” (6:34). In this example, Kant is using the state as a macrocosm of the individual human
being.32 The point that he is making here is that the brutality of the state of nature never really
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Morgenthau writes in his Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace the following analysis:
The history of modern political thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ
fundamentally in their conceptions of the nature of man, society, and politics. One believes that a
rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved
here and now. It assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature, and
blames the failure of the social order to measure up to rational standards on the lack of knowledge
and understanding, obsolescent social institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals
and groups. It trusts in education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to remedy these defects. The
other school believes the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of
forces inherent in human nature. To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against
them. This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral
principles can never be fully realized but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary
balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts (Morgenthau 1948, p. 3).

In international relations, the former school is commonly called political liberalism and the latter school is
commonly called political realism. Political realists believe that nation -states are the primary actors in the realm of
international relations, and that these nation-states ought to always act in accordance with their own self-interest.
(Interest here is defined by political realists in terms of military power – either the offensive military power a nationstate has in comparison to its rivals or the defensive military power a nation -state has in comparison to its rivals. The
former are called offensive realists, whereas the latter are called defensive realists). In particular, the political realist
considers it the aim of every nation-state to accumulate military power in order to become a hegemon: “Given the
difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best
way to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a
misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had
sufficient power to survive. But even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that
is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states are almost always
better off with more rather than less power” (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 35). This is precisely the system of international
relations that Kant is describing in the following passage: “So long as a state has a neighboring one which it can hope
to subdue, it strives to aggrandize itself by subjugating it. It thus strives for a universal monarchy – a state constitution
in which all freedom would necessarily expire, and, together with it, virtue, taste and science (which follow upon
freedom)” (6:34n). In the Religion, therefore, Kant is describing the system of international relations the way an
offensive realist would. This may be contrasted with Kant’s description of the system of international relations in
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophyical Sketch, which is considered a key text of political liberalism.
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went away the Enlightenment thinkers imagined it. The advance of human civilization merely
sublimated this brutality away from our neighbors, towards more distant enemies. Therefore, not
only does entering into the state of civilization add more vices in the form of the vices of culture,
but man retains all his old vices of the savagery of nature. Hence Kant dismisses philosophica l
chiliasm the same way he dismisses theological chiliasm, because one must be possible if the other
is: “So philosophical chiliasm, which hopes for a state of perpetual peace based on a federation of
nations united in a world-republic, is universally derided as sheer fantasy as much as theological
chiliasm, which awaits for the completed moral improvement of the human race” (6:34).
If this is indeed the right approach to interpreting the woeful examples that the experience
of human deeds parades before us, then it becomes evident that Kant’s argument for radical evil is
not meant to be an empirical generalization. The problem with interpreting the argument for radical
evil as an empirical generalization is that it makes Kant a terrible philosopher, because there is no
way these examples can be used to prove that the propensity is universal. Allison explains this well
when he observes: “But clearly, even if for the sake of argument, one accepts Kant's appeal to
some rather selective anthropological evidence, the most that this evidence can show is that evil is
widespread, not that there is a universal propensity to it” (Allison 1990, p. 154). But it is not
necessary to interpret the argument for radical evil as Kant's attempt to prove the universality of
radical evil through the use of this anthropological evidence. For Kant seems to be using this
anthropological evidence to disprove the hypothesis that human beings are by nature good, and
this would be a perfectly good use for them. Even though it is impossible to prove an empirica l
generalization in this way, no matter how many examples we choose to provide, the opposite is
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not true – only one example is needed to disprove an empirical generalization.33 And Kant does
precisely that. The examples of the ritual murders of Tofoa and the never-ending cruelty of
northwestern America serve to disprove the empirical generalization that human beings are good
when in the state of nature. And the examples of the different vices of culture and of realpolitik in
the relations between nation-states serve to disprove the empirical generalization that human
beings are good when in the civilized state. In other words, the woeful examples that the experience
of human deeds parades before us are not meant to provide verification for the doctrine that human
beings are by nature evil, but for the falsification of the doctrine that human beings are by nature
good.

33

The positions described here are therefore reminiscent to those featured in the debate over the problem of
induction in the philosophy of science. The problem of induction has many forms, but the problem we are interested
in is the problem of justifying interests of the following form:
a 1 , a 2 , … a n are all Fs that are also G
---Therefore, all Fs are G
The verificationist position is that we would need to verify that every object a 1 through a n is an F that is also
a G. If we do this, and it is true that every object a 1 through a n is an F that is also a G, then we are justified in makin g
the inference that all Fs are G. But this method seems unpromising. It is not always possible to examine every F to
verify that are G. And it is also not always possible to know that the Fs we have examined are all the Fs in existence.
For this reason, Popper proposed the falsificationist position. The assertion that all Fs are G is, according to Popper,
a hypothesis. As such, it may be posited without the need for justification. If we examine every object a 1 through a n
and find that they are all Fs that are also G, we have not verified the hypothesis that all Fs are G. All we have done is
avoided falsifying the hypothesis that all Fs are G. As Popper puts it in The Logic of Scientific Discovery: “Scientific
theories can never be ‘justified’, or verified. But in spite of this, a hypothesis A can under circumstances achieve more
than a hypothesis B – perhaps because B is contradicted by certain results of observations, and therefore ‘falsified’ by
them, whereas A is not falsified; or perhaps because a greater number of predictions can be derived with the help of A
than with the help of B. The best we can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to show its worth, and
that it has been more successful than other hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be justified, verified, or even
shown to be probable. This appraisal of the hypothesis relies solely upon deductive consequences (prediction) which
may be drawn from the hypothesis. There is no need to even mention induction” (Popper 1959, p. 317).
Kant cites a multitude of woeful examples that the experience of h uman deeds parades before us as proof
that human nature is evil. When interpreters of the Religion dismiss this proof because no amount of examples of
human misdeeds, however numerous, is sufficient to prove the universality of radical evil, they have tacitly interpreted
Kant’s argument as verificationist in nature. This is evident when they dismiss the anthropological evidence provided
because it is not possible to examine every human being for moral wickedness. But perhaps we do not need to ascribe
to Kant a verificationist approach. For then we would no longer assume that the anthropological evidence Kant has
provided is supposed to justify his inference from the misdeeds of certain classes of human beings to the presence of
evil in the species. Instead, we would interpret Kant as using this anthropological evidence to falsify competing
hypotheses concerning the moral character of the human species. That is, we interpret Kant’s argument in the Religion
in accordance with a falsificationist methodology and not a verificationist methodology.
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Radical Evil as Innate Disposition
Radical evil is described as the propensity to evil throughout the Religion. It is therefore
important to understand precisely what this term “propensity to evil” consists in. Kant provides us
with two different explanations of what he means by a propensity in the section of the Religion
where he introduces it. First, he describes a propensity as a species of predisposition: “Propensity
is actually only the predisposition to desire an enjoyment which, when the subject has experienced
it, arouses inclination to it” (6:29n). In his example, Kant cites the propensity for intoxicants that
is present in savages, where “although many of them have no acquaintance at all with intoxicatio n,
and hence absolutely no desire for the things that produce it, let them try these things but once,
and there is aroused in them an almost inextinguishable desire for them” (6:29n). 34 But there is

Frierson discusses the structure of Kant’s moral psychology using the example of a savage with a propensity
for intoxicants from the Religion. He notes that the causal model in a case of an inclination to strong drink would look
like so:
34



Sensory cognition
(sight or smell of strong
drink)



Feeling/Desire
(desire to consume
drink)

↑
Inclination (for strong
drink)
But Kant considers inclinations to be acquired. Inclinations are acquired through past experiences, which
subsequently develop into a habitual desire:
Sensory cognition
(sight or smell of
strong drink)
Past experience with
strong drink









Feeling/Desire
(desire to
consume drink)

↑
Inclination
(for strong
drink)

This causal connection between the subject’s past experience with strong drink and the inclination for strong
drink needs to be explained. In other words, a reason why some (but not all) experience develop into habitual desires.
And this introduces the concept of a propensity into the causal model:
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also the description of propensity that makes it into a ground of inclinations: “By propensity
(propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire,
concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general” (6:29). 35 A
propensity here described is not a predisposition. For this passage tells us that predispositions are
innate and can only be represented as innate. But a propensity is described here as a ground “that
can indeed be innate yet may be represented as not being such: it can rather be thought of (if it is
good) as acquired, or (if evil) as brought by the human being upon himself” (6:29). Thus, here
propensities and predispositions are being described as distinct species of innate dispositions, and
their difference consist in the fact that the former can be represented as freely acquired, whereas
the other cannot be so represented.
But what are dispositions? In the contemporary discussion of properties, a property can
either be categorical or dispositional. The standard way of making the distinction has been to say
that dispositional properties contain a conditional, whereas categorical properties do not. For
example, a paradigmatic categorical property would be the shape of an object. An object’s surface

Sensory cognition
(sight or smell of
strong drink)
Past experience with
strong drink





↑
Propensity (for
strong drink)





Feeling/Desire
(desire to
consume drink)

↑
Inclination
(for strong
drink)

In this model, our desires are grounded in inclinations, and our inclinations are grounded in turn in
propensities and predispositions (Frierson 2005, pp. 21-22). The location of the propensity in the causal model as the
subjective ground to another subjective ground (the inclination) demonstrates what Kant had in mind when he makes
the following statement defining propensity: “Propensity is actually only the predisposition to desire an enjoyment
which, when the subject has experienced it, arouses inclination to it” (6:29n).
35
It should be noted that Kant provides yet a third definition of propensity in the Anthropology, where he
defines it as: “The subjective possibility of the emergence of a certain desire, which precedes the representation of its
object, is propensity (propensio)” (7:265). This definition is similar to, but not the same as, the definition of propensity
as the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (6:29). This is because an inclination is a desire t hat is
habitual. The Anthropology definition of propensity therefore encompasses a wider range of cases (all desires) than
the Religion definition of propensity (only those desires that are habitual).
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is square when all of its sides are of the same length. By contrast, a paradigmatic dispositio na l
property would be fragility. For when we say that an object is fragile, we mean that if it was
subjected to a sudden force, it would shatter. And here we have a condition (subjection to a sudden
force) and the result that occurs when this condition is met (the object shattering into pieces). 36
There are two takeaways from this that are relevant here. First, insofar as dispositional properties
contain a conditional, it follows that the disposition may never manifest itself because this

36

The existence of dispositional properties is by no means a settled matter. In the context of contemporary
Analytic philosophy, the debate on dispositional properties can be traced to the logical empiricists, who objected to
dispositional properties because of their semantic indeterminancy. For the logical empiricists, the issue with
dispositional properties is this: “Imagine hesitating to attribute the dispositional predicate ‘is water-soluble’ to a given
object. If the object undergoes the appropriate test, in this case, if it is put into water, all is well, because in the
circumstances of the test, the application conditions of the predicate are not conditional: while it undergoes the test,
the object is water-soluble if it dissolves and not water-soluble if it does not dissolve. The problem arises in
circumstances in which the object under consideration does not undergo any appropriate test. What determines in this
case whether the object is water-soluble?” (Kistler-Gnassounou 2007, p. 24). The logical empiricists give the
following answer in response to this: there is nothing that determines whether the object is water-soluble under those
circumstances. This means that it is up in the air whether the object is water-soluble or not, i.e. the property “is watersoluble” is an indeterminate property.
The idea that an object can have indeterminate properties is obviously problematic. The positions that
subsequent philosophers have adopted to avoid adopting the logical empiricist position can be divided into roughly
two camps. There are philosophers who, like Quine, deny that there are dispositional properties entirely: “Quine’s
thesis is that the attribution of a dispositional predicate to an object reflects our incomplete knowledge of that object:
when we call the sugar ‘soluble’, we in fact attribute a categorical property, though one that we know only
incompletely. The real properties making true attributions of dispositions are categorical properties of
‘microstructure’. By using a dispositional predicate, says Quine, ‘we can refer to a hypothetical state or mechanism
that we do not yet understand’. From his point of view, to attribute a disposition to an object is just a provisional way
to characterize it faute de mieux, awaiting a more direct way. There are really no dispositional properties, the
dispositional being only an incomplete and provisional way to characterize microstructural categorical properties”
(Kistler-Gnassounou 2007, p. 27). For Quine, there is something that determines whether the object is water-soluble
under the circumstances described, and that is the categorical properties of microstructure. If the object has a certain
microstructure, then the object is water-soluble, and if it does not have this microstructure, then it is not water-soluble.
Then there are philosophers who follow Goodman in accepting the existence of dispositional properties. As
such, they attempt to respond to Carnap’s objection by understanding dispositional properties in terms of
counterfactual conditionals: “… This is the research tradition initiated by Goodman: his starting point is the
observation that dispositions ‘strike us by comparison [with observable properties] as rather ethereal. Ans so we are
moved to inquire whether we can bring them down to earth; whether, that is, we can explain disposition -terms without
any reference to occult powers.’ According to Goodman’s hypothesis, which constitutes until today the framework of
this debate, the meaning of dispositional predicates can be analyzed in categorical terms with the help of
counterfactual conditionals” (Kistler-Gnassounou 2007, p. 26). For Goodman, there is something that determines
whether the object is water-soluble under the circumstances described, and that is the counterfactual properties the
object has. If the object would dissolve if it is immersed in water, then it has the dispositional property of being watersoluble, even if it never actually undergoes the test of being immersed in water. And if the object wouldn’t dissolve if
it is immersed in water, then it lacks the dispositional property of bein g water-soluble, even if it never actually
undergoes the test of being immersed in water.
For a more in-depth discussion of these two positions on the existence of dispositional properties, see
Dispositions and Causal Powers (2007) by Max Kistler and Bruno Gnassounou.

83
condition is never met. As an example, consider a glass that is fragile. This means that, if the glass
is subjected to a sudden force, then it would shatter. But if this glass is never subjected to a sudden
force, then it would never have the occasion to shatter, unless we posit further conditions that
would also result in its shattering (for example, a high-pitched sound). Second, an object has the
dispositional property whether or not it actually manifests. To return to our example of a fragile
glass, we say that the glass is fragile because, if the glass is subjected to a sudden force, it would
shatter. But a glass that is never subjected to a sudden force remains fragile, even though it never
has and never will have the occasion to shatter. The glass retains its dispositional property of
fragility on the basis of the following counterfactual’s being true: Even though the glass was never
subjected to a sudden force, had it been subjected to a sudden force, it would have shattered into
pieces.
There is evidence that Kant thinks about dispositions along these same lines. In the
following passage from the Metaphysik Herder, Kant writes: “If a substance suffers, then it must
contain in itself by its own power the ground of the inherence of the accident, because otherwise
the accident would not inhere in it” (28:51-52). From this, it follows that it is not enough to have
a determining ground that allows us to posit a predicate in the subject. There must also be a
corresponding ground in the subject that allows this predicate to inhere in the subject. Kant’s
reasoning on the matter is that, if a determining ground was sufficient by itself to produce a
determination in a subject, then it would be possible for a determining ground of sufficient power
(God) to make a wooden post think (28:52). But this is plainly absurd, because even if God could
produce a thought in the wooden post all by himself, it would be God, and not the wooden post,
that has the thought: “Thus for the inherence of an accident in A its own power is required, and a
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merely external, not even a divine power, does not suffice” (28:52). 37 To put this in the terms of
our discussion in the previous paragraph, consider a glass that has the dispositional property of
being fragile, and a metal block that does not. Now we say something is fragile if it is disposed to
shatter into pieces when subjected to a sudden force. Therefore, because glass is fragile and metal
is not, when subjected to such a force, the glass shatters but the metal block does not. Now God,
by his power, could cause the metal block to shatter into pieces, but this does not make the metal
block fragile. And the reason why it does not is because it lacks the relevant dispositional property.
The metal block is not disposed to shatter when struck by a sudden force, it is not characteristic
of metal blocks to behave in this way (even though they conceivably could so shatter due to divine
intervention).
If we are right in our reading of Kant, then he intends for radical evil to be a dispositional
property in the same sense we do when we use the term. Now to repeat what a propensity is: “By
propensity (propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclina tio n
(habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general”
(6:29). The propensity to evil would therefore have to be the subjective ground of the possibility
of an inclination to evil, insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general. And as a
dispositional property, the propensity to evil would contain a condition for the manifestation of

In his article “The Critique of Metaphysics: Kant and Traditional Ontology”, Ameriks discusses this
argument as the Restraint Argument. He writes: “Like Baumgarten, Kant wants to argue from the start that action is
always a mixture of spontaneity and reaction, and that in any real action there are always several concurring causes.
For example, when we listen with attention, outer things are a true ground of the experience; but, in attending, we are
also playing a role, so we are active and passive at once. In particular, Kant stresses that, even for God to put a thought
into us, there must be a ground within us, a capacity to receive and have the thought; otherwise, there would be no
point in saying that it is we rather than God who have the thought” (Ameriks 2003, p. 125). Ameriks calls this argument
the Restraint Argument because it prevents us from ascribing all activity and reality to God (Ameriks 2003, p. 125).
This application of the Restraint Argument to the actions of God must not, however, cause us to overlook Kant’s point:
In any real action, there are always several concurring causes. Therefore, for any external cause (even God) to bring
about a state in us, there must be a ground within us that has the capacity to receive that state . This ground would, in
contemporary parlance, be called a disposition.
37
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this inclination.38 For example: a human being has the propensity to evil because he would
succumb to evil if he were subjected to a great enough temptation. Here we have a condition
(subjection to temptation) and a result that occurs when the condition is met (succumbing to evil).
The two important takeaways from before are still relevant here. First, insofar as dispositio na l
properties contain a conditional, it follows that the disposition may never manifest because the
condition is not met. This means that, even though a human being might have the dispositio na l
property of moral frailty, he might never succumb to evil because he has never encountered
temptation (or never encountered great-enough temptation). The human being that lives his life
without ever having experienced temptation would never have the occasion to succumb to the
temptation. Second, an object retains its dispositional properties whether or not they manifest. This
means that the human being that has never had the occasion to succumb to temptation because of
the temptation- less life he’s led still has the dispositional property of moral frailty. He retains the
dispositional property of moral frailty based on the truth of the counterfactual that, if he is subjected
to a great enough temptation, then he would falter and he would succumb to the temptation.39 For

As Mariña notes, the human being’s choice of a fundamental maxim determines his orientation to the world.
For the individual that chooses to adopt a fundamental maxim that is evil, h e develops a propensity to subordinate the
moral incentives to other incentives that are nonmoral. It would be inaccurate to describe this as depravity, however,
if what we mean by it is a conscious decision to reverse the ethical order of incentives (6:30). The influence of the
propensity is far more subtle: “… Because the individual has already made a grounding choice – too often unexamined
– about what she takes to be most important, she will simply find the objects of her daily concern mattering to her in
one way or another. The propensity is so deeply ensconced in the soul that it preexists experience and hence actual
incentives. In fact, a person may not have certain inclinations only because they have not yet awoken. As such, it may
be quite accidental that a person is not subject to certain vices, for she may simply have not encountered the conditions
that would have brought them out. The subjective ground for them is, however, still there. And because at the level of
her inner phenomenal life she simply finds things she encounters mattering to her in a certain way, this has enormous
effects on her imaginative capacities, on what characteristics of a situation she will identify as salient, on what, for
her, counts, and hence, on which moral demand she considers to be at play. In other words, the propensity conditions
how an individual understands and interprets her situation and its demands” (Mariña 2017, pp. 196-197).
39
The argument that Kant makes in 6:39 appears to have more in common with the rhetorical enthymeme than
the formal syllogism. Traditionally, the enthymeme has been defined in the following manner: “The Enthymeme must
consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these
propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need to even mention it; the hearer adds it himself” (Rhetoric 1357a16-1 8).
For an example, consider the formal syllogism:
38
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this reason, we should take note of the fact that Kant calls the propensity to evil a potentiality for
sin: “... When we enquire into the origin of evil, at the beginning we still do not take into account
the propensity to it (as peccatum in potentia) but only consider the actual evil of given actions
according to the evil's inner possibility, and according to all that must conspire within the power
of choice for such actions to be performed” (6:40-41).
Let us now try to reconstruct Kant's reasoning that leads him to assert that radical evil is
universal among human beings. There are three points to consider here. First, evil is a possibility
for the entire race. This is where Kant's anthropological research enters the picture. For this
anthropological research is not only useful in disproving the competing hypotheses on the moral
bent of the human species, but the same research also serves to show that this evil cannot be
confined to any sub-section of the human species: every human being is capable of evil-doing.
Second, this possibility can only be explained through the presence of a dispositional property

All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
---Therefore, Socrates is mortal
From this formal syllogism, an enthymeme may be constructed by leaving either the major premise or the
minor premise unstated. If it is the major premise that is left unstated, then the enthymeme we have constructed will
state: Socrates is a man; therefore he is mortal. If it is the minor premise that is left unstated, then the enthymeme we
have constructed will state: All men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal.
Kant writes in 6:39 the following: “A member of the English Parliament exclaimed in the h eat of debate:
“Every man has his price, for which he sells himself”. If this is true (and everyone can decide by himself), if nowhere
is a virtue which no level of temptation can overthrow, if whether the good or evil spirit wins us over only depends
on which bids the most and affords the promptest pay-off, then, what the Apostle says might indeed hold true of human
beings universally, “There is no distinction here, they are all under sin – there is none righteous (in the spirit of the
law), no, not one.” (6:38-39). This would give us the following:
If “Every man has his price, for which he sells himself”, then there is a universal propensity to evil
This would form the major premise of the syllogism. The minor premise and conclusion are both left out by
Kant here (to be supplied by the reader). This makes the argument in 6:39 an enthymeme (rhetorical syllogism) rather
than a formal syllogism. But it is evident that the formal syllogism Kant had in mind can be reconstructed so:
If “Every man has his price, for which he sells himself”, then there is a universal propensity to evil
It is true that “Every man has his price, for which he sells himself”
---Therefore, there is a universal propensity to evil
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belonging to the entire human species. By describing radical evil in terms of a propensity, Kant
makes it a disposition that is innate to all human beings. Insofar as the propensity to evil is the
disposition to succumb to evil when subjected to great enough temptation, it is not necessary for
Kant to prove that every human being has succumbed to evil, because it is possible that there are
human beings for whom the condition has not been met. What is important here is that the human
being in question has not succumbed to evil as a matter of fact, not as a matter of necessity.40
Third, given that every human being has this innate disposition, it must be concluded that human
nature is evil, the original predisposition to good notwithstanding. The reason for this is because
ethical rigorism has ruled out the possibility that human nature might be morally neutral and the
possibility that human nature might be partly good and partly evil. And while experience inclines
us towards ethical latitudinarianism, if we had to describe human nature as either good or evil, we
would have to describe human nature as evil, because even the smallest imperfection mars the
beauty that is moral perfection: For whosoever keeps the whole law, yet offend at one point, he is
guilty of all (James 2:10).41

40

Kant raises the possibility of sages with finite holy wills in the Metaphysics of Morals, for example, who
might be examples of human beings who never succumb to evil (6:383). As representatives of human morality in its
highest stage, the sage would be an example of a human being who has restored his original predisposition to good
(6:46). And succumbing to temptation would be impossible for the sage on account of this purity, that is, being free
from the influence of any incentive other than that of duty (6:383).
41
In this reading, the argument for radical evil bears an interesting resemblance to transcendental arguments as
interpreted by Karl Ameriks. Ameriks interprets transcendental arguments as regressive arguments. In reading the
argument of the Analytic as a regressive argument, Ameriks ascribes to it the following structure: “… Empirical
knowledge (‘experience’) is possible only if the ‘original synthetic unity of apperception’ applies to it, which is
possible only if pure concepts have validity, and this in turn requires that transcend ental idealism be true. Such an
argument would be transcendental in that it too would explain that a body of knowledge is possible only if there are
representations (pure concepts) of a certain kind” (Ameriks 2003, p. 54). This is to be contrasted with the progressive
approach: “The major departure of this interpretation is that it takes the Critique to accept empirical knowledge as a
premise to be regressively explained rather than as a conclusion to be established. Peter Strawson, Jonathan Bennett,
and Robert Paul Wolff have insisted at length that such an argument is undesirable, uninteresting and not
representative of Kant’s best intentions. They all represent the transcendental deduction as basically aiming to
establish objectivity, i.e. to prove that there is an external and at least partially lawful world, a set of items distinct
from one’s awareness, and to do this from the minimal premise that one is self-conscious” (Ameriks 2003, p. 55).
Likewise here, we begin with the idea that moral evil in human beings is a premise to be regressively explained rather
than a conclusion to be established. From here, we posit the existence of radical evil as the condition for the possibility
of the moral evil in human beings. This is different in comparison to other interpretations of the argument for radical

88
Frailty and Depravity
A problem arises at this point. Kant refers to the evil in human nature exclusively as radical
evil. This obscures the fact that radical evil can be understood as either a fundamental maxim or
as a propensity. Radical evil, as a fundamental maxim that is evil, is the intelligible ground of all
our (empirical) maxims. It determines the form that our maxims take. For a maxim is good or evil
depending on whether we subordinate the moral incentive or the nonmoral incentive that we have
incorporated into our maxims. If the fundamental maxim of the human being is good, then he will
take the moral law as the sole sufficient determining ground of his maxims, and the nonmoral
incentive will invariably be subordinated to the moral incentive in his maxims. But when the
fundamental maxim of the human being is evil, then the moral law is merely one among the many
grounds that can determine his maxims, and this makes possible the subordination of the moral
incentive to the nonmoral incentive in his maxims. But as the propensity to evil, radical evil is the
phenomenal ground of all our wayward inclinations. It is (partially) the source of the matter of our
maxims, insofar as our inclinations determine what can serve as incentives for us. These incentives
(moral and nonmoral) are then incorporated into our maxims, and our maxims are determined to
be good or evil depending on which incentive is given priority in the maxim. Therefore, absent the
propensity to evil, a real opposition between the moral incentive and the nonmoral incentive would
be impossible, and the human being’s power of choice would always act on the moral incentive it
has incorporated into the maxim. Now there would be no problem if either conception of radical
evil can be reduced to the other, because then Kant would just be speaking of one thing in two
ways, and not of two distinct things. As we will demonstrate in this section, however, neither

evil that argue progressively from a condition that is present in every human being, e.g. the embodied nature of human
beings (Michalson) or the social nature of human beings (Wood), and prove that radical evil is present in every human
being on account of their having this condition. It is after they have proved that radical evil exists that they accept the
moral evil in human beings.
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conception of radical evil is reducible to the other. For the evil of depravity is grounded in a
fundamental maxim that is evil. Therefore, if we take radical evil to be a propensity only, depravity
becomes incomprehensible as an evil. Yet the opposite course of action is also closed to us. If we
take radical evil to be a fundamental maxim only, then frailty becomes incomprehensible as an
evil. For the evil of frailty does not consist in any maxim, but in the real opposition of inclinatio ns
that are able to prevent a maxim from being efficacious. Radical evil seems, therefore, to be a
patchwork of disparate ideas, connected to each other by nothing more than the empirical deeds
that they are supposed to ground.42

For Palmquist, radical evil is to be sharply distinguished from the propensity to evil. He writes: “Although
the term ‘radical evil’ appears in the title of Book One, Kant mentions it only a few times in the main text itself.
Nevertheless, it should not be regarded as a mere synonym for the evil propensity. Rather, it is Kant’s te chnical name
for the mysterious noumenal origin of our propensity to evil. Naming it in this way does not actually explain it, so
much as indicate the extent of our ignorance of its origin” (Palmquist 2000, p. 157n). Neither is radical evil identical
with the fundamental maxim, because according to Palmquist, the propensity to evil is the cause of the choice of an
evil fundamental maxim, and not the result of this choice (Palmquist 2000, p. 158). Palmquist’s account of radical
evil can be broken down into three steps.
In the first step, the good predisposition provides a person with the potential to do good (Palmquist 2000, p.
151). This is represented in the following manner:
42

good predisposition

original innocence



potential to do good

In the second step, radical evil corrupts the potential to do good into the propensity to evil (Palmquist 2000,
p. 158). Palmquist does not explain how this corruption takes place, but is content in following Kant in saying that
this corruption is contingent (and therefore free) and universal to every human being. Hence:

potential to do good



radical evil


propensity to evil

In the third step, Palmquist describes what happens as: “The choice of an evil maxim as supreme realizes the
human propensity to evil by producing an evil heart” (Palmquist 2000, p. 158). And this is represented as:

propensity to evil

act of choosing an evil supreme
maxim



an evil heart

This means that Palmquist’s reading does not have a difficulty with the tension between frailty and depravity,
because he does not trace frailty to the propensity to evil and depravity to the evil fundamental maxim. The three
gradations arise at Step 2 of his process, because they are, according to Palmquist, the corruption of the good
potentialities of the human being (Palmquist 2000, pp. 152-153). The predisposition to animality is corrupted by
radical evil into frailty, or a self-love rooted in sensibility. The predisposition to humanity is corrupted by radical evil
into impurity, or a self-love rooted in understanding. And the predisposition to personality is corrupted by radical evil
into wickedness, or a self-love rooted in judgment. It seems, however, that this interpretation of the origins of the three
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Let us consider why radical evil, considered as a propensity, is unable to ground empirica l
deeds of depravity. Fundamentally, depravity has to do with our maxims, as can be seen in Kant’s
account of depravity: “… The depravity (vitiositas, pravitas) or, if one prefers, the corruption
(corruption) of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to
others (not moral ones)” (6:30). In depravity, the Willkür freely chooses to subordinate the moral
incentive to nonmoral incentives, and this subordination is what makes the Willkür’s choice an
evil one. Per the incorporation thesis, we know that the Willkür makes this choice by incorporating
the relevant incentive into its maxim: “… Freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic,
entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as
the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universal rule for himse lf,
according to which he wills to conduct himself)” (6:24). It is therefore safe to say that the
incentives play no role in Kant’s account of what it means to act depravedly. The problem is that
for Kant a propensity is a subjective ground for the possibility of an inclination or a habitual desire
(6:29). And these inclinations and habitual desires become incentives for us to act, albeit not moral
ones. It follows then that the propensity to evil grounds our nonmoral incentives to act in a manner
contrary to the moral law. But according to the incorporation thesis, the incentives do not
determine the power of choice to action: it is only determined to action through the incorporatio n
of one of these incentives into the maxim. The propensity therefore arrives at the scene too early,
before any wrongdoing has even occurred. Depravity places the moral responsibility of
wrongdoing squarely on the Willkür, and we do not choose whether or not we possess one incentive

gradations of evil is inconsistent with Kant’s declaration in 6:28, where he argues that the predisposition to personality
cannot be corrupted in the way Palmquist envisions, otherwise the moral law wou ld be unable to serve as an incentive
for the human being: “… A power of choice so constituted is a good character, and this character, as in general every
character of the free power of choice, is something that can only be acquired; yet, for its possibility there must be
present in our nature a predisposition onto which nothing evil can be grafted” (6:27 – see also 6:28).
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or the other, so much as we choose how to subordinate the incentives that we do possess, and so
there seems to be a fundamental mismatch between the evil of depravity and its ground in radical
evil.
Let us consider why radical evil, considered as a fundamental maxim, is unable to ground
the empirical deeds committed out of frailty. The starting point of our discussion here is a passage
that comes later in the Religion, in which Kant writes: “The original good is holiness of maxims in
the compliance to ones’ duty, whereby a human being, who incorporates this purity into his
maxims, though on this account still not holy as such (for between maxim and deed there is still a
wide gap), is nonetheless upon the road of endless progress towards holiness” (6:46-47). It is
surprising to see Kant say that there is a wide gap between the maxim and the deed. For consider
the implications of this assertion: According to the incorporation thesis, an incentive must be
incorporated into a maxim in order for the will to be determined to action. But once this incentive
has been incorporated into the maxim, how is it possible that the will remains undetermined with
respect to action? If the transition from the maxim to the deed is liable to fail, then there must be
a reason for this. That is, we need to posit the existence of an obstacle that needs to be overcome
before the maxim can be translated into action. But there isn’t any obstacle that can impede our
maxims in this way except for our feelings and inclinations, because no other counterweight exists
within us that can stand up to the moral law in this manner, as Kant observes in the following
passage from the Groundwork: “The human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight
to all the commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of the highest respect
– the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under
the name happiness” (4:405). But the incorporation thesis has already ruled out these feelings and
inclinations, because to have reached this point in our reasoning process means that the incentives
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of sensibility have already been rejected in favor of incorporating the incentive of the moral law
into our maxim to form the good maxim. The feelings and inclinations therefore seem to play a
double role, not only as the incentives which, when incorporated into a maxim, allow for an act of
depravity, but also as an additional obstacle that can prevent a good maxim from becoming a good
deed.
It would be easy to dismiss this separation between the maxim and the deed if the passage
above was just an isolated incident. But this way out is not available to us, because there are crucial
aspects of Kant’s account of radical evil that assume just such a separation of the maxim from the
deed. The discussion of frailty, which is represented as a grade of the propensity to evil, proceeds
in the following way: “... The frailty (fragilitas) of human nature is expressed even in the complaint
of an Apostle: “What I would, that I do not!” i.e. I incorporate the good (the law) in to the maxim
of my power of choice; but this good, which is an irresistible incentive objectively or ideally (in
thesi), is subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in comparison with inclination) whenever the
maxim is to be followed” (6:29). This passage is important for the argument we are making in this
section, since it shows that, according to Kant’s analysis of frailty, there is only one maxim present
in a given case of frailty, and since the moral law has been prioritized in this maxim as its incentive,
the only maxim present in a given case of frailty is a good maxim. But even though the only maxim
present in a given case of frailty is a good maxim, it is somehow possible for the moral incentive
to be resisted, and the good deed that is supposed to follow from the good maxim never
materializes, from which results the evil of frailty. The account of frailty makes it clear that an
action prescribed by our maxim need never come to pass in deed, and insofar as frailty is
represented as a weakness for desires and inclinations that are contrary to the moral law, it also
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confirms our earlier speculation that the inclinations are the obstacles that prevent our chosen
maxim from becoming a deed.
This account of frailty is not easily reconciled with the idea that evil lies in our maxims.
Frailty is not an evil that can be represented in terms of a choice of an evil maxim. Here we are
not confronted with a choice between the moral incentive and nonmoral incentives. In the case of
frailty, this choice needs to have already happened, in which we have chosen to subordinate the
nonmoral incentive in our maxim to form a good maxim.43 For it is only after we have made this
choice to subordinate the nonmoral incentive, and constructed a good maxim, that it becomes
possible for the good maxim to fail to become a good deed. But this failure cannot be explained
by positing an opposing maxim. This is because a maxim is a general principle for our actions, by
reference to which we will our conduct (6:24). Therefore, if our power of choice is determined to
ɸ, it is because it falls under a universal rule we have constructed for ourselves, according to which
we have willed to conduct ourselves. And if our power of choice is determined to not ɸ, it is
because it falls under a different universal rule that we have constructed for ourselves, according
to which we have willed to conduct ourselves. This means that if the reason a good maxim failed
to become a good deed consists in the interference of an opposing maxim, then there would have
to be two universal rules in us, and that we have willed to conduct ourselves in two opposing ways.
But how then would we be able to break the stalemate between the opposing maxims that direct

Baron makes a similar observation regarding frailty in the following passage: “Moral weakness involves
resolving to do something which one believes is morally required, and failing to act accordingly (without any change
of heart as to what one should do). But how is this possible, on the model of human agency that Allison attributes to
Kant? It cannot be that the agent is overcome by desire, since according to the Incorporation Thesis, no desire can
move the agent unless she incorporates it into her maxim. The Incorporation Thesis would seem to require a denial of
the possibility of weakness” (Baron 2008, p. 433). For the entire point of the Incorporation Thesis is to deny the
possibility of the human being’s power of choice being moved to action (and presumably inaction also) by an incentive
(6:24). The human being must have input on what determines him to action by incorporating the inc entive into his
maxim (6:24). Whereas moral weakness, as Baron understands it, represents the human being as being overcome by
desire, and this seems antithetical to the point Kant is trying to make in the Incorporation Thesis.
43
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us to ɸ and to not ɸ? It would require an appeal to a maxim that is higher up in the human being’s
hierarchy of maxims to break the stalemate. But every maxim has its ground in a higher maxim.
Therefore, if we have a maxim that directs us to ɸ and a maxim that directs us to not ɸ as our
maxims, then both of them must be grounded in a higher maxim, and since they cannot both belong
to the same series, they would have to each be grounded in a different first subjective ground for
the adoption of maxims, which is absurd, because different fundamental maxims cannot coexist in
the same subject. And if the good maxim is not opposed by an evil maxim, but is instead opposed
by inclinations that interfere with the designs of our good maxims, then it would be useless to posit
the formation of another good maxim tasked with overcoming these opposing inclinations. For
this maxim would need to become a deed in order to be efficacious in overcoming the opposing
inclinations, but insofar as there is a wide gap between the maxim and the deed, this maxim can
also be prevented from becoming a deed by the interference of our desires and inclinations, and
the regress would continue unto infinity. And since this regress is never resolved, the gap between
maxim and deed remains unbridged, and no maxim belonging to the series will ever become a
deed.
Allison is not blind to the problems that frailty creates for the account of evil associated
with the incorporation thesis. This is why he addresses frailty specifically in the following passage:
“… The so-called lack of sufficient strength to follow moral principles when they conflict with the
claims of inclination reflects the lack of full commitment to these principles in the first place. Thus,
self-deception enters the picture at the very beginning, depicting what is in reality a free evaluatio n
on one’s part as a “weakness” for which one is not responsible” (Allison 1990, p. 159). But this
proposal is not a solution to the problem so much as an attempt to make the problem go away,
because the distinction between frailty and depravity no longer exists after Allison is done with it,
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insofar as all that is left is a depravity that involves self-deception (or frailty) and a depravity that
does not (or depravity per simplicitur). In other words, this proposal reinterprets the concept of
frailty, in which Allison’s “basic hermeneutical assumption is that Kant’s entire account of evil,
including the brief discussion of frailty, must be understood in light of the governing principle that
“Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or
evil, he is or is to become” (Rel 6:44; 40)” (Allison 1996, p. 120). This is however baldly
contradicted by what Kant himself actually says about frailty, which is that the “irresistib le
incentive objectively or ideally (in thesi), is subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in comparison
with inclination) whenever the maxim is to be followed” (6:29). This distinction is not preserved
when frailty is turned into depravity, which “reverses the ethical order as regards the incentives of
a free power of choice” (6:30). The point is that frailty involves the formation of a good maxim,
as Kant says “I incorporate the good (the law) into the maxim of my power of choice” (6:29), and
this is incompatible with its being depravity, insofar as depravity involves an evil maxim, or “the
propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to
others (not moral ones)” (6:30), which is an altogether different matter than self-deceptive ly
treating the temptations we face as directly determining our power of choice to action, contra the
incorporation thesis.

Conclusion
There is a formal proof for the universality of radical evil, and it is exactly where it purports
to be. The multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before us
proves that moral evil is possible for every human being, even the best among us. The propensity
to evil has to be posited to ground this possibility, as a condition for the possibility of moral evil
in every human being. But this development is bittersweet, because the conception of radical evil
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as propensity is distinct from the conception of radical evil as fundamental maxim. Now Kant
considers the empirical character of a human being to be grounded on his intelligible character:
“… But the very same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in itself, also
views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time and himself as
determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason; and in this existence of his nothing
is, for him, antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action – and in general every
determination of his existence changing conformably with inner sense, even the whole sequence
of his existence as a sensible being – is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligib le
existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as
a noumenon” (5:97-98). The empirical character of a human being is multifaceted. It includes his
inclinations and desires, but also the beliefs he holds and the hopes he wishes for. The propensity
to evil is only one facet of a human being’s character. But the choice of the fundamental maxim
constitutes the intelligible character of a human being. Therefore it must be concluded: an evil
fundamental maxim is the condition for the possibility of the propensity to evil, albeit as nothing
more than a trivial metaphysical corollary of the proposition that the world of understanding
contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws (4:453). And if we are to move
beyond this purely formal understanding of the grounding of the propensity to evil, we must give
flesh to the bare-bones concept of a fundamental maxim through the moral-psychological terms of
Kant’s practical philosophy.
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CHAPTER 3. THE NOUMENAL ORIGINS OF RADICAL EVIL

Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.
Matthew 5:48
Introduction
How are we to prove that radical evil is really possible? The most controversial aspect of
Critical philosophy is its transcendental idealism, in which Kant separates the appearances from
the things themselves. Everything that is intuited in space and time is mere appearance, and thereby
relegated to the sensible world. And everything that exists independently of us and our sensibility
is a thing in itself, and thereby relegated to the intelligible world. But the concept of radical evil
stands astride these two worlds, with one foot in the sensible world and the other in the intelligib le
world. This is because the concept of radical evil, considered as a fundamental maxim, is distinct
from the concept of radical evil, considered as a propensity. As a fundamental maxim, radical evil
is described by Kant as the subjective ground of the adoption of maxims (6:25). It is the intelligib le
ground of all our maxims, hence it is assigned to a place in the intelligible world. As a propensity,
however, radical evil is described by Kant as the subjective ground of the possibility of an
inclination (6:29). It is the sensible ground of all our wayward inclinations, and hence it is assigned
to a place in the sensible world. The real possibility of radical evil consists in being able to bring
together these two disparate concepts that Kant has subsumed under the heading “radical evil”,
first by explaining how an evil fundamental maxim is even possible without reference to the
sensible world, and second by explaining how the fundamental maxim is the intelligible ground
of the natural propensity to evil.
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It is by understanding what the noumenal choice of the radical evil consists in that its real
possibility may be ascertained. To do so, the following question must be asked: How is the choice
of a fundamental maxim that is evil even possible? For moral evil involves the incorporation of a
sensible incentive, which is unavailable to us, as atemporal first causes making the choice of our
fundamental maxims. Indeed, since the only incentive available to us is the moral one, we should
all have fundamental maxims that are good, yet we do not. The only way out of this conundrum is
to say that we incorporate the only incentive that is available to us, the moral incentive. The human
being cannot escape the moral law that is engraved upon his heart. His choice consists in the
attitude he adopts with respect to the moral law, which he can either embrace wholeheartedly, or
accept begrudgingly. The wholehearted embrace of the moral law represents a moral strength of
will that would never waver. While the mere acceptance of the moral law testifies to a moral
strength of will that is imperfect, which will not remain steadfast before the obstacles it will face.
And the human being cannot avoid facing these obstacles, which are placed before him because
they belong with necessity to the possibility of his being.
First, the human being is always embodied. And because he is embodied, the human being
will experience the sensuous impulses that come with having a body. The human being desires
happiness: “… There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all
rational beings (insofar as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent beings), and therefore
one purpose that they not merely could have but that we can safely presuppose they all actually do
have by a natural necessity, and that purpose is happiness” (4:415). The moral weakness of a
human being in the face of obstacles of this sensuous nature is frailty. Second, the human being
can never be without his humanity. And this predisposition to humanity in him gives rise to a
conception of happiness that is not merely sensuous, which animals also have, but also
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comparative: “The predispositions to humanity can be brought together under the general title of
a self-love which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is,
only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy” (6:27). The problem
with self-love is not that the human being desires happiness for himself, but that he has a tendency
to put this desire for happiness above the dignity of his fellow man. Self-love has the tendency to
turn into self-conceit. And the moral weakness of the human being that allows self-love to be
corrupted into self-conceit is depravity. Frailty and depravity are not disparate concepts that Kant
has subsumed under the heading “radical evil”. Radical evil is the moral weakness of will that is
the condition for the possibility of frailty and depravity. The human being freely determines for
himself his relationship with the moral law, and in so doing, inevitably falls to frailty and depravity.

Noumenal Choice
Every moral evil has to be a deed, and radical evil is no exception. But there is a
considerable difference between radical evil and the evil deeds that stem from it, as Kant notes in
the following passage: “And yet by the concept of a propensity is understood a subjective
determining ground of the power of choice that precedes every deed, and hence is itself not yet a
deed” (6:31).44 Kant addresses this issue by introducing a distinction between two senses in which

Kant makes note of a possible contradiction in the concept of a propensity to evil when he writes: “Nothing
is, however, morally (i.e. imputably) evil but that which is our own deed. And yet by the concept of a propensity is
understood a subjective determining ground of the power o f choice that precedes every deed, and hence is itself not
yet a deed” (6:31). Now an act of the human being is called a deed when it is caused by the free exercise of his will.
If an act is not a deed, then it may not be imputed to the human being, and an y evil that results from it would be a
physical evil, but not a moral evil. If the propensity to evil is to be a moral evil, and not a physical evil, it would
therefore have to be a deed. But a propensity is also a subjective determining ground of the powe r of choice that
precedes every deed, and hence is itself not yet a deed, and so there can only be a propensity to physical evil, and not
a moral one. Kant’s way out from this is to distinguish between two senses of the word “deed” in the following
passage: “Now the term “deed” can in general apply just as well to the use of freedom through which the supreme
maxim (either in favor of, or against, the law) is adopted in the power of choice, as the use by which the actions
themselves (materially considered, i.e. as regards the objects of the power of choice) are performed in accordance with
that maxim” (6:31). Both the intelligible deed through which the fundamental maxim is chosen and the empirical
deeds that either obey or resist the moral law materially are deeds, and can therefore be imputed to the human being.
44
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deed can be used. For a deed can either be empirical, or it can be intelligible. Empirical deeds are
deeds that take place in time, and these are deeds which can resist the moral law materially as
peccatum derivatum, that is, derivative sin (6:31). Radical evil, as the subjective determining
ground of the power of choice, precedes every empirical deed, and hence cannot itself be an
empirical deed, on pain of circularity. But empirical deeds are not the same as intelligible deeds.
Empirical deeds occur in the empirical realm and intelligible deeds occur in the intelligible realm.
Insofar as radical evil involves the adoption of a fundamental maxim that is in opposition to the
moral law by the free power of choice, it falls under the definition of a deed: “An action is called
a deed insofar as it comes under obligatory laws and hence insofar as the subject, in doing it, is
considered in terms of the freedom of his choice. By such an action the agent is regarded as the
author of its effect, and this, together with the action itself, can be imputed to him…” (6:223). This
means that if the adoption of radical evil is not a deed, then the human being cannot be regarded
as the author of this effect, and the adoption of radical evil cannot be imputed to him. Therefore,
insofar as the adoption of radical evil cannot be an empirical deed because it is supposed to precede
every empirical deed, the adoption of radical evil has to be an intelligible deed because it can be
imputed to us. And as an intelligible deed, it is the formal ground of every empirical deed contrary
to law, leading Kant to call it the peccatum originarium, that is, original sin (6:31).
But the adoption of radical evil is more than just a deed that takes place in the intelligib le
realm. It is also a moral evil. Remember that for something to be a moral evil, it must involve a
choice freely made by the Willkür. Now the Incorporation Thesis is defined by Kant in the

But when the concept of a propensity is understood as a subjective determining ground of the power of choice that
precedes every deed, and hence is itself not yet a deed, it is understood as a subjec tive determining ground of the
power of choice that precedes every empirical deed, and hence is itself not yet an empirical deed. This does not result
in a contradiction because the propensity to evil is adopted in the power of choice through an intelligible deed, in
which the human being’s fundamental maxim is determined to be against the law.
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following manner: “… Freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to
it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as the human being
has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universal rule for himself, according to
which he wills to conduct himself)” (6:24). This means that the presence of an incentive in a maxim
is never accidental. The human being must incorporate the incentives into his maxim in order to
act on them. Both the moral and nonmoral incentives end up being incorporated into the human
being’s maxim because he wills it, insofar as the human being is so constituted to be receptive to
both the moral law and to the impulses of his sensuous nature. As such, what makes a maxim good
or evil depends on the Willkür’s choice to subordinate the moral incentive to the nonmoral
incentive in its construction of the maxim, or vice versa. Kant writes: “… The difference, whether
the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he
incorporates into his maxim (not the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the form
of the maxim): which of the two he makes the condition of the other” (6:36). The maxim in which
the nonmoral incentive is subordinated to the moral incentive is considered to be good. And the
maxim in which the moral incentive is subordinated to the nonmoral incentive is considered to be
evil. In both these cases, Kant is insistent that the morality of the deed involves an active choice
on the part of the Willkür. For Kant, moral evil is not a simple failure to choose the moral incentive :
the Willkür chooses “a real and opposite determination” to the moral incentive, the nonmoral
incentive, and subordinates the moral incentive to it (6:22n).
This account becomes problematic when we try to apply it to the adoption of radical evil.
The adoption of radical evil, remember, is a deed that takes place in the intelligible realm. But by
placing this deed on the noumenal side of the noumenal-phenomena divide, Kant has put it beyond
the reach of the appearances. This means that nothing from the phenomenal side can have any

102
influence on the will as it makes the choice to adopt radical evil. The way Morgan puts it, “The
problem we face is that in imagining the will between morality and self-love, prior to its immers io n
in the world, we have pared away virtually every element of the self that might provide it with
reasons – its desires, its emotions, its values, its membership in a society, its history, its individ ua l
identity” (Morgan 2005, p. 77). In other words, the nonmoral (sensuous) incentives that have their
origins in the body cannot have any influence whatsoever on the choice being made in this
intelligible deed, because they belong on the wrong side of the divide. But a moral evil is only
produced when the Willkür chooses to prioritize the nonmoral incentive over the moral incentive
in his maxim. This becomes impossible if there is no nonmoral incentive that the Willkür can
subordinate the moral incentive to, because the only incentive available to the Willkür in the
intelligible realm is the incentive of morality. By placing the adoption of the fundamental maxim
on the noumenal side of the noumenal-phenomena divide, Kant has deprived this deed of the
material conditions necessary for its being an evil deed. For nothing is available to the Willkür in
the intelligible realm besides the moral incentive, and this means that the Willkür only has the
moral incentive to choose from when it forms its fundamental maxim. Therefore, the Willkür can
only choose to adopt a good fundamental maxim, not an evil fundamental maxim.
But even if, per impossibile, a nonmoral incentive could be made available to the Willkür
for this intelligible deed, the adoption of radical evil remains problematic. By placing this deed on
the noumenal side of the noumenal-phenomena divide, Kant has also put it beyond the laws of
sensibility. As such, the only law that can determine this intelligible deed is the law of reason, as
Kant notes in the Groundwork: “Since the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in
accordance with which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must
be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with natural laws, is
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not for this reason lawless but must instead be a causality in accordance with immutable laws but
of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an absurdity” (4:446). And a will that obeys
the law of reason would decide to adopt a fundamental maxim that is morally good. For the law of
reason is none other than the moral law. Conversely, a will that decides to adopt a fundame nta l
maxim that is morally evil cannot be a will that is solely determined by the laws of reason. Insofar
as a free will is not lawless, it follows that a will that is not determined by a law of reason must be
a will that is determined by natural laws. Therefore, even if a nonmoral incentive was made
available to the Willkür for this intelligible deed, there is no law of causality available to the Willkür
that could make for the adoption of radical evil. Insole describes the problem in the following
terms: “If the noumenal self is perfectly rational, it cannot do otherwise than the good, as ‘the
determination according to natural law is abolished on account of freedom’; but, if the noumena l
self can do otherwise than the good, then it would seem that it is not perfectly rational, in which
case it must be subjected in some way to sensuous and irrational impulses, in which case it is not
an atemporal first cause” (Insole 2013, p. 127).
From this, we can describe the problem that Kant created when he made the adoption of
radical evil an intelligible deed thusly: given that a rational being would choose the good, and
given that the noumenal free self is not subjected to any interfering sensuous impulses, it seems
that a rational noumenal being would not choose to do otherwise than the good (Insole 2013, p.
127). Indeed, this can be put in even stronger terms: given that a rational being is determined by
the laws of reason to choose the good, and given that the noumenal free self is given no alternative
to the good in the form of interfering sensuous impulses, it seems that a rational noumenal being
has no choice but to choose the good. But choosing the good in the context of this intelligible deed
involves adopting a fundamental maxim that is morally good, and this is not what Kant thinks
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actually happens – the doctrine of radical evil maintains that, in the context of this intelligible deed,
every human being chooses to adopt a fundamental maxim that is morally evil. This makes no
sense, given our considerations to this point. There aren’t any nonmoral incentives available to the
Willkür that has to decide the human being’s fundamental maxim, and there is no law through
which the Willkür, as a causality, is able to select anything other than a fundamental maxim that is
good. Despite this, Kant expects us to believe that the human being exercises his will (as a
causality) to select a fundamental maxim that is evil when the (intelligible) deed is done. This
drives us to ask the following question: How is it possible to choose a fundamental maxim that is
evil? And yet it must be possible to choose a fundamental maxim that is evil, because every human
being actually does choose a fundamental maxim that is evil.

Fallibility and Infallibility
The problem we are faced with here is this: As a noumenal first cause, we have neither the
material conditions (in the form of nonmoral incentives) nor the formal conditions (in the form of
a law of causality) to choose a fundamental maxim that is evil. The will is always determined by
the law of reason, to some degree. This is evident in Kant’s rejection of the diabolical will, which
chooses to resist the moral incentive: “… An evil reason as it were (an absolutely evil will), would
on the contrary contain too much [to provide a ground of evil in the human being], because
resistance to the law would itself be thereby elevated to incentive (for without any incentive the
power of choice cannot be determined), and so the subject would be made a diabolical being”
(6:35).45 The diabolical will is evil not because it chooses to incorporate the nonmoral incentive
Kant’s denial of the diabolical will is controversial. It goes against the intuitions that we have that human
beings can be motivated to action by the mere fact that the act is contrary to the moral law. As Augustine records in
his Confessions: “A pear tree there was near our vineyard, laden with fruit, tempting neither for color nor taste. To
shake and rob this, some lewd young fellows of us went, late one night (h aving according to our pestilent custom
prolonged our sports in the streets till then), and took huge loads, not for our eating, but to fling to the very hogs,
45
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into its maxims, nor because it chooses to subordinate the moral incentive to the nonmoral
incentive in its maxims, but because it elevates resistance to the moral law into an incentive: “To
think of oneself as a freely acting being, yet as exempted from the one law commensurate to such
a being (the moral law), would amount to the thought of a cause operating without any law at all
(for the determination according to natural law is abolished on account of freedom): and this is a
contradiction” (6:35). Kant’s point here is the same as it was in the Groundwork: the will is a kind
of causality, and “the concept of causality brings with it that of laws in accordance with which, by
something that we call a cause, something else, namely an effect, must be posited” (4:446). As
free, the causality of a diabolical will is considered to be independent from the determination of
the laws of nature. And as diabolical, the diabolical will is considered independent from the only
other law that could possibly determine it, the law of reason. The diabolical will is therefore a
causality that is lawless, and this is absurd insofar as the concept of causality brings with it the
concept of laws (4:446), which is why Kant describes the diabolical will as a contradiction. 46 In

having only tasted them. And this, but to do what we liked only, because it was misliked” (Confe ssions 2.4.9). In
diabolical evil, theory comes into conflict with experience, because every human being can understand and relate to
the state Augustine was in when he acted for no other reason than because it was morally forbidden. It was evil for
evil’s sake, and therefore diabolical evil. And yet, if Kant is right about diabolical evil, Augustine must have been
mistaken about his motivations, because he could not have made resistance to the moral law into his incentive for
acting. This is par for the course for Kant, given that he has argued: “Now through experience we can indeed notice
unlawful actions, and also notice (at least within ourselves) that they are consciously contrary to the law. But we
cannot observe maxims, we cannot do so unproblematically even within ourselves; hence the judgment that an agent
is an evil human being cannot reliably be based on experience” (6:20). Therefore, while Augustine might believe that
he was consciously acting contrary to the law in feeding the pears to hogs, he d oes not have the access to his own
maxims that he needs to support that belief. As such, no experience can confirm the existence of moral contrarianism,
or diabolical evil.
46
Caswell gives an alternative account of the contradiction of the diabolical will. He objects to the idea of a
will that violates the moral law out of a love for evil as such, which would subordinate the moral incentive to the
incentive to defy the moral law. This would result in a Gesinnung where “love of evil is the highest priority, and the
condition under which all other pursuits are promoted; either self-love or else morality assume second place, leaving
the other to occupy third place” (Caswell 2007, p. 151). But this is logically impossible. Caswell explains why in the
following passage: “The problem is that it is impossible to subordinate any interest to an interest in its opposite.
Consider a non-moral example. I may have competing interests in my career and in gold. Now it is possible for me to
subordinate my career interest to my gold interest, neglecting professional duties in order to spend more time golfing;
or, alternatively, I could make my job my higher priority, and play gold only when my work schedule allowed. But it
is not possible to subordinate my love of golf to a hatred of golf. If I did hate golf, and thus had an interest in avoiding
golf whenever possible, I could not pursue this interest in a way that accommodated my love of golf, or my interest in
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order to determine the difference between a will that has a good fundamental maxim in its heart
and a will that has an evil fundamental maxim in its heart, we must compare them both in order to
ascertain how the law of reason determines them (insofar as a will that is not determined by reason
would be a diabolical will).
In the Groundwork, Kant introduces the concept of an imperative by making a distinctio n
between two types of wills. Wills of the first type are fallibly determined by reason: “… If reason
solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will is exposed to subjective
conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with objective ones; in a word, if the
will is not in itself completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human
beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and
the determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is necessitation…” (4:412-413).
For Kant, to say that to do or to omit something would be good is to provide a reason or incentive
to do or to omit something. And to say that to do or to omit something would be subjectively good
is to say that the reason or incentive to do or to omit something is regarded by the subject as holding
for his own will. By contrast, to say that to do or to omit something would be objectively good is
to say that the reason or incentive to do or to omit something holds for the will of every rational
being. In a will that is fallibly determined by reason, it is possible for these two notions of good to
disagree. Although all rational wills may agree that to do or to omit something would be good, the
human being may decide that it is against his interests to do or omit something, and choose not to
act in accordance with the law of reason for prudential reasons. Such an action would be cognized

playing gold whenever possible. These two interests (golf-love and golf-hatred) cannot share a home in the same will”
(Caswell 2007, p. 152). In the same way, the moral law cannot be both an incentive and a disincentive for one and the
same will. If the moral law in us were not an incentive of the power of choice, then t here would be logical space for a
diabolical will that treats the moral law as a disincentive. But the moral law is an incentive of the power of choice
(6:22n). Therefore, the diabolical will that treats the moral law as a disincentive must at the same time treat the moral
law as an incentive, and this is a contradiction.
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as one that is objectively necessary but subjectively contingent (4:413). In such case, the moral
law has to necessitate the fallible will to comply with the dictates of reason, and this necessitatio n
takes the form of an imperative: “All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this
the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective condition is not necessarily
determined by it (a necessitation). They say that to do or to omit something would be good, but
they say it to a will that does not always do something just because it is represented to it that it
would be good to do that thing” (4:413).
This may be compared to the wills of the second type, which are infallibly determined by
reason: “If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such a being that are cognized as
objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a capacity to choose only
that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that is, as good”
(4:412). For a will that is infallibly determined by reason, there can be no disagreement between
the two notions of good. If it is said that to do or to omit something would be objectively good,
then this would be regarded as a reason or incentive for the subject to act, that is, as a reason or
incentive holding for its own will as well. This means that the moral law does not need to compel
the will that is infallibly determined to act according to its strictures, because such a will is by its
nature necessarily obedient to it (4:413). Therefore, the moral law does not take the form of an
imperative for the will that is infallibly determined: “A perfectly good will would, therefore,
equally stand under objective laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as
necessitated to actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can
be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence no imperatives hold for the
divine will and in general for a holy will: the “ought” is out of place here, because volition is of
itself necessarily in accord with the law” (4:414). As the passage indicates, there are two types of
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wills that are infallibly determined by reason. The divine will, which is the will belonging to an
infinite being, is one example of a will that is infallibly determined by reason. The holy will is the
other example of a will that is infallibly determined by reason, and Kant is almost certainly
referring to the holiness of the finite will in this context, in contradistinction to the holiness of the
infinite will (insofar as the divine will is trivially also a holy will). 47 Thus, finitude is not the
determinant as to whether reason fallibly determines the will, insofar as the will of a finite being
can be fallibly determined by reason, and it can also be infallibly determined by reason.
Kant’s treatment of the divine will is found in his Lectures on the philosophical doctrine
of religion. There he argues that God is free, despite not having the power to do otherwise. Hence:
The human being, however, can always decide something else, e.g. a human being,
instead of being benevolent in this case, could also not be that. But it is precisely
this which is a lack of freedom in the human being, since he does not always act
according to his reason; but in God it is not due to the necessity of his nature that
he can decide only as he does, but rather it is true freedom in God that he decides
only what is in conformity with his highest understanding (28:1068).

47

What is the distinction between an infinite being and a finite being? We know what an infinite being is for
Kant: It is an ens realissimum. Finite beings, then, are any beings that are not ens realissimum. Now an ens realissimum
is the most real being, and it is distinguished from finite beings that have only some reality, which is what Kant does
in the following passage: “Every thing must have something positive which expresses some bein g in it. A mere notbeing cannot constitute any thing. The concept de ente modo negativo is a concept of a non entis. Consequently, since
each thing must have reality, we can represent every possible thing either as an ens realissimum or as an ens partim
reale, partim negativum. But in the same case of any thing which has only some reality, something is still always
lacking, and hence it is not a complete thing. A highest thing, therefore, would have to be one which has all reality.
For in this one case I do have a thing whose thoroughgoing determination is bound up with its concept, because it is
thoroughly and completely determined with respect to all possible praedicates opposites. Consequently, the concept
of an ens realissimum is the very concept of an ens summum; for all things except this being are partim realia, partim
negativa and just because of this their concepts are not thoroughly determined” (28:1013 -1014). Therefore, a finite
being can be distinguished from an infinite being in two ways with respect to its reality: either it lacks some reality
that the ens realissimum has, or the reality that it shares with the ens realissimum is limited in some way. This is what
it means to be partly real and partly negative (ens partim reale, partim negativum): “… Thus if every negative concept
is derivative in that it always presupposes a reality, then every thing in its thoroughgoing determination as an ens
partim reale, partim negativum also presupposes an ens realissimum with respect to its realities and negations, because
they are nothing but limitations of the highest reality. For when I entirely remove some realities from the concept of
an ens realissimum, there arise negations which give me the concept of an ens partim reale, partim negativum when
I combine them with the remaining realities; hence the concept of an ens realissimum contains simultaneously the
ground for every other concept” (28:1014). It is this insight that forms the basis of Kant’s proof in The only possible
argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God (28:1015).
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There are, therefore, no subjective conditions (nonmoral incentives) in God that are opposed to the
objective conditions (moral incentives) in him. And evil is therefore a logical impossibility for
God. For moral evil is only possible as “a real and opposite determination of the power of choice”,
that is, as a real opposition, which is logically inconceivable in a perfect being, as Kant notes: “…
In the most real being of all there cannot be any real opposition or positive conflict among its own
determinations, for the consequence would be a deprivation or a lack, and that would contradict
its supreme reality” (2:86).48 In contrast to the divine will, the finite holy will is incapable of evil
due to its being a real impossibility for the finite holy will. The discussion of the finite holy will
takes place in the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant writes: “For finite holy beings (who could
never be tempted to violate duty) there would be no doctrine of virtue but only a doctrine of morals,
since the latter is autonomy of practical reason whereas the former is also autocracy of practical
reason, that is, it involves consciousness of the capacity to master one’s inclinations when they
rebel against the law...” (6:383). This is not a case where the subjective conditions (nonmoral
incentives) are always in accord with the objective ones (moral incentives), like in the divine will.
The finite holy will can experience temptation. But there is no level of temptation that is able to
overcome the finite holy will’s commitment to the moral law. Thus, evil is logically possible for
the finite holy will, insofar as nothing is being simultaneously affirmed and denied of the very

48

As Chignell notes, Kant never abandoned his commitment to the deductive validity of the Pre -Critical
argument given in The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God (1763). This is
in spite of the criticisms he made to the traditional arguments for the existence of God in the Transcendental Dialectic.
In the Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion, Kant refers to the Pre-Critical argument when he writes: “…
This proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot establish the objective necessity of an original being, but
establishes only the subjective necessity of assuming such a being. But this proof can in no way be refuted, because it
has its ground in the nature of human reason. For my reason makes it absolutely necessary for me to assume a being
which is the ground of everything possible, because otherwise I would be unable to know what in general the
possibility of something consists in” (28:1034). And in a Reflexion dated circa 1785, Kant again refers to the PreCritical argument when he writes: “The possibilities of things, which can only be regarded as determinations of a
single universal possibility, namely of the highest being, prove the existence of the realissimi as a sum-total,
consequently, if understanding is a reality, they prove that it is intelligent” (R6278). These passages are evidence that
Kant continued to conceive God as the ground of all realities (the ens realissimum) well into the Critical period of his
thought.
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same thing here. But it is really impossible for the finite holy will, insofar as the good tendency in
him is always sufficient to cancel out the evil tendency in him.
It is the subjective constitution of the will that determines whether the will is fallibly or
infallibly related to reason. If reason does not adequately determine the will, then when the fallib le
will is exposed to nonmoral incentives, it might not do something just because it has been
represented to it that it would be good to do that thing (4:413). But if reason adequately determines
the will, then even though the infallible will is exposed to nonmoral incentives, they have no
influence on the will whatsoever, because the will chooses only that which reason independently
of inclination cognizes as practically necessary (4:412). But is the subjective constitution of the
will an intrinsic property or an extrinsic one? Intrinsic properties are properties that a subject can
have even if it is lonely, that is, if it is the only thing in existence.49 Here we find Langton discussing
intrinsic properties with respect to substances: “A substance is a thing which can exist absolutely,

The concept of loneliness is introduced alongside that of accompaniment in the article “Psychophysical
Supervenience”, where Kim provides the following definition: G is rooted outside the objects that have it = def.
Necessarily any object x has G only if some contingent object wholly distinct from x exists (Kim 1981, p. 60). If G is
rooted outside the objects that have it, then some contingent object wholly different x has to exist in order for x to have
G. G would therefore entail that x must be accompanied. If G is not rooted outside the objects that have it, then no
contingent object wholly distinct from x has to exist in order for x to have G. G would therefore be compatible with x
being lonely. Lewis has objected to this identification of intrinsicness with loneliness in the following way:
“Loneliness is just as extrinsic as accompaniment, yet certainly it does not imply accompaniment and certainly it is
compatible with itself. If something is lonely – the cosmos, or some lesser otherworldly thing – its loneliness remains
unrooted” (Lewis 1983, p. 199). This is because an object’s being accompanied or lonely both depend on whether
something else exists, and whether a contingent object wholly dis tinct from x exists or not is, by definition, not up to
x. Therefore, accompaniment and loneliness are both extrinsic properties. This was followed by a later proposal in
which Langton and Lewis defined a property as intrinsic iff the following four condit ions were met:
49

1.
2.
3.
4.

A lonely thing can have the property G
A lonely thing can lack the property G
An accompanied thing can have the property G
An accompanied thing can have the property G

If these four conditions are met, then having or lacking G is independent of loneliness or accompaniment ,
and Langton and Lewis define intrinsicness as a property that is independent in this way (Langton -Lewis 1998, p.
334).
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independently of all its relations to other things. A substance is the kind of thing that can exist on
its own it can exist and be lonely. But nothing can exist without having properties. If a substance
can exist on its own, it must have properties that are compatible with existing on its own. If a
substance can be lonely, it must have properties compatible with loneliness. So a substance must
have intrinsic properties” (Langton 1998, p. 19). This discussion is applicable to our consideratio n
of the subjective constitution of the will. For the subjective constitution of the will consists of the
properties that make up the will of the subject. If these properties were absent, there would be no
will, no reason, and no (mental) subject. The subjective constitution of the will must therefore be
an intrinsic property (or a collection of intrinsic properties). The nonmoral incentives, by contrast,
have their origins in nature. If the phenomenal world were to suddenly cease to exist, these
nonmoral incentives would disappear along with their causes. All that would remain are the
intrinsic properties that make up the subject, the subjective constitution of his will, in its relation
to reason, be it fallible or infallible.

Vice and Virtue
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines virtue in the following manner: “Now the
capacity and considered resolve to withstand a strong but unjust opponent is fortitude (fortitudo)
and, with respect to what opposes the moral disposition within us, virtue (virtus, fortutido
moralis)” (6:380).50 This definition is given as part of his discussion of duty, which is the

It should be observed that Kant’s concept of virtue closely corresponds to the Scholast ic concepts of
continence and fortitude. Aquinas describes continence in the following way: “Continence denotes, by its very name,
a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence continence is properly said
in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that
reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the like,
which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason
dictates, as stated above. Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening
inclinations, as stated above. Wherefore the more they follo w the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the
passions urge the pursuance of an object” (ST II-II, Q 155, Art. 2). For Aquinas, there is a distinction between the
50
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necessitation of a will by the objective law of reason. According to Kant, necessitation here is a
kind of constraint, and he divides these constraints into external constraints and interna l
constraints. External constraints may be imposed on us by others, and the duties that can be coerced
in this way form the basis of Kant’s doctrine of rights (6:383). Internal constraints, by contrast,
cannot involve coercion by others.51 The duties that form the basis of Kant’s doctrine of virtue are
based on free self-constraint (6:383). Insofar as the impulses of nature that create obstacles to the
moral disposition within us can only be resisted through self-constraint, it follows that “virtue ”
and the capacity for “self-constraint” are one and the same thing. Insofar as virtue is a capacity,
however, we may understand it in terms of a counterfactual conditional: If the impulses of nature
create obstacles to the moral disposition, the virtuous person would withstand it. This does not

passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something and the passions which urg e a man to withdraw from
something. Continence curbs the desires that seek to tempt the human being away from reason, and therefore pertains
only to the former. Whereas it takes fortitude to endure and withstand those things to which we have an aversion,
under which the latter falls: “… It belongs to fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from followin g
reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal fro m
an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult
things, which can withdraw the will from following reason” (ST II-II, Q 123, Art. 3). By contrast, Kant considers the
faculty of desire to be responsible for the formation of both desire, which is connected to the feeling of pleasure, and
aversion, which is connected to the feeling of displeasure (6:211). Insofar as inclination is nothing more than a habitual
desire, we might call a disinclination a habitual aversion (6:212). Both of these can be obstacles to the fulfillment of
one’s duty, as Kant describes in the following passage: “Impulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within the
human being’s mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes powerful) forces opposing it, which he must judge that
he is capable of resisting and conquering by reason not at some time in the future but at once (the moment he thinks
of duty)” (6:380). Insofar as virtue is the capacity for resisting and conquering by reason these impulses of nature, it
represents the moral strength to dutifully refrain from what we are naturally inclined to do, and dutifully act what we
are naturally inclined to avoid.
51
The duties that fall under the doctrine of right pertain to our actions. These duties tell us what actions are
obligated or prohibited by the moral law. It is therefore possible for an external authority to compel us to act in
accordance with these duties. The duties that fall under the doctrine of virtue, by contrast, pertain to the incentives
from which we act and the end for which we act. This setting of ends is internal and performs according to our sole
discretion. Hence Kant writes: “… Determination to an end is the only determination of choice the very concept of
which excludes the possibility of constraint through natural means by the choice of another. Another can indeed
coerce me to do something that is not my end (but only a means to another’s end), but not to make this my end; and
yet I can have no end without making it an end for myself. To have an end that I have not myself made an end is selfcontradictory, an act of freedom that is not yet free” (6:381). That there is an end that is also a duty follows from the
concept of the categorical imperative (6:385). The way Louden explains it is so: “We must assume that there are
morally necessary ends, for if we don’t, “this will do away with all moral philosophy.” [Kant’s] reasoning is that if all
ends are contingent, then all imperatives become hypothetical. If we are free to accept or reject any goal put before us
whenever we are so inclined, then all commands prescribing maxims for actions are likewise open to rejection once
the goal is dismissed. In other words (by contraposition), if there is a categorical imp erative, there must be at least one
morally necessary end” (Louden 1986, p. 482).
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imply that there actually are impulses of nature in the human being that create obstacles to the
moral disposition in him. That is, it is possible for a person to have the capacity to withstand the
impulses of nature, and thereby be virtuous, even if he has no impulses of this kind, or even if the
impulses in him pose no obstacle to his moral disposition. It is a matter of fact, not a matter of
necessity, that every virtuous person has impulses of nature that create obstacles to the moral
disposition.52
The concept of virtue as moral fortitude is opposed by two distinct concepts, as evidenced
by what Kant writes in the following passage: “Virtue = +a is opposed to negative lack of virtue
(moral weakness = 0) as its logical opposite (contradictione oppositum); but it is opposed to vice
= +a as its real opposite (contrarie s. realiter oppositum)” (6:384). This distinction between logical
opposition and real opposition can be traced back to Kant’s Pre-Critical writings.53 In Negative

This fact about virtue needs to be remembered, given Kant’s definition of virtue in a later passage: “ Virtue is
the strength of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty. – Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the
obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are the natural inclinations, which can come into
conflict with the human being’s moral resolution...” (6:394). Now the strength of a human being’s maxims in fulfillin g
his duty is a capacity. It is a property that a human being has (or can have). This is distinct from the recognition of
strength, or the determination of whether a human being actually has this property. Therefore, in saying that strength
of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, Kant is indicating the epistemological role of
natural inclinations in revealing an underlying metaphysical fact, the moral fortitude of a human being. This is
precisely the point Kant makes in a later passage in the Metaphysics of Morals: “Virtue so shines as an ideal that it
seems, by human standards, to eclipse holiness itself, which is never tempted to break the law. Nevertheless, this is an
illusion arising from the fact that, having no way to measure the degree of a strength except by the magnitude of the
obstacles it could overcome (in us, these are inclinations), we are led to mistake the subjective conditions by which
we assess the magnitude for the objective conditions of the magnitude itself” (6:396-397).
53
Kant discusses this in the Religion in the context of noumenal and phenomenal virtue. He describes
phenomenal virtue in the following terms: “When the firm resolve to comply with one’s duty has become a hab it, it
is called virtue also in a legal sense, in its empirical character (virtues phaenomenon). Virtue here has the abiding
maxim of lawful actions, no matter whence one draws the incentives that the power of choice needs for such actions.
Virtue, in this sense, is accordingly acquired little by little, and to some it means a long habituation (in the observance
of the law), in virtue of which a human being, through gradual reformation of conduct and consolidation of his maxims ,
passes from a propensity to vice to its opposite” (6:47). In its empirical character, virtue is opposed by vice, which we
know from the Metaphysics of Morals consists in a real opposition to virtue (6:384). Insofar as vice is a material
resistance to the moral law, it represents the desires and incentives that “hinder the human heart in complying with
the adopted maxims” (6:29). If it has the moral strength to withstand these temptations, and comply with the maxims
that it adopts, these maxims become abiding. But Kant also describes noumenal virtue, and he does so in the followin g
terms: “However, that a human being should become not merely legally good, but morally good (pleasing to God) i.e.
virtuous according to the intelligible character (virtus noumenon) and thus in need of no other incentive to recognize
a duty except the representation of duty itself – that, so long as the foundation of the maxims of the human being
remains impure, cannot be effected through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the
52
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Magnitudes, Kant explains an opposition between two things as one thing canceling out what is
posited by the other (2:171).54 He then proceeds to explain logical opposition in the following
passage: “… The opposition consists in the fact that something is simultaneously affirmed and
denied of the very same thing. The consequence of the logical conjunction is nothing at all (nihil
negativum irrepraesentabile), as the law of contradiction asserts. A body which is in motion is
something; a body which is not in motion is also something (cogitabile); but a body which is both
in motion and also, in the very same sense, not in motion, is nothing at all” (2:171). In the case of
virtue, the logical opposition involves a positive predicate (moral fortitude) and a negative
predicate (the absence of moral fortitude – moral weakness). But moral fortitude admits to degrees
of perfection. For a person in whom moral fortitude is imperfectly present, the degree by which he
falls short of perfect moral fortitude is the degree to which he is morally weak. 55 It would therefore

disposition of the human being (a transition to the maxim of holiness of disposition)” (6:47). The contrast in this
passage is made in terms of purity and impurity. The purity of the human heart consists in th e adoption of the law
alone as sufficient incentive for the determination of the power of choice for what duty requires (6:30). But should
the moral strength be insufficient, the determination of the power of choice for what duty requires will need still o ther
(nonmoral) incentives, and this represents the impurity of the human heart (6:30). This describes the absence of moral
strength, also called moral weakness, which we know from the Metaphysics of Morals consists in a logical opposition
to virtue (6:384). Thus, noumenal virtue has its logical opposite in moral weakness, and phenomenal virtue has its real
opposite in vice.
54
Note that Chignell believes that real opposition can be divided into real oppositions that are subjectcancelling and real oppositions that are predicate-cancelling. A real opposition that is predicate-cancelling occurs
when the opposition between two predicates cancels out each of their respective effects. The standard example of this
type of real opposition is a ship that is subjected to a wind blowing east and a current flowing west. The effect of these
two forces on the ship cancel each other out, and the ship is moved neither to the east nor to the west. There is,
however, another type of real opposition, which Chignell describes u sing the following example: “Suppose A is the
concept of a, and that A contains the predicates being water, and being XYZ (where “XYZ” refers, as usual, to some
chemical compound other than H2 O). Most philosophers would agree that these predicates are not logically opposed
to one another. But they are really opposed when co-instantiated at a time; thus, in A they will “cancel out” not just
one another but also the real possibility of a as a whole. In other words, any joint and simultaneous instantiation of
these two predicates makes their bearer a really impossible being” (Chignell 2009, p. 173). The real opposition
described here is subject-cancelling. It consists in a conflict between the nature of a thing and “a predicate which is
not metaphysically compatible with that nature” (Chignell 2009, p. 173). And despite consisting in two positive
predicates, the result of this real opposition is not the cancellation of the predicates (and their effects), but that of the
subject, like in a logical opposition.
55
To consider another example, consider the predicates “light” and “dark”. Now it is evident that darkness is
the absence of light. The opposition between light and dark is therefore an opposition between a positive predicate
and its negation (a negative predicate), and not an opposition between two different positive predicates. Therefore, the
opposition between light and dark is a logical opposition and not a real opposition. But it does not follow from this
that the presence of these two predicates in the s ame subject is a contradiction (subject-cancelling). The presence of
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be right to say that such a person is morally weak, even though this does not mean he is completely
lacking in moral fortitude. Thus, what makes this a logical opposition is that a positive predicate
(virtue) is opposed to a negative predicate (the absence of virtue), and not that the opposition is
subject-cancelling (2:77).
This may be contrasted with real opposition, which Kant explains in the following passage:
“The second opposition, namely real opposition, is that where two predicates of a thing are
opposed to each other, but not through the law of contradiction. Here, too, one thing cancels out
that which is posited by the other; but the consequence is something (cogitabile)” (2:171). In a real
opposition, the two predicates are opposed to each other, and both these predicates are
simultaneously possible in one body. Kant oftentimes uses opposing motive forces as his
paradigmatic example of a real opposition: “The motive force of a body in one direction and an
equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction do not contradict each other; as
predicates, they are simultaneously possible in one body. The consequence of such an opposition
is rest, which is something (repraesentabile)” (2:171). But if one of these motive forces were to
suddenly be removed, the body would no longer be at rest. The resting state of the body is

these two predicates in the same subject is a contradiction when their magnitudes are inconsistent. If we say of a room
that it is both completely illuminated (light = 1) and completely d ark (light = 0), then the result would be a
contradiction. But if we say of a room that it is dimly-lit (light = 0.5), then there would be no contradiction, because
even though there is light in the room, there is also darkness to the extent that the room is not completely illuminated ,
and the same can be said of the darkness in the room, mutatis mutandis. Hence, Kant writes in his Lectures on the
philosophical doctrine of religion: “If one speaks of “mixed realities”, one is using an improper expression. For a
mixture of a reality and a negation, of something and nothing, cannot be thought. If I am to mix something with
something else, then I must have something actual; but negations are mere deficiencies. Hence if a thing has something
negative along with what is real (for example, a darkened room, etc.) then in this case there is no mixing in of the
negation, but rather a limitation of reality. Thus in the case cited I could not mix the negation darkness in with the
light as something real, but rather the negative darkness arose when I reduced and limited the reality light. But the
logical mixture of concepts is something wholly different. Here I can certainly say that the concept of a negation is
mixed in with my concept of reality, for my concept of something negative is a concept every bit as much as my
concept of something real is a concept” (28:1015). Therefore, the distinction between a logical opposition and a real
opposition does not consist in the fact that the opposition is subject -cancelling or predicate-cancelling, because both
logical opposition and real opposition can be either. It consists in the fact that a logical opposition is an opposition
between a positive predicate and its negation (a negative predicate), and a real opposition is an oppo sition between
two different positive predicates.
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maintained only because the motive force of a body in one direction has its effect (moveme nt)
cancelled out by an equal tendency of the same body in the opposite direction. Analogously, the
real opposition between virtue and vice may be thought of in terms of motive forces also. The
moral law provides a person with an incentive to act in a certain way. The impulses of nature might
provide a person with an incentive to not act in that way. As human beings, both these incentives
are always simultaneously present in a person (6:36). If the moral incentive does not have the
strength to overcome the nonmoral incentive, then the consequence of such an opposition is rest
(inaction), even though the human being has already made it his maxim to act in a certain way,
because “between the maxim and deed there still is a wide gap” (6:47). This is what happens in
frailty, when the “good, which is an irresistible incentive objectively or ideally (in thesi), is
subjectively (in hypothesi) the weaker (in comparison with inclination) whenever the maxim is to
be followed” (6:29). But if one of these motive forces were to suddenly be removed, the person
would no longer be inactive. The inaction of the person is maintained only because he does not
have the fortitude to overcome the obstacles that prevent him from carrying out his maxim. 56
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Let us take a moment and consider how divine grace would look like under this account of radical evil. In
this chapter, radical evil is portrayed as a choice that enfeebles the moral character of the huma n being. The resulting
absence of moral strength leaves the human being impaired in the action of his moral duties. The role of divine grace
is as assistance to the human being in the execution these moral duties. In particular, God provides the human being
with the moral strength that is lacking: “… Granted that some supernatural cooperation is also needed to his becoming
good or better, whether this cooperation only consist in the diminution of obstacles or be also a positive assurance, the
human being must nonetheless make himself antecedently worthy of receiving it; and he must accept this help (which
is no small matter), i.e. he must incorporate this positive increase of force into his maxim” (6:44). Per Mariña’s
discussion of divine grace, Kant has two notions of grace besides his general understanding of grace as God’s
unmerited favor (Mariña 1997, p. 385). She writes: “The first of these corresponds to a kind of grace that Kant believes
cannot be brought into our practical maxim. It has to do with God ’s supernatural cooperation with our becoming better
persons, that is, with how God may affect the will itself such that its very desires and motives will become different”
(Mariña 1997, p. 385). And then: “The second notion corresponds to the kind of divine aid which must be laid hold
of by the person. It differs from the first in that such aid does not alter a person’s will at the outset, but is, rather, so me
historical occurrence – a person or situation – to which the person must respond in some way. Only after the practical
and existential import of the person or situation has been assessed and interiorized by the individual can it affect a
person’s character” (Mariña 1997, p. 386). It is the second of these two conceptions of grace that is being describ ed
in the 6:44 passage. The human being must make himself worthy of this divine assistance, and only afterwards would
this positive increase in moral strength be made available to him.
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Now if we are going to be precise, it must be noted that the concept of virtue does not map
perfectly onto the concept of moral fortitude (or moral strength). Kant makes this clear in the
following passage: “Virtue signifies a moral strength of the will. But this does not exhaust the
concept; for such strength can also belong to a holy (superhuman) being, in whom no hindering
impulses would impede the law of its will and who would thus gladly do everything in conformity
with the law” (6:405). This is because the concept of duty is inapplicable to a holy being.
Remember that Kant defines an imperative in the Groundwork as the relation of an objective law
of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (4:413). He
then proceeds to make an exception for the divine will and the holy will, saying: “… The “ought”
is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with the law. Therefore
imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to
the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, for example, of the human
will” (4:414). Imperatives hold for the human being because the subjective constitution of his will
does not necessarily conform with the objective law of reason. Even though the imperative says
that to do or to omit something would be good, it says it to a will that may not do something just
because it is represented to it that it would be good to do that thing (4:413). But for a holy being,
in whom no hindering impulses would impede the law of its will and who would thus gladly do
everything in conformity with the law, there can be no imperatives. For this reason, the concept of
duty, understood as an action that someone is obligated to perform by the categorical imperative
(6:223), is inapplicable to holy beings. But the concept of virtue is inextricably linked to that of
duty in the following passage: “Virtue is, therefore, the moral strength of a human being’s will in
fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes
itself an authority executing the law” (6:405). The holy being does not encounter hindering
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impulses that would impede the law of its will like the human being does. Ipso facto, the holy
being does not have a duty to fulfill, and virtue, as the moral strength needed to fulfill one’s duty,
would be absent in a holy being.
Yet this does not mean that a holy being does not have moral fortitude (or moral strength).
For the opposition to moral strength can be divided into its logical opposite and its real opposite.
If we assume that a holy being does not have moral strength because there are no natural impulses
in him that can prevent his will from acting in conformity with the moral law, then we have
effectively ascribed to this holy being the logical opposite of moral strength, moral weakness. For
a being is morally weak to the extent that his moral strength is lacking. But this is absurd, because
a holy being in whom moral strength is absent would be neither holy nor superhuman. Insofar as
a holy being does not have hindering impulses that can prevent his will from acting in conformity
with the moral law, there is nothing that opposes the moral law in such a being. From this, what
follows is that moral strength does not have a real opposite in a holy being. Therefore, the moral
strength of a holy being has neither a logical opposite nor a real opposite. But this connection is
merely contingent, because it is possible to imagine a being whose moral strength has a logical
opposite, but not a real opposite. Imagine a being who is lucky – things have turned out for him
such that there are no hindering impulses that are obstacles to his will acting in conformity with
the moral law. The moral strength of a lucky being would therefore be without a real opposite as
a matter of fact. From this, however, we are not licensed to infer that the moral strength of a lucky
being has no logical opposite, because it is possible for such a being to be morally weak, but have
the good fortune of living his entire life without ever being faced with hard moral decisions. The
difference between the two cases lies in their attitude to the following counterfactual conditiona l:
If he encounters a hindering impulse in him, he would still act in conformity with the law. It is

119
impossible for any hindering impulse to exist in a holy being, and this makes the counterfactua l
conditional true for a being that is holy. But it is possible for a hindering impulse to exist in a being
who has had the good fortune to avoid them all his life, and he might not (or would not) act in
conformity with the moral law in the face of these hindering impulses, and this makes the
counterfactual conditional false for the being that was only lucky. His moral strength was lacking,
but because he had the good fortune to have avoided all hindering impulses, this moral weakness
never had the occasion to be revealed.
Given this analysis, the opposition between a fallible and infallible will should be
understood in terms of moral strength and its privative opposite, moral weakness. 57 For when a
will is infallibly determined by reason, it is so determined by the moral strength of the individ ua l.
But a will that is fallibly determined by reason does not imply that the individual is entirely without
moral strength. Insofar as his will is sometimes determined by reason, it is to that extent that he
does have moral strength. And when reason fails to determine his will, and he does not act as he
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In the traditional privation theory of evil, evil is understood as a privation of the good. It is an absence of a
goodness a thing ought to have. Hence we find Aquinas providing the following explanation of evil: “Now, evil is in
a substance because something which it was originally to have, and which it ought to have, is lacking in it. Thus, if a
man had no wings, that is not an evil for him, because he was not born to have them; even if a man does not have
blond hair, that is not an evil, for, though he may have such hair, it is not something that is necessarily due to him. But
it is an evil if he has no hands, for these he is born to, and should, have – if he is to be perfect. Yet this defect is not
an evil for a bird. Every privation, if taken properly and strictly, is that which one is born to have, and should have”
(SCG 3.1.6.1). The traditional privation theory of evil is predicated on the Aristotelian metaphysics of natures and
natural ends. It is by reference to the nature of a thing that we are able to say, concerning a good that is absent, that it
ought to be there, and its absence is a privation. In the case of sin, the will that ought to be ordered towards a higher
good, abandons this higher good for some inferior good instead. The absence of this right order is the privation that
constitutes sin: “Now there is a certain order of these various things that are man’s goods, based on the fact that what
is less primary is subordinated to what is more primary. Hence, a sin occurs in our will when, failing to observe this
order, we desire what is only relatively good for us, in opposition to what is absolutely good” (SCG 3.2.108.6). The
parallel to Kant is worth noting here. For Kant describes evil in much the same way: “Hence the difference, whether
the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between t he incentives that he incorporates into his
maxim (not in the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim): which of the two he
makes the condition of the other. It follows that the human being (even the best) is evil only b ecause he reverses the
moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims” (6:36). The human being ought to order his
incentives in the right way, by subordinating his nonmoral incentives to the moral incentive, and when he fails to do
so, the order that ought to be there, is not. Kant’s absence of right order is therefore a privation, and because evil just
is this reversal of the moral order of incentives, it follows that Kantian evil is a privation.
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knows he should, to that extent is his moral strength lacking. It is not a power that grounds this
deviation from the moral law, but rather the absence of power, a moral weakness. To borrow an
analogous example from Wood: “An indifferent swimmer may have the power to save himself if
he falls into deep water. But he has no power, only a possibility, of drowning in the same
eventuality. Although he has the power to swim, he may drown if he does not exercise the power
effectively, due (say) to confusion or panic. In the latter case, his possibility of drowning is due to
a kind of weakness or lack of power, though not to a lack of power to swim” (Wood 1984, pp. 8182). Likewise, a fallible will has the power to save itself in the face of temptation. All that it needs
to do is maintain its commitment to the moral law, and stand strong against the temptation. But
there is no opposing power that grounds the possibility where the will succumbs to temptation.
This possibility comes to be due to a lack of power (moral weakness). Although the moral strength
is there, and is sufficient to overcome the temptation, the fallible will may yet succumb to it if this
power is not exercised effectively, due (for example) to a wavering commitment to the moral law.
Put another way: “Not every possibility is a power. Some possibilities, in fact, are due to a lack of
power” (Wood 1984, p. 81). So we may surmise that it is only fortitude (moral strength) that is
something real and positive, whereas moral weakness is a negation of moral strength, a lack of
fortitude, a privation of its power. And because moral weakness is derivative of moral strength in
this way, it cannot exist without moral strength, even though moral strength can perfectly well
exist without moral weakness, as in the case of a holy being.

Frailty and Embodiment
In the Groundwork, Kant introduces the idea that there is a natural dialectic between
happiness and morality. The human being finds in himself a moral cognition, which he uses for
the practical appraisal of all moral matters: “Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable
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of being prepared for whatever might come to pass in it, I ask myself only: can you also will that
your maxim become a universal law? If not, then it is to be repudiated, and that not because of a
disadvantage to you or even to others forthcoming from it but because it cannot fit as a princip le
into a possible giving of universal law, for which lawgiving reason, however, forces from me
immediate respect” (4:403). This moral cognition is present in the common human understanding,
and although, Kant writes, it is not represented in the familiar formulae of the categorical
imperative, it is what the human being “actually has always before its eyes and uses as the norm
for its appraisals” (4:403-404). But this moral cognition does not have full run over the human
being unopposed. For Kant observes that, “The human being feels within himself a powerful
counterweight to all the commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of the
highest respect – the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which
he sums up under the name happiness” (4:405). Morality and happiness are both necessary
components of the natural dialectic. The conflict that the natural dialectic represents simply would
not be able to exist without either. Insofar as the human being is a creature that belongs to both the
sensible world and the intelligible world, he finds himself trapped in this conflict between his
duties and his inclinations, pulled in one direction by the demands of the moral law in him and
pulled in the other direction by the claims happiness makes on him.
Michalson traces these needs and inclinations to the fact of man’s embodiment. The reason
why radical evil is universal is explained, according to him, by this: “… The connecting thread is
provided by the body – every moral agent has one. What is more, the definitive feature of a moral
agent is the struggle to subordinate the incentives that emerge because we are embodied to the
incentive arising out of reason” (Michalson 1990, p. 69). It is because human beings are embodied
that they have the needs and inclinations that they do. If not so embodied, the needs and
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inclinations that form this powerful counterweight to the commands of duty would be gone as well,
and there would be nothing that stands in the way of the human being’s performance of his duty.
For this reason, Michalson makes the observation that “moral evil arises out of the competition for
control of character between sensuous and rational incentives: rationality would have no
competition if it were not embodied” (Michalson 1990, p. 69). Even so, Michalson is careful not
to blame the body for the moral evil in human beings, 58 because it has to be the Willkür that decides
to give in to the temptations arising from the human being’s needs and inclinations, instead of
obeying the commands of duty given to him by reason. For otherwise the moral evil in human
beings could not be imputed to him, and this evil would thereby cease to be a moral evil, and
become instead a physical evil. The point that emerges in Michalson’s discussion of embodime nt
is that, even though it is the free Willkür that goes wrong, it is the body that provides the free
Willkür with the opportunity to go wrong (Michalson 1990, p. 69). This is his explanation for the

58

Kant is unambiguous in his insistence that the moral evil of the human being is not to be blamed on his
natural inclinations (or the body from which they arise). This is evident in his criticism of the Stoics: “… However,
those valiant men mistook their enemy, who is not to be sought in the natural inclinations, which merely lack discipline
and openly display themselves unconcealed to everyone’s consciousness, but is rather as it were the invisible enemy,
one who hides behind reason and hence all the more dangerous” (6:57). There are two factors behind this insistence.
First, the incorporation thesis dictates that the power of choice cannot be determined to action through any incentive
except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (6:24). This would not be the case if the natural
inclinations were to blame for the human being’s moral evil. For it would mean that the nonmoral incentives supplies
by these natural inclinations were by themselves sufficient to determine the human being’s po wer of choice to action,
without any preceding act of incorporation. This would make the human being’s power of choice an arbitrium brutum,
and in the absence of freedom, there can be no moral responsibility. Second, the natural inclinations have their origins
in the human being’s predispositions to animality and humanity. The predispositions to animality is the source of the
human being’s mechanical self-love, from which his instincts for self-preservation, the propagation of the species,
and community with other human beings all originate (6:26). The predisposition to humanity is the source of the
human being’s comparative self-love, without which he would never have been able to form the idea of happiness, as
Wood explains: “Happiness is an idea we make for ourselves through imagination and reason. Put otherwise, the
desire for it is a second-order desire for the satisfaction of a certain rationally selected set of first-order inclinations. It
is far from being the case that every finite being of needs wou ld be able to form such an idea; nor, even if it did form
the idea, would every such being have a reason to desire its object” (Wood 1998, p. 145). Neither the predisposition
to animality nor the predisposition to humanity are evil. In fact, Kant says the precise opposite – they are both good.
Hence: “All these predispositions in the human being are not only (negatively) good *they do not resist the moral law)
but they are also predispositions to the good (they demand compliance with it)” (6:28). And neither of these would be
true if the natural inclinations arising from our original predispositions to animality and humanity were to blame for
the moral evil of human beings.
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“latent resentment” of the body that we find throughout the Religion: “There is, after all, a profound
connection between transcendental method and the “disembodied” standpoint – as though we “get
it right”, philosophically, only to the extent that we bracket (if not escape altogether) the conditions
of our embodiment, as well as the effects” (Michalson 1990, p. 69).
Michalson is exactly right on this point: rationality would have no competition if it were
not embodied. The decision we make in the noumenal realm determines our commitment to the
moral law. If we are committed to the moral law, then we will have the moral strength of will to
be unwavering in our duty, even when we are faced with obstacles. But if we are not committed
to the moral law, then our moral weakness of will becomes exposed when we are faced with
obstacles, and we end up wavering in our duty. These obstacles are not present in the noumena l
realm, and so the strength of our commitment to the moral law cannot be determined there, because
we cannot measure the degree of a strength except by the magnitude of the obstacles it could
overcome (6:396). It is when we are embodied, and become subject to the needs and inclinatio ns
that come with having a body, that there are obstacles that allow the strength of our commitme nt
to the moral law to be measured. For now the commands of reason are forced to compete with the
claims of happiness: “Now reason issues its precepts unremittingly, without thereby promising
anything to the inclinations, and so, as it were, with disregard and contempt for these claims, which
are so impetuous and besides so apparently equitable (and refuse to be neutralized by any
command)” (4:405). And now the precise nature of our relationship with the moral law begins to
matter. The finite holy will would be an example of a human being who has adopted a fundame nta l
maxim that is morally good. As such, he is resolute in his commitment to the moral law. It matters
little to the finite holy will that he is embodied, even though he is subject to the needs and
inclinations that come with having a body like any other human being, because these needs and
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inclinations can never tempt him to violate duty (6:383). By contrast, a human being who has
adopted a fundamental maxim that is morally evil has a relationship with the moral law that is
tenuous and easily shaken. When disembodied, his relation to the moral law is never put to the
test, and he follows the commands of reason unreflectively, because they are the only commands
available for him to follow. But once he is embodied, he becomes subject to the needs and
inclinations that come with having a body. He has now been provided with the opportunity to go
wrong, because his embodiment leaves him with needs and inclinations that tempt him to do
otherwise than his duty, and his capacity to resist them is only as strong as his relation to the moral
law.59 It is in becoming embodied that the natural dialectic is generated.
This natural dialectic that arises as a result of our embodiment makes possible the frailty
of human nature: “… I incorporate the good (the law) into the maxim of my power of choice; but
this good, which is an irresistible incentive objectively or ideally (in thesi), is subjectively (in
hypothesi) the weaker whenever the maxim is to be followed” (6:29). Frailty, as the general
weakness of the human heart in complying with adopted maxims (6:29), is a state of the human
being. In particular, frailty is a state of moral conflict, in which the sensuous incentives the human

To be precise, the human being’s capacity to resist the inclinations that he has de pends on his commitmen t
to either the moral law or to prudence. In the Collins lecture notes on ethics, he writes Kant as saying: “There is in
man a certain rabble element which must be subject to control, and which a vigilant government must keep under
regulation, and where there must even be force to compel this rabble under the rule in accordance with ordinance and
regulation. This rabble in man comprises the actions of sensibility. They do not conform to the role of the
understanding, but are good only insofar as they do so” (27:360). This self-control is a matter of having discipline,
which is “the executive authority of reason’s prescription over the actions that proceed from sensibility” (27:360). The
human being that has discipline disciplines himself according to either the rules of prudence (pragmatic discipline) or
the rules of morality (moral discipline). So it is written: “Hence we say that self-command consists in this, that we are
able to subject all principia to the power of our free choice. This may be considered under two rules, namely those of
prudence and morality. All prudence rests, indeed, on the rule of the understanding; but in the rule of prudence
understanding is the servant of sensibility, providing it with means whereby the inclina tion is satisfied, since in regard
to ends it is dependent on sensibility. But the true self-mastery is moral in character. This is sovereign, and its laws
hold a categorical sway over sensibility, and not as the pragmatic laws do, for there the understand ing plays off one
sensible factor against the rest. But in order for it to have a sovereign authority over us, we must give morality the
supreme power over ourselves, so that it rules over our sensibility” (27:360-361). When morality has supreme power
over the human being, it can be said that there is an autocracy of practical reason (6:383).
59
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being experiences threatens to undermine his resolution to do good. The state of frailty precedes
both the choice the human being makes to stand firm against the sensuous incentives that tempt
him astray, and the choice the human being makes when he succumbs to those same sensuous
incentives. For Kant, the moral conflict that is described here is the same, whether it is called frailty
or it is described as a natural dialectic between happiness and morality. And the origins of this
moral conflict lie in the fragility of the human being’s commitment to the good (the moral law),
because had the human being been resolute in his commitment to the moral law in the formatio n
of his fundamental maxim, then his embodiment and its attendant introduction of sensuous
incentives would not have given rise to this internal conflict. The irresistible incentive objectively
or ideally (in thesi), would have remained subjectively (in hypothesi) the stronger whenever the
maxim is to be followed. But because he had been irresolute in his commitment to the good (the
moral law) in the formation of his fundamental maxim, his embodiment and its attendant
introduction of sensuous incentives revealed this weakness that was already present in his heart.
And so the irresistible incentive objectively or ideally (in thesi), becomes subjectively (in
hypothesi) the weaker whenever the maxim is to be followed. Following Michalson, we might say
that the Willkür’s choice of how it relates to the moral law determines whether or not a moral
conflict will arise when it becomes embodied. And for the human being who has to struggle to
obey the commands of reason against the temptation of sensuous incentives (and who perhaps fails
entirely and succumbs to the temptation), the body merely provides the occasion for this conflict
through its introduction of incentives that are not in themselves moral, even though they can be
used for moral purposes.60
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The human being is embodied into an animal body. Because of this, he has a predisposition to animality. And
the predisposition to animality comprises of the instincts “first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of
the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding;
third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive” (6:26). If the human being does not wholeheartedly
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Depravity and Self-Conceit
There are distinctions, Wood observes, in the way Kant uses the term “love” in his practical
philosophy (Wood 1996, p. 145). For Kant, love can mean benevolence (Wohlwollen or
benevolentia) or well-pleasedness (Wohlgefallen or complacienta). Benevolence has to do with
conduct. It is an action that we take to benefit another, as Kant writes: “… Unselfish benevolence
toward human beings is often (though very inappropriately) also called love; people even speak of
love which is also a duty for us when it is not a question of another’s happiness but of the complete
and free surrender of all one’s ends to the ends of another (even a supernatural) being” (6:401).
Well-pleasedness, by contrast, is a feeling that we have towards another: “… Only the love that is
delight (amor complacentiae) is direct. But to have a duty to this (which is a pleasure joined
immediately to the representation of an object’s existence), that is, to have constrained to take
pleasure in something, is a contradiction” (6:402). These two kinds of love are often connected.
For “to love someone, in other words, is to be pleased by them, or by their perfections, and on this
basis to have an inclination toward their good” (Wood 1996, p. 145). But benevolence can also be
a duty, and so must also be possible to be benevolent to another out of duty, and not because we
are well-pleased by them, because, “What is done from constraint, however, is not done from love”
(6:401). Wood suggests that Kant uses the term “self-love” in much the same way: “Since both
sorts of love, love as pleasure and benevolent love, apply to oneself, ‘self-love’ is also an
ambiguous term, denoting a similarly complex phenomenon. Benevolence toward oneself Kant

embrace the moral law, he deprives himself of the moral strength necessary to take control of these animal instincts.
First, the instinct for self-preservation – this becomes the bestial vice of gluttony when not constrained (6:27). Second,
the instinct for the propagation of the species – this becomes the bestial vice of lust when not constrained (6:27).
Third, the instinct for community with other human beings – this becomes wild lawlessness (in relation to other
human beings) when not constrained (6:27). This is what it means for evil to be grafted onto the predisposition to
animality. The bestial drives are not natural, in that they do not of themselves issue from the predisposition to
animality as a root, but are grafted onto the predisposition as a result of the human being failing to control his animal
nature.
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calls ‘love of oneself’ (Eigenliebe or philautia), while well-pleasedness in oneself is called ‘selfconceit’ (Eigendünkel or arrogantia)” (Wood 1996, p. 145). From this, we might make a
distinction between benevolence to oneself and well-pleasedness with oneself in terms of the
former being a matter of conduct and the latter being a feeling. 61 Now Kant indeed says that the
human being has duties to himself (6:417). And so we can be benevolent to ourselves (self-love)
out of duty we have to ourselves (respect), or because we are well-pleased with ourselves (selfconceit).
In his discussion of self-love in the Religion, we find that Kant divides self-love into
mechanical self-love and comparative self-love. The former, mechanical self-love, is described in
the following manner: “The predisposition to animality may be brought under the general title of
physical or merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not required” (6:26). Kant
therefore connects this self-love to the instinct that can also be found in animals, particularly the
animal instincts for self-preservation, procreation, and community (6:26). The latter, comparative
self-love, is described in the following manner: “The predispositions to humanity can be brought
under the general title of a self-love which is physical and yet involves comparison (for which
reason is required); that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or
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Wood interprets the relation between benevolence and well-pleasedness differently. He does not draw a
distinction between benevolence out of duty and benevolence out of inclination (well-pleasedness), but rather connects
well-pleasedness to benevolence as cause to effect: “Benevolence is an inclination or wish to benefit someone; well pleasedness is a pleasure taken in the person, chiefly in the person ’s perfections. The two sorts of love are distinct, but
they appear to be determinately related. The love of well-pleasedness is the basis for the love of benevolence. To love
someone, in other words, is to be pleased by them, or by their perfections, and on this basis have an inclination toward
their good” (Wood 1998, p. 145). Although it is certainly true that the love of well-pleasedness is oftentimes the basis
for the love of benevolence, it cannot be the sole basis for the love benevolence. This is the entire point of Kant’s
discussion of love of human beings – that duty can form the basis for the love of benevolence the same way the love
of well-pleasedness can. Hence: “So the saying “you ought to love your neighbor as yourself” does not mean that you
ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do good
to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination
to beneficence in general)” (6:42). Even though, as Wood notes, benevolent conduct is not love in the proper sense of
the word, it is benevolent conduct and not the feeling of delight that is the primary sense of “love” in Kant’s
interpretation of the command “you ought to love your neighbor as yourself”, and the basis of this love is duty and not
well-pleasedness in the perfections of our neighbor.
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unhappy” (6:27). Notice that the concept of happiness that arises from the predisposition to
humanity has a comparative component added to it. It can no longer be construed in purely
hedonistic terms as “the satisfaction of all our inclinations (extensive, with regard to their
manifoldness, as well as intensive, with regard to degree, and also protensive, with regard to
duration)” (A806/B834). As Wood points out, this comparative component does not merely
involve the comparison of the different objects of our inclinations, in order to figure out how to
best satisfy the system of inclinations that Kant calls happiness (Wood 1996, p. 146). It is in
comparison with others that we judge ourselves to be happy or unhappy: “Our pursuit of happiness
thus also always involves comparing ourselves with other people; further, the original point of
considering ourselves to be happy is that we want to think of ourselves as better than others;
conversely, Kant says, we think of ourselves as unhappy or badly off to the extent that we think of
our condition as one that might cause others to despise us” (Wood 1996, p. 145).
Self-conceit is intimately connected to the comparative self-love that arises from the
predisposition to humanity. As noted by Wood, “Love of oneself is not merely an animal imp ulse
directed toward certain results. Rather, happiness is an end I set for myself, taking it to be
objectively good; accordingly, self-conceit not only is a desire to be worth more than others, but
also makes an objective claim to superior self-worth” (Wood 1996, p. 147). The human being
naturally has inclinations that need to be satisfied. The predisposition to humanity is accompanied
by a comparative aspect that impels the human being to compare himself to others in order to
determine whether or not he is happy. And he compares himself to others based on the satisfactio n
of his inclinations – with regard to their manifoldness, with regard to their degree, and with regard
to their duration (A806/B834). The human being regards himself as happy, when in comparison
to his neighbor, more of his inclinations are satisfied (extensive), when his inclinations are better
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satisfied (intensive), and when his inclinations are satisfied longer (protensive). And he regards
himself as unhappy to the extent these are not the case. In comparing himself to others on the basis
of the satisfaction of his inclinations, the human being comes to adopt a system of valuation based
on these inclinations. According to Wood, the relationship between benevolence and wellpleasedness consists in the fact that we are well-pleased in ourselves, and use that as the basis for
being benevolent to ourselves. But this well-pleasedness with ourselves would not be possible if
there was nothing in us to be objectively well-pleased with, in contradistinction to those around
us. This is why the development of self-conceit is accompanied by the formation of a system of
values in which it is possible for some human beings to be worth more than others, as Wood writes:
“Thus, if (as Kant thinks) our desire for happiness is naturally a desire to be happier than others,
and this desire takes the form of a conviction that our happiness is objectively good, then it must
be founded on the conviction that we are worth more than others” (Wood 1996, p. 148). 62
But this is contrary to Kant’s discussion of worth in the Groundwork. The Formula of
Humanity argument in which Kant identifies humanity as something having unconditional worth
is, by and large, read as an argument involving a regress of conditions, as suggested by Korsgaard.
Now the argument begins by considering what might be described as putative candidates for being
objects of unconditional worth: objects of inclinations, inclinations, natural beings or “things”, and

As Reath writes in “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility”: “People naturally place a special importance on
themselves, and often make a concern for others conditional on its congruence with their own interests. As Kant
understands it, self-conceit tries to get others to accord the same priority to your interests that you give them, by
putting your desires forward as conditions on the satisfaction of their own. Though aimed at increasing one’s welfare,
it does so by claiming a certain kind of value for one’s person relative to others. How could you possibly get other
rational individuals, with desires of their own, to treat your desires as reasons for their actions? Self-conceit attempts
to get others to defer to your interests by ranking yourself higher, and by claiming a special value for your person. In
this way, it seeks a kind of respect that moves in one direction” (Reath 1989, p. 293). But if the only system of
valuation is based on the intrinsic worth of the individual, then self-conceit can gain no traction, because the humanity
in every individual is of absolute worth. It is only through the creation of a system of valuation based on the extrinsic
characteristics of individuals that self-conceit is able to introduce (artificial) differences in the worth of distinct
individuals, without which it would be impossible to claim “a special value for your person” (Reath 1989, p. 293).
62

130
persons. The process has us begin with the objects of our choice, where we find that, in order to
provide justification for their goodness (or worth), we need to appeal to the inclinations that pushed
us to make the choice in the first place. That is, it is because we have a particular inclinat ion that
the object of the inclination has any worth whatsoever, because had we not had the inclination, we
would have no reason to assign worth to the object at all (Korsgaard 1996, p. 121). But the
inclinations themselves cannot be the source of worth either, because Kant observes, “… The
inclinations themselves, as sources of needs, however, are so lacking in absolute worth that the
universal wish of every rational being must be indeed to free himself completely of them” (4:428).
Korsgaard refrains from outright agreement with Kant here. Instead, she brings up bad habits as
examples of inclinations that we might wish to be completely free of: “Take the case of a bad habit
associated with a habitual craving – it would not be right to say that the object craved was good
simply because of the existence of the craving when the craving itself is one you would rather be
rid of” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 121). Rather than discuss natural beings, however, Korsgaard moves
to the step in which Kant establishes rational nature as the objective end: “[Rational natures],
therefore, are not merely subjective ends, the existence of which as an effect of our action has a
worth for us, but rather objective ends, that is, beings the existence of which is in itself an end and
indeed one such that no other end, to which they would serve merely as means, can be put in its
place, since without it nothing of absolute worth would be found anywhere…” (4:428). In other
words, Kant finds something in rational nature that differentiates it from everything else in nature
as an objective end and it is this that marks it as something that is not to be used merely as means.
But what is it about rational nature that can accord it such a privileged status in the system of ends?
The way Korsgaard reads it, it is because every agent acts as if his rational nature actually does
confer worth upon the objects of its choice (Korsgaard 1996, p. 123). But rational nature being
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what it is, there is no relevant difference between distinct rational natures that would privilege one
agent’s rational nature over the rational natures of any other (Korsgaard 1996, p. 123). In other
words, rational consistency demands that, if an agent considers his own rational nature to be the
sufficient condition of worth of the object of its choice, he must consider all other rational natures
to be the sufficient conditions for the worth of the objects of their choice. Thus, Korsgaard writes:
“If you view yourself as having a value-conferring status in virtue of your power of rational choice,
you must view anyone else who has the power of rational choice as having, by virtue of that power,
a value-conferring status” (Korsgaard 1996, p. 123). 63
Self-conceit is more than simply having an overly high opinion of oneself. It represents an
alternative system of values that is diametrically opposed to the system of values expressed in the
Formula of Humanity. This the point Wood is making in the following passage:
People are endowed unequally by both nature and fortune, allotted different degrees
of strength, beauty, intelligence, talents of all kinds, varying temperame nts,
different shares of happiness. In Kant’s view, however, none of this has anything
to do with their true self-worth, which is always equal. Yet the worth of differe nt
rational beings is not merely equal – as if there were some privileged respect in
which we could compare their worth and find it present in equal measure. Rather,
the dignity of rational nature implies that every rational being’s worth is absolute,
beyond the reach of any possible comparative measure. Kant’s view is that all the
normal comparative measures of self-worth that people use – honor, wealth, power,
63

Wood disagrees with Korsgaard on this point. For Korsgaard, it is the presence of the predisposition to
humanity that marks a human being as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its
discretion. But the rational nature that is signified by the predisposition to humanity is to be distinguished from the
moral nature that is signified by the predisposition to personality, as Kant explains in the following footnote: “For
from the fact that a being has reason does not at all follow that, simply by virtue of representing its maxims as suited
to universal legislation, this reason contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and hence
to be “practical” on its own; at least, not so far as we can s ee. The most rational being of this world might still need
certain incentives, coming to him from the objects of inclination, to determine his power of choice” (6:26n). It is the
predisposition to personality that allows respect for the moral law to be of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of
choice for the human being (6:27). And it is the presence of the predisposition to personality, not the predisposition
to humanity, that marks a human being as an end in itself for Wood. He writes: “… Kant seems to be saying that
dignity belongs to rational beings not in virtue of their end -setting capacity, but in virtue of their capacity to be moral
agents and actualize the good will: “Thus morality, and humanity, so far as it is capable of morality, alone hav e
dignity” (G 4:435). The end in itself, he says, “can never be other than the subject of all possible ends themselves,
because this is at the same time the subject of a possible will that is absolutely good” (G 4:437). These passages
suggest that it is not so much humanity (the capacity to set ends) that has dignity as personality (the capacity to act
from pure reason alone and have – or be – a good will)” (Wood 1998, p. 149).
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social status in all its forms (success, prestige, attractiveness, charm, charisma, even
success in relationships with others) – are expressions of an utterly false sense of
values (Wood 1996, pp. 149-150).
From this, we can see that there are two ways in which self-conceit is opposed to the system of
values of the moral law.64 First, self-conceit judges worth on an empirical basis. The things that
have worth for it are empirical things like strength, beauty, intelligence, talents of all kinds, varying
temperaments, and different shares of happiness (Wood 1996, p. 149). From the standpoint of the
moral law, the only thing that has worth is the good will, and this worth is determined
independently of all empirical conditions: “A good will is not good because of what it effects or
accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volitio n,
that is, it is good in itself, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that
could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the
sum of all inclinations” (4:394). Second, self-conceit judges all worth to be commensurable. This
is to judge the worth of all human beings as something that can be compared, as opposed to judging
the worth of each human being as beyond the reach of any possible comparative measure. The
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Mariña has described this opposition between self-conceit and the moral law in terms of the selftranscendence of the will. When the will is autonomous, it finds the law of its determination in the moral law, and it
is by obeying the commands of this moral law that a will is able to surpass its finitude and particularity: “For Kant the
locus of self-transcendence is not speculative but practical. It is grounded in the unconditional demand that the moral
law places upon us. The nature of this unconditional demand is such that it immediately places the self in relation to
other rational selves. This relation is, moreover, not one in which the other is valued in terms of the self’s preexisting
projects and concerns. Rather, the other must be valued as an end in him or herself” (Mariña 2001, p. 181). By contrast,
a will that is heteronomous finds the law of its determination in the inclinations, that is, in the subjective desires that
the individual happens to have at the moment of acting. In so doing, “the other is valued in terms of the self’s
preexisting projects and concerns” (Mariña 2001, p. 181). As Mariña explains it, this is precisely not to surpass the
finitiude and particularity of an individual will: “… The decision to attribute value only to the desires one happens to
have has a determinate influence on the content of those desires. This influence is such that in cases wherein action is
simply in accordance with the strongest desire one happens to have, the content of one’s valuing never moves past the
circle of one’s self-concern” (Mariña 2001, p. 185). It is by acting on the basis of objective principles that the will is
able to transcend itself. Self-conceit, as the will’s attempt to make its subjective principles the ground of absolute
value, is an obstacle to the self-transcendence of the will: “… Self-conceit is the attempt to make the conditioned
desires of the finite self absolute, that is, to give them a universal validity that they cannot, in principle, have. Insofar
as its principle dynamic is that of decreeing “subjective conditions of self-love as laws”, it rests on a lie in the attempt
to make that which is only subjective into something objective. As such, this attitude blocks self-transcendence, that
is, the move beyond the finite self and its concerns toward an ability to value that which can in principle be shared by
others as a standard of value” (Mariña 2001, pp. 190-191).
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point Wood is making here is that, not only is it incorrect to accord human beings more or less
worth based on empirical conditions, it is also not correct to treat human beings as if they all have
an equal amount of worth. For this implies that there is still a way to measure worth when we make
a moral decision, the way a utilitarian might choose to act for the benefit of the many, even if it
might infringe on the dignity of the few, as if we could tally up the moral worth of those affected
by our decision, and measure them against each other. This would still represent the comparative
mindset that the moral law opposes. The worth of a human being, according to the moral law, is
absolute, and this means that the many are no more worthy of beneficence than the few, despite
their greater numbers.
This self-conceit is the evil of depravity, which Kant describes in the Religion in the
following passage: “… The depravity (vitiositas, pravitas) or, if one prefers, the corruption
(corruption) of the human heart is the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate
the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones)” (6:30). 65 Insofar as self-conceit is a

Wood represents the place of self-conceit in Kant’s moral psychology different. He identifies self-conceit
with radical evil and not with depravity, as we have done here. According to Wood, they are one and the same thing:
“We have seen that self-conceit is a propensity to regard our own inclinations as legislative, thereby placing our
comparative self-worth above the absolute worth other rational beings have according to the moral law. This very
same propensity to invert the rational order of incentives, to place the incentives of our inclination ahead of those of
the moral law, is what Kant identifies in the Religion as the innate propensity to radical evil in human nature, which
we have as rational-social beings who compare ourselves to others and seek superiority over them” (Wood 1998, pp.
153-154). This is because Wood interprets radical evil as an anthropological thesis. Radical evil arises as the result of
the social condition of human beings. The solitary human being is moderate in his desires and disposed to contentment
(Wood 1999, p. 288). It is when the human being lives alongside other human beings that his d esires go out of control
and he is thrown into a state of discontent. For he develops an idea of happiness that is comparative amidst society,
and judges himself happy or miserable in comparison to other human beings. This comparative standpoint comes into
conflict with the moral standpoint, as Wood describes in the following passage: “The thesis of radical evil represents
human nature as doomed to a basic internal conflict between two equally necessary, but utterly irreconcilable
standpoints regarding our own self-worth. It is nature’s plan that our reason should develop through antagonism, that
we should measure our worth by comparing ourselves with others and seeking superiority over them. But as reason
does develop, it makes us aware that our true self-worth is of an entirely different nature, absolute and incomparable,
and moreover that this very same incomparable worth belongs to all those fellow beings our natural-social self-love
causes us to see as rivals and obstacles to our self-worth” (Wood 1998, p. 154). Fundamentally, Wood does not think
of radical evil in terms of a noumenal choice of an evil fundamental maxim. Thus, he identifies radical evil with selfconceit, as opposed to identifying radical evil as the reason self-love turns into self-conceit, or as the reason the natural
inclination to gain worth in the opinion to others gives way to an unjust desire to acquires superiority for oneself over
others (6:27).
65
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propensity to regard one’s own inclinations as legislative, Wood describes self-conceit as “placing
our comparative self-worth above the absolute worth other rational beings have according to the
moral law” (Wood 1996, p. 153). And this is to describe depravity’s inversion of the ethical order
of incentives from the perspective of the Formula of Humanity. As an alternative system of values,
self-conceit provides the human being with the subjective ground that makes it possible for him to
subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones). That is, self-conceit is a
psychological framework under which the human being is able to think of himself as having more
moral worth than others, and on the basis of which he elevates self-love into a lawgiving and
unconditional practical principle (5:74). But at the same time, self-conceit is an outgrowth of the
comparative apparatus that comes with the human being’s predisposition to humanity. The concept
of happiness that is comparative has to enter the picture before self-conceit does, because selfconceit involves an overstepping of (moral) boundaries: “Out of this self-love originates the
inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others, originally, of course, merely equal worth: not
allowing anyone superiority over oneself, bound up with the constant anxiety that others might be
striving for ascendancy; but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for
oneself over others” (6:27).66 Every human being has a right to pursue happiness (self-love), but
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Depravity is the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the in centives of the moral
law to nonmoral incentives (6:30). It arises from the predisposition to humanity. The predisposition to humanity gives
rise to an inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others (6:27). This inclination to be on par with other huma n
beings, and not allow anyone superiority over oneself, gives way to an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself
over others (6:27). But this unjust desire is not natural to the predisposition to humanity. Like the bestial vices, it does
not issue from the predisposition as a root (6:27). The predisposition to humanity merely instills in us an inclination
to gain worth in the opinion of others – the unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others is then grafted
onto this inclination (6:27). If the human being does not wholeheartedly embrace the moral law, he deprives himself
of the moral strength necessary to go beyond the (moral) limits set by the inclination, from the simple desire to not
allow anyone superiority over oneself to an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others. This is how
vices come to be grafted onto inclinations that are originally good. Ambition is not the root of evil that Wood says it
is (Wood 1999, p. 290). It is good, because without ambition, the progressive development of the human race would
never take place. But ambition unconstrained by reason or morality is either envy (Eifersucht) or haughtiness
(Hochmuth, superbia), and these are vices that are grafted upon the inclination as vices of culture (cf. Wood 1999, p.
264).
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not to pursue happiness at the expense of others (self-conceit). This is why pure practical reason
merely infringes upon self-love (5:73). For the human being is allowed to be benevolent towards
himself, so long as this does not result in depravity towards his fellow man. But pure practical
reason strikes down self-conceit altogether (5:73). Because self-conceit represents a rival system
of values that permits and legitimizes depravity against one’s fellow man.

Conclusion
The human being must decide for himself his relationship to the moral law. He can accept
the moral law into his heart completely, wholeheartedly. And once he has committed himself to
the moral law in this manner, his commitment will be unwavering. This is what it means to have
moral strength. Should he accept the moral law into his heart halfheartedly, however, then he has
made no real commitment to the moral law. That moral strength is absent here. There is only the
logical opposite of moral strength, the absence of moral strength (moral weakness). But strength
can only be measured when there is an obstacle that it has to overcome. These obstacles are the
real opposites of moral strength. The human being encounters two obstacles that test his moral
strength. There are the sensuous impulses that he experiences as the result of being embodied.
These impulses represent the claims of happiness (4:405). And they act as a powerful
counterweight to the demands of duty (4:405). Embodiment – the condition of having a body –
belongs with necessity to the possibility of being human. Human beings are not disembodied by
nature. But with embodiment comes sensuous impulses and an innate desire for happiness. If the
human being is not firmly committed to the moral law, these impulses will take root in the human
heart alongside it, insofar as the human being that is morally weak with respect to sensuous
impulses is frail. There is also self-love, which arises from the human being’s origina l
predisposition to humanity. It is natural for a human being to love himself, and to have an interest
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in his own happiness. But the human being’s pursuit of happiness has to be restrained, because it
cannot be allowed to infringe on the dignity of other human beings, lest self-love turn into selfconceit. If the human being is not firmly committed to the moral law, he will not have the selfrestraint to prevent his self-love from becoming self-conceit, insofar as the human being that is
morally weak with respect to self-love is depraved. Frailty and depravity are therefore not so
different after all. For they are both rooted in a moral weakness that arises from the attitude we
have adopted with respect to the moral law, which we have made into a universal rule for ourselves,
according to which we will to conduct ourselves, an evil fundamental maxim.67
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For the purposes of continuity, we have focused our attention on frailty and depravity. This means that there
has been no discussion at all of impurity, which Kant defined so: “… The impurity (impuritas, improbitas) of the
human heart consists in this, that although the maxim is good with respect to its object (the intended compliance with
the law) and perhaps even powerful enough in practice, it is not purely moral, i.e. it has not, as it should be, adopted
the law alone as its sufficient incentive but, on the contrary, often (and perhaps always) needs still other incentives
besides it in order to determine the power of choice for what duty requires; in other words, actions conforming to duty
are not done purely from duty” (6:30). In this passage, Kant draws a distinction between actions that are done merely
in conformity with duty and actions that are done from duty. Both of these actions are lawful but only the actions that
are done from duty are moral, per the Metaphysics of Morals: “The mere conformity or nonconformity of an action
with law, irrespective of the incentive to it, is called its legality (lawfulness); but that conformity in which the idea of
duty arising from the law is also the incentive to the action is called its morality” (6:219). The lawfulness of actions
falls under the doctrine of right. It is therefore concerned with “the external and indeed practical relation of one person
to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other” (6:230). Whereas
the morality of actions falls under the doctrine of virtue. It is concerned with the incentives of our actions: “The
doctrine of right dealt only with the formal condition of outer freedom (the consistency of outer freedom with itself if
its maxim were made universal law), that is, with right. But ethics goes beyond this and provides a matter (an object
of free choice), an end of pure reason which it represents as an end that is also objectively necessary, that is, an end
that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have” (6:380). For this, virtue is needed. Remember that
virtue is the capacity and considered resolve to withstand what opposes the moral disposition within us (6:380). And
the opponents to the moral disposition of the human being are the sensible inclinations: “… For since the sensible
inclinations of human beings tempt them to ends (the matter of choice) that can be contrary to duty, lawgiving reason
can in turn check their influence only by a moral end set up against the ends of inclination, an end that must therefore
be given a priori, independently of inclinations” (6:380-381). If the human being does not make the noumenal choice
to wholeheartedly embrace the moral law, he would not have t he capacity and considered resolve to withstand the
sensible inclinations that oppose the moral disposition in him. Should this happen, he will be tempted to ends that are
contrary to duty, and even though the actions he undertakes as means to this end may still be constrained, either by
others or by his innate sense of duty, the action can always only be legal, and not moral. And this is precisely what
defines the evil of impurity.
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CHAPTER 4. INTERPRETATIONS OF RADICAL EVIL

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could.
Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken.
Introduction
A survey of the literature on Kant’s doctrine of radical evil will reveal their shared interest
in the following question: What is the missing formal proof of the radical evil in human nature in
the Religion? The numerous attempts to supply this missing formal proof invariably use the same
strategy: they search for a characteristic that is universally present in human beings, and then they
argue that simply having this characteristic makes the human being evil. For Firestone and Jacobs,
this characteristic is every human being’s participation in a secondary substance, humanity.
Whereas Morgan considers this characteristic to be the spontaneous will every human being has
as a free agent. Allison tells us that this condition lies in the finitude characteristic of every human
being. And Wood traces radical evil to the social condition in which every human being finds
himself. The problem is that, because this characteristic is universally present in human beings,
our possession of it is not up to us. And this leads us to conclude that our radical evil does not
involve the use or abuse of our power of choice in any way whatsoever. In Firestone and Jacobs,
the Willkür of humanity chooses evil, but individual human beings are evil simply by being a
member of the human species, not because they choose evil for themselves. Morgan wants to
identify the propensity to evil with the desire for unrestricted freedom that every free will has by
virtue of its spontaneity, but the mere possession of something cannot be culpable when it is given
to us by nature and not brought upon ourselves by our choices. The finitude of the human will,
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according to Allison, brings with it certain subjective hindrances. But this finitude is analytica lly
contained in the concept of a human being, and so holiness becomes impossible for us by
definition. And Wood’s idea that the propensity to evil arises in the social context gives it an origin
in time, and so it is something that happens, with a previous state upon which it follows without
exception according to a rule (even if we cannot specify what this previous state is). All these
attempts to supply the missing proof of the radical evil in human nature try to prove that human
nature is radically evil by proving the necessity and universality of the evil in human beings.68 In
so doing, they invariably turn evil into something that happens to us, rather than something that
we freely choose.

Chris Firestone and Nathan Jacobs
Firestone and Jacobs, in their book In Defense of Kant’s Religion, interpret the propensity
to evil in terms of its relation to the human species. By this they mean that the human species can
be considered a subject in its own right, and on this basis they distinguish between the individ ua l
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Mariña has further argued that our interpretation of the doctrine of radical evil is also guided by our (tacit)
acceptance of the Augustinian model of understanding human evil and how it fits in with human destiny. The
Augustinian model is described as having the following characteristics: “For our purposes, what is important a bout
this model is the inexplicability and seriousness of the fall to evil. First, the fall is inexplicable. If these beings are
fully mature, then presumably this implies they have an understanding of what is of true value. Insofar as they are in
the presence of God, they are enjoying the beatific vision. But something tempts them away from that. How can this
be? Second, the fall is serious. Given the original righteousness of these beings, who must have had a deep
understanding of the value of that which they eschewed in turning away from the good, the fall is an extremely serious
moral evil, so serious, in fact, that in some minds it justified the eternal damnation of fallen humanity” (Mariña 2017,
p. 185). By contrast, the Ireneaian model of understanding human evil and how it fits in with human destiny can be
described in the following way: “God does not create creatures fully formed, but rather as simple and immature. Virtu e
and knowledge, the perfection of the creature, these are things the creature mu st attain for itself, that is, it must make
itself into what is intended to be through its own development of the seeds of goodness implanted within it. Without
such self-development, there is no genuine knowledge or understanding of what has true worth ca nnot be truly
interiorized” (Mariña 2017, pp. 185-186). The inexplicability of radical evil is not a feature of Kant’s doctrine of
radical evil, but of the Augustinian lens through which we have been wont to interpret it. But under the Ireneaian
model, the doctrine of radical evil can be made explicable, because human beings are created as simple and immature,
and they therefore do not fully grasp the consequences of their choices (Mariña 2017, p. 186). Therefore, when faced
with making a moral choice at the beginning of their development, their immaturity shows itself, and they choose to
side with the principle of self-love over the moral law, thereby precipitating their fall to evil (Mariña 2017, p. 187).
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and the species in much the same way Aristotle distinguishes between primary substance and
secondary substance. For Aristotle, substances are the subjects of predication. The individual man
is a subject of predication, for example, as the subject of paleness. But so too is the species this
individual man belongs to, insofar as the human species is the subject of rationality. Because the
human species can be predicated of the individual man, but the individual man cannot be
predicated of anything else, Aristotle calls the individual man a primary substance, and the species
he belongs to a secondary substance. Hence: “Substance, in the truest and primary and most
definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject;
for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called
substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as
genera, include the species” (Categories 2a11-16). Firestone and Jacobs consider the propensity to
evil to be something that is predicated of the secondary substance, rather than of the primary
substance. And because humanity is predicated to every individual man as a member of the species,
it can be said that the propensity to evil is universal to every individual man.
Where the interpretation of Firestone and Jacobs treads new ground is in giving the
secondary substance agency in producing this propensity. The choice secondary substance makes
to adopt an evil supreme maxim is meant to be taken literally, not metaphorically. Firestone and
Jacobs are clear on this in the following passage: “… The exercise of Willkür in the context of the
supreme maxim is very much like an Adamic Fall into sin. However, rather than the dispositio n
being the product of one particular individual, such as Adam, the dispositional bent is chosen by
the secondary substance, human, when first individuated and actualized in matter, prior to all
particular exercises of freedom” (Firestone-Jacobs 2008, pp. 147-148). In other words, it is not the
individual man that makes the free choice that brings about the propensity to evil in him, but rather

140
the human species that makes the free choice that brings about the propensity to evil in the species,
and the individual man is culpable for this propensity by the mere fact of his participation or
membership in the human species. This can be seen in the following passage, where they write:
“In this way, our culpability for the disposition resides in our participation or membership in the
species. We cannot separate ourselves from our humanity; the properties of our species are our
species. This freely chosen disposition is thus part of the species in which we participate and is
that which defines our common moral nature” (Firestone-Jacobs 2008, p. 148).69
The reasoning Firestone and Jacobs provide for this is relatively straightforward. Kant
indicates in the Religion that the human being is by nature evil (6:42). And what it means to be
evil by nature is that being evil applies to every human being considered in his species (6:32). But
a propensity can either be physical or moral (6:31). If a propensity is physical, then it pertains to a
human being’s power of choice as a natural being, and this means that the choice is based on

A natural objection to raise at this point would be this: Why should we think that Kant’s doctrine of radical
evil depends on an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance? For Firestone and Jacobs want to argue that it is not through
the Willkür belonging to the individual (primary substance), but by the Willkür belonging to humanity as a species
(secondary substance), that “determines the moral bent of the species prior to all particular exercises of freedom”
(Firestone-Jacobs 2008, p. 147). The burden of proof is on Firestone and Jacobs to show that Kant wo uld accept the
Aristotelian distinction between primary substance and secondary substance into his metaphysics. They attempt to do
so by arguing that the prevailing notion of species during the period was in line with the traditional Aristotelian notion
of species:
69

… Leroy E. Loemker has argued that the dominant concept of species in the early sixteenth century was
Aristotelian in nature. Loemker points to Julius Caesar Scaliger as a prime example of the type of
understanding dominant in the period: forms are immanent and individuated, being placed as “seeds” within
matter, first in potential and brought forth in actu. These “seeds” are then passed on and further individuated
in the process of generation. Human concepts are therefore held to be signs of things known through contact
with the individuated form. Scaliger’s not uncommon use of Aristotle thus “made Aristotle the founder of
the preformation theory of generation”. Loemker notes that this Aristotelian understanding of species
persisted into the seventeenth century (albeit with Platonic additions […]), and he suggest that this
understanding of species was dominant in figures such as Leibniz. Moreover, part of this realist view of
species was the notion that “ideas are active or, as Leibniz put it, have an exigency to actualize themselves,
and are therefore discoverable in things by scientific analysis”. In light of these historical trends preceding
Kant, we should not think it strange to find Kant embracing a realist view of species, and understanding
immanent form as active (Firestone-Jacobs 2008, p. 147)
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sensory inducements (6:31). If a propensity is moral, then it pertains to a human being’s power of
choice as a moral being, and this means that the choice presupposes a Willkür that has the capacity
to freely make the choice (6:31). Now the propensity to evil is a moral propensity, and this means
that it pertains to a human being’s power of choice as a moral being. For the propensity to evil to
be part of human nature, however, means that the propensity to evil is not the property of the
individual man, but of the human species, and this moral propensity entails that the human species
has a Willkür to freely make the choice.70 Hence, Firestone and Jacobs write: “Yet, per the concept
of nature, this maxim must be an essential property of our species – even if the specific bent of
our species is non-essential. Moral nature therefore indicates that the human species, or humanity
as secondary substance, must possess Willkür, at least with regard to the single act of generating
the supreme maxim that defines our moral nature – a nature for which we are culpable as members
of humanity” (Firestone-Jacobs 2008, p. 150).
It is difficult, however, to see how this solution can avoid the incredulous stare. The idea
that the human species has its own Willkür that makes the choice of evil in its determination of
human nature seems, to most people, metaphysically extravagant at best. To their credit, Firestone

70

Firestone and Jacobs appeal to this in order to explain why the propensity to evil cannot be extirpated through
human forces: “With Kant’s investigation of the species being outside the individual sphere, the supreme maxim is
not an individual affair. If the corrupt maxim was an individual affair, the change of maxim, it would seem, would be
within the individual’s power to undo. But since the adoption of the supreme maxim is by the species, it stands beyond
the power of the individual to affect” (Firestone-Jacobs 2008, p. 150). This seems to misinterpret the point Kant makes
in 6:37. For Kant denies that it is within the individual’s power to undo the corrupted fundamental maxim, even though
it is an individual affair. This is because the maxims of a human being are arranged in a hierarchy according to their
generality. The more general a maxim is, the higher its position in the hierarchy, and the more numerous the maxims
that fall under it (are grounded by it). If there is to be a change to the maxims in the hierarchy, grounds must be given
for this change, and this is done by appeal to the maxims higher in the hierarchy that ground it. But the fundamental
maxim is located at the apex of the hierarchy. There are no maxims above it in the hierarchy that we can appeal to in
order to have it changed. This is why an evil fundamental maxim cannot be extirpated through human forces, as Kant
makes evident in the following passage: “ Now if a propensity to this [inversion] does lie in human nature, then there
is in the human being a natural propensity to evil; and this propensity itself is morally evil, since it must ultimately be
sought in a free power of choice, and hence is imputable. This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all
maxims; as natural propensity, it is also not to be extirpated through human forces, for this could only happen through
good maxims – something that cannot take place if the subjective supreme ground of all maxims is presupposed to be
corrupted” (6:37). Nowhere in the passage does Kant go beyond the individual sphere, as Firestone and Jacobs claim
he does.
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and Jacobs attempt to make the idea more acceptable in the following passage: “A strong history
of interpretation exists that takes Aristotle to distinguish an individual (tode ti) from a particular
(kath’ hekasta). When a particular is non-repeatable and cannot be predicated of another object, a
universal can be individual. If individuation is understood in this way, it is possible to conceive of
secondary substance being individuated in the first particular human, actively determining the
moral bent of the species prior to all particular exercises of freedom, and then being further
individuated in the process of generation, bringing with it an innate disposition” (Firestone-Jacobs
2008, p. 147). The human species, according to this passage, is not an abstraction from individ ua l
human beings, but constitutive of individual human beings. The moment humanity first became
individuated and actualized in matter, say in the individual known as Adam, that was when
humanity used its Willkür to determine the dispositional bent of the species. Through this passage,
Firestone and Jacobs hitch their wagons to the organic whole theory of original sin, which has a
long and venerable history that includes such proponents as Aquinas and Edwards (Rea 2007, p.
328). The organic whole theory, as described by Rea, is this: “The idea, in short, is that humanity,
human nature, or the human race is an organic whole with the following properties: (a) it is a
moral agent; (b) every individual human being is a part or instance of it; and (c) it committed the
sin of Adam by virtue of having a part or instance – namely, Adam – that committed that sin. On
this view, it is by virtue of being parts, instances, or members of this whole that individuals other
than Adam participated in Adam’s sin and share the guilt for it” (Rea 2007, pp. 329-330). The idea
is that we can make a distinction between Adam’s first sin and Adam’s second sin. Because Adam’s
first sin is committed by Adam qua humanity, the sin is imputed to humanity. By contrast, because
Adam’s second sin is committed by Adam qua Adam, the sin is imputed to Adam himself. 71 But,

But why is Adam’s first sin committed by Adam qua humanity and Adam’s second sin committed by only
Adam qua Adam? As Rea points out, the organic whole does not have a principled response to this question: “… It is
71
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as participants and members of the human species, individual human beings other than Adam
participated in Adam’s sin and share the guilt for it. Firestone and Jacobs are proposing a Kantian
adaptation of the theory. As humanity first became individuated and actualized in matter as the
first human being, it had to decide the dispositional bent of the species. The difference between
Adam’s first and second exercises of freedom is this: Adam’s first exercise of freedom was made
by Adam qua humanity. It is not the product of one particular individual because it was not Adam’s
Willkür but humanity’s Willkür that made the decision to choose the propensity to evil. By contrast,
Adam’s exercise of freedom was made by Adam qua Adam. It is the product of one particular
individual because it was Adam’s Willkür that made the decision, and not humanity’s Willkür.
Thus, as participants and members of the human species, individual human beings other than Adam
participated in Adam’s first exercise of freedom and share the guilt for it. 72

hard to see why Adam’s first sin, and that sin alone, would involve all of human nature in the way required by the
analogy. Even if we grant that there is a sense in which your hand, but not your foot is to blame for sins you commit
with your hand, still it is hard to see why Adam’s first sin was a sin committed with his whole nature, as it were, rather
than a sin that simply involved him as an individual” (Rea 2007, pp. 330-331). Insofar as Firestone and Jacobs want
to claim that the human species was an individual in the person of Adam, because there were no other human beings
besides him, it would seem that they cannot give no principled distinction bet ween the Willkür of Adam and the
Willkür of the human species. Every exercise of the power of choice by the Willkür of is therefore an exercise of the
power of choice by the Willkür of the human species, and vice versa. And there will be no way to separate the Willkür
of Adam from the Willkür of the human species, except by separating the substantial being of Adam from that of the
human species, which would only happen when the human species becomes instantiated in other individuals besides
Adam.
72
The problem with interpreting the doctrine of radical evil in this way is that moral evil is ascribed to every
human being by way of an inheritance from our first parents, Adam and Eve. This is precisely what Kant says radical
evil is not. Kant is explicit in his rejection of this idea: “Whatever the nature, however, of the origin of moral evil in
the human being, of all the ways of representing its spread and propagation through the members of our species and
in all generations, the most inappropriate is surely to imagine it as having come to us by way of inheritance from our
first parents; for then we could say of moral evil exactly what the poet says of the good: genus et proavos, et quae non
fecimus ips, vic ex nosta puto (Race and ancestors, and those things which we did not make ourselves, I scarcely
consider as our own)” (6:40). Inherited moral evil, like race and ancestors, are not things that we make or choose for
ourselves, and therefore not something we would consider our own. In interpreting the origin of moral evil in terms
of an organic whole theory, Firestone and Jacobs consider Adam’s choice to sin to be made through the Willkür of the
species (humanity) and not through the Willkür of the individual (Adam), and every human being is guilty of this sin
due to his participation of the species. But this has the effect of making moral evil something that is inherited. In
particular, the organic whole theory represents the origin of moral evil in human beings as an inherited sin, rather than
an inherited disease or an inherited guilt, in accordance with the taxonomy provided by Kant in the footnote: “The
three so-called “higher faculties” (in the universities) would explain this transmission each in its own way, namely,
either as inherited disease, or inherited guilt, or inherited sin. (1) The Faculty of Medicine would represent the
inherited evil somewhat as it represents the tapeworm, concerning which certain natural scientists are actually of the
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This solution to the problem of radical evil by Firestone and Jacobs gives rise to the
following problem: It seems that I cannot be morally responsible for the decisions made by the
Willkür of a secondary substance. They make the following two claims: That it is the human
species, and not the individual human being, that determines the dispositional bent of the human
species as evil. And that the individual human being is evil because of his participation in the
human species. These two claims together imply that the propensity to evil is a physical propensity
for the individual human being, not a moral propensity. For remember that good and evil is not
imputed to the individual human being unless he has, through his own Willkür, made the choice to
incorporate the relevant incentive into his maxim, “… for otherwise the use or abuse of the human
being’s power of choice with respect to the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the
good or evil in him be called “moral” (6:21). But the individual human being has no say in how
the Willkür of the human species is exercised, as Rea remarks in his discussion on the organic
whole theory: “It is clear even from this rough sketch, the obvious challenge for the view is to
explain in what sense, if any, the non-Adamic parts or instances of the whole could have prevented
the sin of Adam. Prima facie, they could not have” (Rea 2007, p. 330). Nor does the individ ua l
human being have any say in whether or not he wants to be human. 73 And so his participation in

opinion that, since it is not otherwise found either in an element outside us nor (of this same kind) in any other animal,
it must already have been present in our first parents. (2) The Faculty of Law would regard it as the legal consequence
of our accession to an inheritance bequeathed to us by these first parents but weighted down because of a serious
crime (for to be born is just to inherit the use of the goods of the earth, inasmuch as these are indispensable to our
survival). We must therefore make payment (atone) and, at the end, shall still be evicted (by deat h) from this
possession. This is how the justice of law works! (3) The Theological Faculty would regard this evil as the personal
participation by our first parents in the fall of a condemned rebel: either we were at the time ourselves accomplices
(though not now conscious of it); or even now, born under the rebel’s dominion (as Prince of this World), we prefer
his goods to the supreme command of the heavenly master and lack sufficient faith to break loose from him, hence
we shall eventually have to share in his doom” (6:40n).
73
It is not strictly correct to say that the human being is blameless for the choice that the Willkür makes on
behalf of the entire species. For imagine that a soul can be reincarnated in another body after its death, and the body
it is reincarnated into depends on the use or abuse of its power of choice during its previous life, as believed by some
Eastern religions. For example, a human being that has lived a moral and upright life might be reincarnated as a deva.
Whereas a human being that has lived a life of villainy and depravity might be reincarnated as a hungry ghost. In such
a cosmology, a soul is reincarnated as a human being because of the way its power of choice was exercised (used or
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the human species, through which he inherits the dispositional bent towards evil, is not up to him
either. It is therefore difficult to see how the propensity to evil in an individual human being can
in any way be traced to an abuse of his power of choice. And if the propensity to evil does not
involve an abuse of the individual human being’s power of choice, then it cannot be imputed to
him. And this would mean that the propensity to evil in him cannot be called “moral” – the
propensity to evil in the individual human being would have to be a physical propensity and not a
moral propensity. That the human species has a moral propensity to evil would be, given the
distinction between humanity and its members that has been introduced, completely beside the
point.

Seiriol Morgan
The interpretation of the propensity to evil proposed by Morgan in his article “The Missing
Formal Proof of Humanity’s Radical Evil in Kant’s Religion” is next up for consideration. The
way he explains it, the choice of a fundamental maxim is ultimately a choice between negative and
positive freedom, and not a choice between good and evil per se. In the Groundwork, Kant defines
negative freedom in terms of freedom from outside determination: “Will is a kind of causality of
living beings insofar as they are rational, and freedom would be the property of such causality that
it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the
property of the causality of all nonrational beings to be determined to activity by the influence of
alien causes” (4:446). By contrast, positive freedom is defined in terms of the laws that can

abused) in its previous life. From this, it follows that the soul is responsible for the human form it is reincarnated as.
Then even though the individual human being had no say in how the Willkür of the human species was exercised
before his birth, he can nevertheless be imputed the sin of the sp ecies, because he did have a say in his participation
in the human species. (If he had acted differently in his previous life, he would not have been reincarnated as a human
being, but as some other creature, or perhaps have escaped the cycle of rebirth co mpletely). But it is exceedingly
unlikely that a devout Pietist like Kant would have embraced reincarnation as a solution to the universal imputation
of the Adamic sin.
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properly determine a will that is free in the negative sense: “Since the concept brings with it that
of laws in accordance with which, by something that we call a cause, something else, namely an
effect, must be posited, so freedom, although it is not a property of the will in accordance with
immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an absurdity” (4:446).
This distinction between negative freedom and positive freedom is important to Morgan’s
interpretation of radical evil because of the circumstances in which he thinks the fundame nta l
maxim is chosen. The choice of the fundamental maxim is a choice that precedes every deed that
takes place in space and time (6:31). It is therefore a deed that cannot itself take place in space and
time (6:31). But having been separated from all spatiotemporal conditions, this choice of a
fundamental maxim cannot be made on the basis of our inclinations and desires, as Morgan puts
it:
The problem we face is that in imagining the will making a choice between morality
and self-love, prior to its immersion in the world, we have pared away virtua lly
every element of the self that might provide it with reasons – its desires, its
emotions, its values, its membership in society, its history, its individual identity.
All that remains is the sheer power of choice, the will’s spontaneity. And so it is
precisely within spontaneity that Kant locates its reasons. Kant’s reasoning is that
since all the will is is freedom, the only thing that can possibly provide the will with
a reason is spontaneity itself. As freedom is its inner nature, the will has reason to
choose the principle which best preserves and expresses it (Morgan 2005, p. 77).
According to Morgan, the choice of the will’s fundamental maxim has to be made in terms of
freedom. In choosing the moral law, the will chooses freedom in the positive sense as the princip le
which best preserves and expresses it. But even in the choice of self-love, the will chooses freedom
as the principle which best preserves and expresses it, understanding this freedom as freedom in
the negative sense, where the will chooses to be free of any and all influences, including the
influence of the moral law. As such, the restrictions that the demands of morality places on the
freedom of the rational agent comes to be seen as an alien influence, because they stand in the way
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of the will’s self-expression, and therefore as a hindrance that is to be removed for the sake of
freedom.

74 Thus,

the moral incentive that determines the power of choice takes the form of freedom

positively conceived, whereas the incentive of self-love that determines the power of choice takes
the form of freedom without restraint: “The picture that emerges is of the human being as of her
nature inclined to a kind of gratuitous willfulness, in which she simply fetishizes and elevates to a
supreme value, trumping all other considerations, the unlimited indulgence of her whims” (Morgan
2005, p. 85).
But how is any of this supposed to show that the propensity to evil is universal? Palmquis t’s
observation seems apt here: “… He ingeniously presents a definition of outer freedom as selfdeceptive (i.e., as excluding the inner freedom of the moral law) and claims (perhaps rightly) that
this is an assumption adopted by people who have succumbed to the evil propensity. But how does

The passage Morgan is referencing here comes from the Metaphysics of Morals: “Resistance that counteracts
the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is consistent with it. Now whatever is wrong is a hindrance to
freedom in accordance with universal laws. But coercion is a hindrance of resistance to freedom. Therefore, if a certain
use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed
to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that
is, it is right. Hence there is connected with right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone
who infringes upon it” (6:231). Now Kant believes that the principle of right can be analytically derived from the
concept of freedom (6:396). From this, it follows that reflection on outer freedom would allow us to discern its limits ,
that the outer freedom of an individual extends only so far as it does not conflict with the outer freedom of another,
beyond which it becomes a hindrance to freedom (6:396). It seems then that the agent who adopts outer freedom must
understand that it does not license untrammeled freedom, even when his concept of freedom does not include the
concept of inner freedom (a freedom bound by morality). Morgan is aware of this objection, in response to which he
writes: “But analysis of the concept merely shows us what rightness is, and nothing about the fact itself compels
anyone to take any practical interest in it, and govern his behavior according to the principle o f right. Rather, the only
thing that could motivate an individual to respect the outer freedom of others with whom he interacts, besides fear of
their personal power and that of punitive authority, is morality. From the amoral perspective of a particular a gent
considering his de facto relationship with other agents, rather than that of someone taking an abstract view of the de
jure relations between agents in general, nothing about the idea of outer freedom itself calls for its restriction when it
begins to encroach upon the choices of others (Morgan 2005, p. 83). But if the concept of right is analytically contained
in the concept of outer freedom, then untrammeled freedom, as something contrary to right, cannot also be part of the
concept of outer freedom. Therefore, whatever the noumenal agent is choosing as his incentive in the construction of
his fundamental maxim, he is not making his choice outer freedom, because rightness is contained in the concept of
outer freedom, and he has no practical in governing his behavior according to the principle of right. Nor is he makin g
the choice of inner freedom, because morality is contained in the concept of inner freedom, and he has no practical
interest in governing his behavior according to the principle of morality, per our hypothesis. Therefore, what is the
concept of freedom that the will chooses, given that for such a will, “as pure spontaneity is its nature, only freedom
could be an incentive for it”, and the concepts of outer freedom and inner freedom are no t available to it?
74
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this clarification of the concept amount to a transcendental proof?” (Palmquist 2008, p. 269). To
be fair, we find that Morgan actually does link negative freedom to universality in his summary of
the argument:
Consequently the argument also establishes the universality of the propensity. We
know that at least some wills are attracted to evil, because some agents perform acts
that clearly subordinate moral considerations to ones of sensibility. Since sensuous
incentives cannot determine the will except insofar as the agent has incorporated
them into his maxim, the evil must have been presented with an incentive from its
own nature to do so. But its own nature is pure spontaneity, a nature it shares with
every other will. Hence if any will is motivated by its own nature as bare freedom
to incorporate evil into its maxim, every will must present itself with incentive to
do so. And since the incentive emerges from its innermost nature in this way, it does
not seem unreasonable to consider it inextirpable, but possible to overcome in
practice, again as Kant said (Morgan 2005, p. 87).
Let us try to unpack Morgan’s argument. The propensity to evil is defined here as the incentive for
untrammeled freedom. Because some people are actually evil, they must have exercised their free
Willkür to subordinate the moral incentive to nonmoral incentives. For this to be possible, they
must have adopted an evil fundamental maxim, because it is an evil fundamental maxim that
grounds every deed contrary to law (6:31). This choice must itself involve the incorporation of an
incentive into the maxim, otherwise it would not be free. But a sensuous incentive would not do
here, because there are no sensuous incentives available for incorporation in this intelligible deed.
This is why Morgan posits that the spontaneity of freedom must be, by itself, sufficient to generate
this nonmoral incentive for the Willkür to incorporate. And this nonmoral incentive is the incentive
of untrammeled freedom. Now every free Willkür is spontaneous in the exact same way. It must
therefore follow that this incentive of untrammeled freedom is so generated by every free Willkür,
leading Morgan to conclude: “Hence if any will is motivated by its own nature as bare freedom to
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incorporate evil into its maxim, every will must present itself with incentive to do so” (Morgan
2005, p. 87). And Morgan takes this to show the universality of the propensity to evil. 75
But there is something that Morgan does not make clear throughout his entire argument:
Are we morally responsible for the propensity to evil in us because we had incorporated the
incentive to untrammeled freedom into our maxim or because we simply possess this incentive to
untrammeled freedom? Suppose it is the former. Then we are morally responsible for our
propensity to evil because we had incorporated the incentive to untrammeled freedom into our
fundamental maxim. If so, it would seem that Morgan has gotten the relevant relations reversed:
He posits the incentive of untrammeled freedom to explain why we choose self-love when he
should have posited the incentive of self-love to explain why we choose untrammeled freedom. 76

What Morgan writes in its entirety is this: “We know that at least some wills are attracted to evil, because
some agents perform acts that clearly subordinate moral considerations to ones of sensibility. Since sensuous
incentives cannot determine the will except insofar as the agent has incorporated them into his maxim, the evil will
must have been presented with an incentive from its own nature to do so. But its own nature is pure spontaneity, a
nature it shares with every other will. Hence if any will is motivated by its own nature as bare freedom to incorporate
evil into its maxim, every will must present itself with the incentive to do so” (Morgan 2005, p. 87). Now Morgan is
unwilling to say that all wills are attracted to evil (Morgan 2005, p. 64). Therefore he cannot say that every will has
subordinated moral considerations to the considerations of sensibility. Instead, he wants to say that, those wills that
are attracted to evil, have subordinated moral considerations to the considerations of sensibility, and this is only
possible because its own nature as bare freedom has presented it with the incentive to do so. And that every will has
this same nature, and every will is therefore presented with the same incentive to subordinate moral considerations to
the considerations of sensibility. But this does not establish a propensity to subordinate moral considerations to the
considerations of sensibility in every human being, only a possibility of subordinating moral considerations to the
considerations of sensibility, adding to the possibility of subordinating the considerations of sensibility to moral
considerations, which was already present. A propensity for something to happen makes it more likely to happen – the
mere presentation of an incentive is not enough here.
76
According to Morgan, the choice between morality and self-love is made in the noumenal realm, in the form
of the agent’s selection of his fundamental maxim:
75

In effect, the task the will is faced with then is choosing what is going to count as a reason for action for
it when it gets into the world. Various reason-generating principles spring to mind, but for the sake of
argument, let’s confine ourselves within Kant’s strictures and limit the choice to that of self-love or morality .
So the will has to choose what will count as supreme reason for it when it arrives in the world, the satisfaction
of its own inclinations or the conformity of its choices with the cat egorical imperative. In deciding which of
the principles to give overriding status, it is deciding which to subordinate to the other. So the choice it has
to make is one between a good and evil disposition. But how is it to make the choice? Since it is dec iding
what is going to count as a reason for it in the future, what reason could it have to guide it now? Certainly no
appeal can be made either to morality or self-interest, conceived as the satisfaction of inclination, since any
such appeal would be a circular justification. So one might think that the will would be in a condition prior
to all reasons, and any choice it makes would simply be a random exercise of its spontaneity, an utterly
unmotivated “leap of volition” (Morgan 2005, pp. 76-77 – emphasis mine).
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This is because the human being who chooses the incentive of untrammeled freedom does not do
so because he mistakenly thinks it is morally good. He does so knowing full well that he has chosen
evil, morally speaking. Morgan himself admits this in the following passage: “Motivated by the
allure of a distorted picture of freedom, it is blinded to the reality of its choice. But we are certainly
not to conceive of the fundamental problem here as a kind of intellectual mistake, as if the evil
will were the fruit of a confusion about a matter of fact. The evil person is not someone who has
made a subjectively rational decision on the basis of false information, who at most we could
convict of culpable ignorance. The evil person is someone who willfully does what in some sense
she knows to be bad” (Morgan 2005, pp. 84-85).
Indeed, it cannot be any other way, because if we suppose that the will is free, the law that
alone is competent to determine such a will is the law of reason. As Kant writes in the Second
Critique:
Since the matter of a practical law, that is, an object of maxim, can never be given
otherwise than empirically whereas a free will, as independent of empirica l
conditions (i.e., conditions belonging to the sensible world), must nevertheless be
determinable, a free will must find a determining ground in the law but
independently of the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing
further is contained in it than the lawgiving form. The lawgiving form, insofar as
this is contained in the maxim, is therefore the only thing that can constitute a
determining ground of the will” (5:29).

In the selection of the fundamental maxim, the incentive of morality cannot be used to select the good
disposition, and the incentive of self-interest cannot be used to select the bad disposition. Now Morgan does not think
that the will, in this state, would be a condition prior to all reasons, and the selection of the good disposition or bad
disposition is a matter left to chance. Instead, he argues that the nature of the will as pure spontaneity is itself an
incentive that is used in the selection of the fundamental maxim. If the incentive of inner freedom, or a freedom in
accordance with the law of reason, is incorporated into the agent’s fundamental maxim as an incentive, then he has a
good disposition. But if the incentive of outer freedom, or a freedom that is completely unrestrained, is incorporated
into the agent’s fundamental maxim as an incentive, then he has a bad disposition. But given that the notion of inner
freedom is that of a freedom in accordance with the law of reason, it seems that morality is already presupposed in
the notion itself. Morality is a more fundamental notion than inner freedom or positive freedom. And the same point
can be made with respect to self-love and outer freedom, mutatis mutandis.
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But the determination of the will by the mere lawgiving form of the law is this: to act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universa l
law. This is the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious as soon as we draw up
maxims of the will for ourselves (5:30), hence it is given to us first, as the ratio cognoscendi
through which we come to know freedom (5:4n). It is therefore impossible for Morgan’s rational
agent to be aware of his freedom and yet be ignorant of the content of the moral law. This means
that a human being who adopts a freedom that is negative to the exclusion of his positive freedom,
does so knowing full well that the conception of freedom he is adopting is incomplete, and that a
complete conception of freedom would have to include positive freedom, that is, freedom as
autonomy (Morgan 2005, p. 82). In other words, the appeal to untrammeled freedom presupposes
that the germ of evil has already taken root in the human heart. The incentive to untramme led
freedom would not be an incentive for us if we had not already elevated our own freedom above
the freedom of others. And this is just self-love disguising itself in the false piety of freedom-talk.
But suppose it is the latter. Then Morgan’s position is that the presence of a propensity to
evil in us is completely explained by the fact that we possess this incentive to untramme led
freedom. If so, this would seem to make Morgan’s propensity to evil a physical propensity rather
than a moral propensity, because we cannot be morally responsible for merely having an incentive
that is presented to us from the nature of our wills as pure spontaneity. Remember that we are only
morally responsible when we have incorporated the relevant incentives into our maxim through
the free exercise of our Willkür. But we are no more responsible for possessing a nonmoral
incentive generated from the nature of the will as pure spontaneity than we are responsible for
possessing a nonmoral incentive generated from our sensuous nature as embodied creatures.
Therefore, if merely having the incentive to untrammeled freedom is sufficient to ascribe to us a
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propensity to evil, then Morgan has made the propensity to evil analytically necessary for every
being with a will that is purely spontaneous (which would presumably include God). For this
reason, Morgan falls back on the distinction between freedom in the sense of spontaneity, and
freedom in the sense of indifference: “To possess liberty of spontaneity is to be oneself the cause
of one’s own choices; liberty of indifference is the power to do otherwise than one actually does,
so that one can either ɸ or not ɸ” (Morgan 2005, p. 92). It is freedom in the sense of indiffere nce
that leads us to think that radical evil being both universal and freely chosen is an exceedingly
improbably affair, because “it is antecedently likely that some people would have freely adopted a
morally good supreme maxim while others adopted a morally bad supreme maxim” (Quinn 1984,
p. 36). But Morgan argues that the two concepts of freedom are not coextensive. That is, the fact
that our choice of radical evil was spontaneously made does not entail that we ever had the power
to do otherwise, and it is therefore logically possible for radical evil to be both universal and freely
chosen, albeit in the sense of being spontaneously chosen and not in the sense of being chosen
with indifference.
To drive home his point, Morgan appeals to God as an example of a being that is free
without having the power to do otherwise: “… God for instance is literally incapable of acting
contrary to the law, but this certainly does not mean that God is thereby unfree. On the contrary,
he is as free as it is possible to be, since there is obviously no question of him betraying the
principle through which freedom is actualized” (Morgan 2005, p. 94). 77 But this feels like a red
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The passage Morgan is referencing here is from the Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion, in
which Kant writes: “One might raise the objection that God cannot decide otherwise than he does, and so he does not
act freely but from the necessity of his nature. The human b eing, however, can always decide something else, e.g. a
human being, instead of being benevolent in this case, could also not be that. But it is precisely this which is a lack of
freedom in the human being, since he does not always act according to his reason; but in God it is not due to the
necessity of his nature that he can decide only as he does, but rather it is true freedom in God that he decides only
what is in conformity with his highest understanding” (28:1068). Now Morgan is making the point that Kant allows
for acts that are free because they are spontaneous, even though we do not have the power to do otherwise with respect
to them (Morgan 2005, p. 94). But this seems like a non sequitur. In the passage, Kant says that human beings have
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herring. For let us concede that God is free, despite not having the power to do otherwise. We may
even concede that “Kant maintains a conception of liberty that allows for “originary” acts of
freedom, acts that are free because they are spontaneous, even though we do not possess liberty of
indifference with respect to them” (Morgan 2005, p. 94). This is a far cry from proving that this
conception of liberty that allows for “originary” acts of freedom is applicable to the individual
human being’s choice of a fundamental maxim, so that this act would be free because it is
spontaneous, even though the human being does not possess liberty of indifference with respect to
it. Indeed, Kant says the exact opposite: “Impulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within
the human being’s mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes powerful) forces opposing it,
which he must judge that he is capable of resisting and conquering by reason not at some time in
the future but at once (the moment he thinks of duty): he must judge that he can do what the law
tells him unconditionally he ought to do” (6:380). Every human being has an evil fundame nta l
maxim, but it is true for each and every one of them that he should have chosen differently, and
because he should have chosen differently, he could have chosen differently. Otherwise there
would have been no abuse of the human being’s power of choice, and the propensity to evil would
not be something brought by the human being upon himself, but something that happened to the

the power to do otherwise because he does not always act according to reason. This signifies a lack of freedom on the
part of the human being. The freedom that the human being lacks is the freedom of the Wille, because only a
heteronomous will can depart from reason in this way: “If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else
than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law – consequently if, in going beyond itself, it seeks
this law in a property of any of its objects – heteronomy always results. The will in this case does not give itself the
law; instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it” (4:441). God cannot do otherwise than
he does. But Kant considers God to be free because He decides only what is in conformity with His highest
understanding. This is the freedom of the Wille, because it is an autonomous will that is subject only to laws given by
itself but is still universal (4:432). As Kant explains it: “Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it
is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy, therefore: to
choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition ”
(4:440). The dichotomy that Kant sets up in the passage is between the freedom of autonomy and the lack of freedom
in heteronomy, and not between the freedom of spontaneity and the freedom of indifference (the power to do
otherwise). While it may well be the case that Kant conceives of freedom in terms of spontaneity (see Sgarbi 2012),
the passage that Morgan references from the Lectures on the philosophical doctrine of religion would be of no help
establishing any such thing.
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human being. And only the former would be a moral propensity to evil, the latter being only a
physical propensity to evil. And this is why Kant writes, when it comes to the rational origin of
evil in human nature, every derivative sin must be like original sin in that the human being is
considered to have had the power to do otherwise (6:44).

Henry Allison
Turning now to Allison’s argument for the universality of the propensity to evil, we find
that he begins by contrasting the propensity to evil with the propensity to good. The propensity to
good is defined in terms of the possession of a holy will: “A perfectly good will would, therefore,
equally stand under objective laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as
necessitated to action in conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can
be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence no imperatives hold for the
divine will and in general for a holy will: the “ought” is out of place here, because volition is of
itself necessarily in accord with the law” (4:414). For Kant, the moral law is by itself sufficient to
determine the power of choice. Therefore, absent the presence of a hindering impulse, the moral
incentive would always be incorporated into the maxim over the incentives that are not moral.
Insofar as a holy will is a will that admits no such hindering impulse, it is thereby insusceptible to
the temptations these sensuous impulses bring, and so it is not constrained by the moral law. Hence,
the holy will acts spontaneously in accordance with the moral law: “In other words, a propensity
to good would consist in a kind of spontaneous preference for the impersonal requirements of
morality over one’s own needs as a rational animal with a built-in desire for happiness. Since this
preference must itself be based on a maxim and, therefore, consist in a settled policy, it might be
inappropriate to characterize it as “spontaneous”. The point, however, is that for such an incentive,
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the moral incentive would, as a matter of course, always outweigh the incentive of self-love ”
(Allison 1990, p. 155).
Allison then argues that it is impossible for finite beings like us to possess a holy will. 78
The holy will always acts in accordance with the moral law, which is the reason why the moral
law is not represented as an imperative to such a will. By contrast, a finite will is related to the
moral law so:
However, if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the
will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always
in accord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not in itself completely in
conformity with reason (as actually the case with human beings), then actions that
are cognized as objectively necessary as subjectively contingent, and the
determination of such a will in conformity with objective laws is necessitation
(4:412-413).
The presence of these subjective conditions affect the finite will in their own way, independently
of the strictures of the moral law. These incentives might determine the will in such a way that a
will that acts on them would nonetheless be in complete conformity with the moral law. But it is
also possible that these incentives would determine the will to act in a way completely contrary to
the moral law. Therefore, while reason might say that to do or to omit something would be good,
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We would do well to press Allison on the concept of a propensity to good. Now Allison claims that finite
sensuous beings cannot possess a propensity to good. He reasons thus: “… Finite, sensuously affected rational beings
such as ourselves are not only autonomous moral agents but also creatures of desire and inclination, which, as resting
on natural causes, are neither completely in our control nor necessarily in agreement with the dictates of morality .
Obviously, this does not mean that we are incapable of subordinating our sensuou sly based desire to moral
considerations and, therefore, incapable of virtue. It does mean, however, that we are never beyond the possibility of
temptation and the need for moral constraint. And this means we cannot be thought to have a propensity to good”
(Allison 1990, p. 156). But an infinite being cannot possess a propensity to good either. For God does not desire. This
is evident from the following passage: “All desires are either immanent or transient, i.e. either they relate to the very
thing which has them and remain in this thing or else they relate to something which is external to the thing. But
neither can be thought in a being of all beings. First, an all-sufficient being cannot have immanent desires, simply
because it is all-sufficient. For every desire is directed only to something possible and future. But since God has all
perfections actually, there is nothing left over for him to desire as a future possibility. But neither can God be
represented as desiring something external to him; for then he would need the existence of other things in order to
fulfill the consciousness of his own existence. But that is contrary to the concept of an ens realissimum” (28:1059).
Yet a propensity is the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination or habitual desire (6:29). Insofar as it is
impossible for God to have desires, there can be no subjective ground in him for the possibility of a desire, and
therefore no propensity (and no propensity to good). But then there is nothing that can possess the propensity to good.
Allison’s propensity to good is an empty concept.
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it says this to a will that does not always act on something because it is represented as good, and
this is solely because it is a will that is susceptible to certain subjective conditions. As such, the
moral law acts as a constraint on the finite will. And the necessitation of such a will by the moral
law is called an imperative. For this reason, Allison thinks that a finite will, exposed in this way to
subjective conditions, cannot be said to be holy, that is, without the possibility of any conflict
between its inclinations and morality. 79 In contrast to finite wills, a will that is holy does not contain
the possibility of a conflict between its inclinations and morality because it is not sensuously
affected: “… Finite, sensuously affected rational beings such as ourselves are not only autonomous
moral agents but also creatures of desire and inclination, which, as resting on natural causes, are
neither completely in our control nor necessarily in agreement with the dictates of morality”
(Allison 1990, p. 156). Insofar as Allison considers having the propensity to good and the
possession of a holy will to be one and the same thing, the fact that the will of a finite being cannot
be holy must therefore entail that it does not have the propensity to good either.80
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In a footnote, Wood wonders indirectly whether this would mean that Jesus was afflicted with the human
radical propensity to evil (Wood 2009, p. 158n). For Allison contends that the presence of the propensity to good in a
human being entails having a holy will. And a holy will would have a spontaneous preference for the impersonal
requirements of morality over the human being’s needs as a sensuous being: “It seems clear, however, that Kant
thought human nature incapable of such a disposition, since it would mean that the will is beyond the need for rational
constraint and thus beyond the twin thoughts of duty and respect for the law. This does not mean that Kant thought it
impossible to subordinate self-love to duty, since this is precisely what the moral law requires. It is only that we cannot
do so spontaneously, without, as it were, giving self-love a hearing. But if this is beyond the capacity of human nature
and we must attribute to it a moral propensity of some sort, it follows on a rigorist view that we must attribute to it the
contrary propensity to evil” (Allison 2002, p. 342). But the Synoptic Gospels clearly record Jesus as having
experienced temptation, with two notable instances being the Temptation of Christ (Matthew 4:1-11 – see also Mark
1:12-13 and Luke 4:1-13) and at the Garden of Gethsemane (Matthew 26:36-45 – see also Mark 14:32-42). And if the
experience of temptation means that the human being has not been able to spontaneously subordinate self-love to duty,
then the portrayal of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels show that He too has not been able to spontaneously subordinate
self-love to duty. And if this is so, and we must attribute to Jesus a moral propensity of some sort, it follows on a
rigorist view (if Allison is correct) that we must attribute to Him the contrary propensity to evil. Hence Wood observes:
“So if we assume that these temptations arise from the radical propensity to evil, then we must conclude that this moral
idea of humanity is also afflicted with that propensity. The holin ess of will exemplified by the moral ideal consists not
in immunity from the radical propensity to evil but rather only in not yielding to it” (Wood 2009, p. 158n).
80
Wood rejects the reasoning given here, arguing that Allison has reduced evil into “a triv ial practical corollary
of our finitude” (Wood 1999, p. 287). For the human being is denied the propensity to good because he is a finite
sensuous being. And since the human being must have either a propensity to good or a propensity to evil, it follows
that the human being is ascribed the propensity to evil because he is a finite sensuous being. Evil therefore becomes
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But, Allison goes on to argue, Kant is an ethical rigorist, and this means that human nature
must either be good or evil. There can be no middle position between the two extremes:
Now, if the law fails nevertheless to determine somebody’s free power of choice
with respect to an action relating to it, an incentive opposed to it must have
influence on the power of choice of the human being in question; and since, by
hypothesis, this can only happen because the human being incorporates the
incentive (and consequently also the deviation from the moral law) into his maxim
(in which case he is an evil human being), it follows that his disposition as regards
the moral law is never indifferent (never neither good nor bad) (6:24).
It is by appeal to this ethical rigorism that Allison intends to prove that the propensity to evil can
be ascribed to the entire human race. Because if the will of a finite being is not that of a holy will,
this has to be because the deviation from the moral law had been incorporated into his maxims,
which prevents it from being so. And because no finite being has a will that is holy, this has to be
because every finite being has incorporated the same deviation from the moral law into his maxims,
which prevents their wills from being so. Thus, the propensity to evil is universal.
Allison’s proof does not end here, however. In what amounts to a separate sub-proof, we
are given Allison’s explanation as to why his formal proof of the propensity to evil amounts to a
synthetic proof. The reasoning he gives in defense of this is as follows: “And since, as we shall

a byproduct of our being finite creatures, thereby incurring the charge that it is a trivial practical corollary of our
finitude. But this is obviously incorrect. There is no evidence at all that Kant thought that evil could be reduced to
something so trivial. Indeed, Kant insists that evil is “an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence all
the more dangerous”, which would hardly seem to describe human finitude. Furthermore, Wood points out that the
mere fact that we are finite beings is not sufficient for the ascription of the propensity to evil to us: “… From the
finitude of a will (or the presence to it of desires other than those prompted by pure reason) it simply does not follo w
that it is not holy (at most it follows that, for all we know, it might not be holy, because those desires might be contrary
to reason and the will might prefer them as incentives over the incentives of reason). Even if we did know that the
human will is not holy, this would tell us only that it does not necessarily follow the moral law, not that it displays a
propensity not to follow the law. Still less could we infer from either the finitude or the n onholiness of the human will
that there is in human nature a universal, innate propensity of this kind, which lies at the ground of all the evil deeds
human beings do” (Wood 1999, p. 402). This brings to mind the possibility of moral luck . Allison says that the finite
being is such that the moral incentive does not always outweigh the incentives of self-love, hence he would always be
tempted to adopt maxims that run counter to the law and, therefore, regard the law as constraining (Allison 1990, p.
155). But is it not possible for a finite being to have the good fortune of living a life in which the moral incentive
would, as a matter of course, always outweigh the incentive of self-love, and therefore never be tempted to adopt
maxims that run counter to the law and, therefore, never think of the law as constraining?
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see, the impossibility that is at issue is not logical (the notion of a propensity to good is not selfcontradictory for Kant), the conclusion has a synthetic a priori status” (Allison 1990, p. 155). For
Allison, what makes the conclusion that finite beings cannot have the propensity to good a
synthetic proposition is the fact that the propensity to good is not self-contradictory. For suppose
the concept of a propensity to good were to indeed be self-contradictory, then it would be true that
finite beings like us cannot have such a propensity. But this would be an analytic truth having to
do with the fact that anything that is self-contradictory would be logically impossible. Insofar as
nothing exists that is logically impossible, it follows trivially that a property that is logica lly
impossible cannot be instantiated in any existing being. Because he claims that the holy will that
is necessary in order to have a propensity to good is unobtainable for finite beings like us, however,
Allison thinks that this makes his conclusion synthetic: “As the text also makes clear, the problem
with these positions is not that the concept of such a higher form of morality is self-contradictor y
(which would make the claim that finite rational agents cannot possess such a disposition analytic);
it is rather that it reflects an ideal of moral perfection that is unobtainable by finite, sensuously
affected agents such as ourselves” (Allison 1990, p. 156). And so Allison considers his formal
proof of the universality of the propensity to evil to be synthetic solely because the propensity to
good is possible for beings other than us, insofar as a propensity to good may be ascribed to God,
even though he admits that it is impossible for finite beings like us to act without at least giving
our desires and inclinations a hearing (Allison 1990, p. 156).
But is Allison’s formal proof for the propensity to evil the synthetic a priori proof he claims
it is, or is it actually an analytic a priori proof in disguise? Now Kant himself denies the analytic
a priori status of radical evil. He clarifies what he means when he says that the human being is by
nature evil, explaining that: “… “He is evil by nature” simply means that being evil applies to him
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considered in his species; not that this quality may be inferred from the concept of his species
(from the concept of a human being in general, for then the quality is necessary), but rather that,
according to the cognition we have of the human being through experience, he cannot be judged
otherwise, in other words, we may presuppose evil as subjectively necessary in every human being,
even the best” (6:32). The formal proof that Allison has proposed seems to run afoul of this
stricture. For if anything can be inferred from the concept of a human being in general, it seems
that finitude would be something that belongs to this category of things, and the conclusion that
the propensity to evil may be presupposed as necessary in every human being follows from this.
This is because Kant considers the concept of finitude a limit on the infinite, as evidenced by the
following passage:
… All three concepts, however – that of an incentive, of an interest and of a maxim
– can be applied only to finite beings. For they all presuppose a limitation of the
nature of a being, in that the subjective constitution of its choice does not of itself
accord with the objective law of a practical reason; they presuppose a need to be
impelled to activity by something because an internal obstacle is opposed to it. Thus
they cannot be applied to the divine will (5:79).
This passage makes it clear that the hindering impulses that a finite being experiences are the result
of the limitations of its nature. Insofar as the nature of an infinite being does not have any such
limitations, such a being would not have needs that require satisfaction, since needs are
deficiencies that would be inconsistent with the nature of an infinite being. This means that, if
Allison is right that merely having hindering impulses prevents our will from being holy, then the
opposition that prevents a finite being from having a holy will must involve a logical opposition
and not a real opposition. For a finite being is, by definition, a being that has certain limitations on
its nature that are not found in an infinite being. If, per impossibile, there is a finite being whose
will is not subject to the hindering impulses that Allison describes, then this would mean that the
limitations of its nature from which these internal obstacles derive are no longer present, and this
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finite being would turn out to be an infinite being after all, which is absurd. And if, per impossibile,
there is an infinite being whose will is subject to the hindering impulses that Allison describes,
then this would mean that the nature of such a being is limited by internal obstacles, and this
infinite being would turn out to be a finite being after all, and this too is absurd. Thus, it is a logical
impossibility for a finite being to have a holy will under Allison’s account. As such, Alliso n’s
conclusion that the propensity to evil is universal to finite beings like us must be regarded as an
analytic proposition.
This result gives us grounds to be suspicious of Allison’s formal proof. The first suspicion
is this: If Allison is right, and the propensity to evil can be ascribed to us on the basis of our finite
nature, this has grave consequences for Kant’s doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Recall
Kant’s argument for the immortality of the soul. The production of the highest good in the world
is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. Insofar as the complete conformity
of the will with the moral law must be assumed for the production of the highest good in the world,
the complete conformity of the will must be possible if the production of this highest good is
possible.81 Because complete conformity of the will with the moral law is holiness, and this is a
perfection that no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence,
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If holiness is the goal for every human being, then there must be a way for a human being to achieve this
goal. Now Kant describes how we are to achieve this holiness in the Metaphysics of Morals, in his discussion of our
duty of self-perfection: “A human being has a duty to carry out the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous
disposition, in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys th e law
from duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection” (6:387). The human being has a duty to cultivate his
will, and the more he cultivates his will, the better he is able to withstand the impulses of nature that impede the moral
disposition in him (6:380). The perfection of the human being’s will would ensure that he is always able to withstand
the impulses of nature that impede the moral disposition in him. This represents a spontaneous preference for the
impersonal requirements of morality over the human being’s needs as a rational animal with a built -in desire for
happiness, which Allison calls holiness or the propensity to good (Allison 1990, p. 155). Holiness is therefore virtue
(or human virtue in its most perfect form). This makes holiness an end that is also a duty (6:383). We ought to be holy,
but if Allison is right, as sensuous finite beings, we cannot be holy. Therefore, if Allison is right, the principle that
ought implies can must be given up in light of the reality of human finitude, because we can either judge that we can
do what the law tells us unconditionally that we ought to do (6:380), or judge that the finitude of the human condition
destroys any possibility of adopting the virtuous disposition that is our duty (6:383).
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there is an infinite distance between the finite will and the holy will. Hence Kant posits the endless
progress of the will towards complete conformity with the moral law as a substitute, and with this
endless progress of the will there must be an endless endurance of the will to accompany it, which
grounds our belief in the immortality of the soul. But this entire argument falls apart if holiness is
something that is logically incompatible with the finite will. For an infinite distance between the
finite will and the holy will presupposes a continuum that exists between the two points, even if it
is assumed that traversing all the points in between is really impossible. This becomes untenable
if the finite will is incompatible with holiness, and not merely incapable of holiness, because then
the line between the finite will and the holy will would lose its end-point, and there would be
nothing for the will to endlessly progress to. The endless progress of the finite will towards holiness
is therefore impossible in precisely the same way the finite will is incapable of being holy, that is,
logically impossible according to Allison. And while the primacy of practical reason gives us
license to believe in things which practical reason finds necessary but speculative reason is silent
on, it is not allowed to contradict speculative reason, which it would have to do in order to mainta in
its belief in the immortality of the soul (5:120).
The second suspicion that emerges from this line of reasoning is this: If Allison is right,
and the propensity to evil can be ascribed to us on the basis of our finite nature, then Kant was
deeply confused when he declared that human beings are by nature evil, or at least ignorant of the
full implications of his own argument. For if Allison is right, every rational being other than God
must be ascribed a propensity to evil on account of their finite natures. But would Kant really be
willing to go so far as to make the bolder claim? It seems like he would hesitate to say that finite
beings are by nature evil.82 For consider the case of rational beings other than humans, and whether
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Indeed, it seems that Allison is simply wrong to say that human beings cannot possess a propensity to good.
When he tries to determine what a propensity to good would look like in a human being, he writes: “… A propensity
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or not such beings would be marked by a propensity to evil. Insofar as finitude is a characteristic
that cuts across the phenomenal-noumenal divide, it seems reasonable to consider the possibility
of finite beings that are not embodied. Human beings, as finite beings that are embodied, have to
be impelled to an activity by the moral law because of an internal obstacle that is opposed to the
moral incentive, an internal obstacle that only exists because of its sensible nature: “Impulses of
nature, accordingly, involve obstacles within the human being’s mind to his fulfillment of duty
and (sometimes powerful) forces opposing it, which he must judge that he is capable of resisting
and conquering by reason not at some time in the future but at once (the moment he thinks of duty):
he must judge that he can do what the law tells him unconditionally that he ought to do” (6:380).
Here we see Kant connecting the obstacle to practical reason to sensibility, the presence of which
also entails finitude. But he also entertains the possibility of beings that are free from all sensibility,
in whom sensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason. Insofar as these beings that are free
from all sensibility are distinguished from the supreme being, they must have finite natures, yet it
does not follow from this that beings that are free from all sensibility are marked by the same
propensity to evil that we human beings are. For all we know, there might be angels, whose wills
conform unhesitatingly with the divine law, despite the limitations of their natures. In conclusio n,

to good would consist in a kind of spontaneous preference for the impersonal requirements of morality over one’s
own needs as a rational animal with a built-in desire for happiness. Since this preference must itself be based on a
maxim and, therefore, consist in a settled policy, it might seem inappropriate to characterize it as “spontaneous”. The
point, however, is that for such an agent the moral incentive would, as a matter of course, always outweigh the
incentive of self-love. Consequently, for an agent blessed with such a propensit y, there would be no temptation to
adopt maxims that run counter to the law and, therefore, no thought of the law as constraining” (Allison 1990, p. 155).
Now Allison’s argument is that human beings cannot have a propensity to good because they are finite sensuously
affected beings (Allison 1990, p. 155). From this, it follows that finite sensuously affected beings cannot have a
spontaneous preference for the impersonal requirements of morality over their own needs as rational animals with a
built-in desire for happiness. Yet Kant explicitly considers finite beings that would never be tempted to adopt maxims
that run counter to the moral law in the following passage: “For finite holy beings (who could never be tempted to
violate duty) there would be no doctrine of virtue but only a doctrine of morals, since the latter is autonomy of practical
reason whereas the former is also autocracy of practical reason, that is, it involves consciousness of the capacity to
master one’s inclinations when they rebel against the law, a capacity which, though not directly perceived, is yet
rightly inferred from the moral categorical imperative” (6:383).
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when Allison says that finite, sensuously-affected beings cannot be assigned the propensity to
good, and must therefore be assigned the propensity to evil, it is not altogether clear whether human
beings cannot be assigned the propensity to good because they are finite or because they are
sensuous, despite Allison’s assumption that it is due to our finitude when he extends his argument
to include all finite rational beings (Allison 2002, p. 342).

Allen Wood
Lastly, we arrive at the interpretation of radical evil proposed by Wood. He draws upon the
idea that the doctrine of radical evil in the Religion is based on Kant’s anthropology, following an
earlier suggestion from Sharon Anderson-Gold.83 According to Wood, radical evil arises in the
social context, and is to be identified with unsociable sociability, which is defined in the following
passage from the Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View: “The means
that nature employs in order to bring about the development of all the predispositions is their
antagonism in society, insofar as this antagonism ultimately becomes the cause of a law-governed
organization of society. Here I take antagonism to mean the unsociable sociability of human

For a different anthropological take on Kant’s doctrine of radical evil, see the development model that has
been proposed by Mariña. According to the Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion and the Conjectural
Beginnings of Human History, the human being in his original state was determined by his animalistic impulses: “So
long as human beings live only in the moment, guided by instinct alone, they are in paradise. Because at this point in
their development reason does not yet exist in them and thereby makes no demands, they also incur no guilt” (Mariña
2017, p. 187). At this stage of human development, reason has not yet entered the picture. And when it finally does
enter the picture, it is unable to contend with the fully-developed animal nature in the human being: “Reason, however,
does not first come on the scene in its full maturity and strength, but only in its infancy, its powers weak. At first it is
always the worsted party in its “scuffle with animality in its whole strength”; it is to be expected that its first exercise
will be almost fully bungled, for along with reason come fresh desires due to the expanded powers of the imagination ,
and hence a new array of possible mistakes. There is just too much to manage” (Mariña 2017, p. 188). Yet there can
be no moral evil before reason enters the picture. Prior to reason, the human being simply acted on his animal ins tincts,
which were all he had. He was no more guilty of his savagery than a lion. But once reason enters the picture, weak as
it is, the human being is confronted with a choice as to which he should follow. Even though the immaturity of his
faculty of reason leads him to inevitably side with his animal instincts, the human being is morally responsible for this
choice. Hence: “… Once reason begins to stir, the person no longer simply is what she finds herself to be. Reason
demands that she must make herself into what she is to become. Since reason represents a moral demand and hence a
choice, she becomes responsible for persisting in her condition of animality insofar as she does so, for she has chosen
to identify with her animal needs. In this way has she made herself into an animal” (Mariña 2017, p. 187).
83
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beings, that is, their tendency to enter into society, a tendency connected, however, with a constant
resistance that continually threatens to break up this society” (8:20). Unsociable sociability is
therefore Kant’s name for this pair of tendencies that work at cross purposes with each other.
According to Kant, there is a sociable tendency that is inherent to human nature. As such, human
beings have an innate inclination to associate with one another, in order to develop their natural
predispositions, per Kant’s account of universal history (8:21). But Kant believes that there is also
an unsociable tendency that is inherent in human nature. As such, human beings also have a
tendency to separate themselves from society: “But they also have a strong tendency to isolate
themselves, because they encounter in themselves the unsociable trait that predisposes them to
want to direct everything only to their own ends and hence to expect to encounter resistance
everywhere, just as they know they themselves tend to resist others” (8:21).
The universality of radical evil can therefore be explained by its origins in the
predispositions of animality and humanity. Now the original predisposition to animality is
described in the following passage: “The predisposition to animality in the human being may be
brought under the general title of physical or merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which
reason is not required. It is threefold; first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the
species; third, for community with other beings, i.e. the social drive” (6:26). It is this social drive
that we get from the predisposition to animality that constitutes the sociable aspect of unsociable
sociability. The original predisposition to humanity, on the other hand, is described so: “The
predispositions to humanity can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is physical
and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is, only in comparison with others
does one judge oneself happy and unhappy” (6:27). Insofar as the human being is a rational animal,
both original predispositions must be found in him as belonging with necessity to the human being,
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because without the predisposition to animality, the human being would be rational without being
an animal, and without the predisposition to humanity, the human being would be a mere animal
incapable of rational thought. In neither case would the human being be a rational animal. But
Kant also writes with respect to the predisposition to humanity: “… Out of this self-love originates
the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others, originally, of course, merely equal worth:
not allowing anyone superiority over oneself, bound up with the constant anxiety that others might
be striving for ascendancy; but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority
for oneself over others” (6:27). And it is this constant anxiety that is responsible for the
competitiveness of human nature, without which there would be no propensity to evil, but without
which there also would be no progress (Wood 1999, p. 289).
How does competitiveness lead the human being to evil? The moment a human being finds
himself in the company of others, his predispositions (or unsociable sociability) determine him not
to allow anyone else gain superiority over himself, and this places him in a state of constant anxiety
in which he suspects everyone around him of striving for ascendancy over him. This warps his
perspective towards those around him. Instead of seeing them as potential allies, he sees them as
competitors and potential threats. This competitive spirit is, according to Wood, in direct conflict
with the basic requirements of the moral law (Wood 2009, p. 159). The moral law tells us “not to
make an exception of ourselves to maxims we will hold as universal laws, to treat all rational
beings as ends in themselves rather than subordinating them to our ends, to follow the laws of a
realm of ends, in which human ends are in systematic harmony” (Wood 2009, p. 160). The
competitive spirit tells us to do precisely the opposite. If we treat all rational beings as ends in
themselves rather than subordinating them to our own ends, we make ourselves vulnerable to the
machinations of others, thereby all but giving our competitors superiority over ourselves. This
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gives rise to diametrically opposed standpoints. The moral standpoint tells us to follow the laws of
a realm of ends, in which it is assumed that human ends can be put in systematic harmony. By
contrast, the competitive standpoint considers human ends to be in contention with each other, and
tells us to follow the counsels of prudence instead. 84 Hence Wood writes: “Once we see that our
natural inclinations, when shaped by our social conditions as rational beings, involve this
competitive spirit, then we can see that the fundamental maxim of evil, which gives their
satisfaction priority over obedience to the moral law, is really nothing except the desire for
superiority over others and a policy of esteeming ourselves on the basis of our state or condit ion,
which can be compared with that of others with the aim of validating that superiority” (Wood 2009,
p. 160).
But are we morally responsible for this state of unsociable sociability that we find ourselves
in? If the propensity to evil is identical with our unsociable sociability, then moral responsibility
becomes problematic for Wood’s interpretation of the propensity to evil as unsociable sociability. 85

Wood addresses this objection in a way in the following passage: “… But it is one thing to say that the social
condition provides the necessary context for developing our radical propensity to evil and qu ite another to say that
society forces us to choose evil maxims, removing or diminishing our responsibility for these choices” (Wood 2009,
pp. 168-169). For Wood, the bad social conditions a human being finds himself in play a necessary role in our choice
of evil maxims, but does not absolve him of the moral responsibility he incurs for doing them, because he always has
the freedom to refrain from making evil choices (Wood 2009, p. 169). The incorporation thesis is instructive here: the
same way freedom of the power of choice cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as the
human being has incorporated it into his maxim, so too are the social conditions in which the human being finds
himself unable to determine the adoption of any incentive without the concurrence of the human being. But while the
social conditions that play a necessary role in the human being’s choice of evil maxims do not exculpate the conduct
that results from them, he cannot be blamed for the social conditions that are a necessary factor in his bad conduct,
given that he is born into a situation in which human beings “mutually corrupt each other’s moral disposition and
make one another evil” (6:94). And this is problematic because Kant considers the human being morally responsible
for not just his bad conduct, but the evil propensity from which all this bad conduct issues (6:31). As Grenberg
observes: “Wood’s assertion that radical evil, despite its social source, has a purely individual culpability is also
compromised: why should I consider my tendency to place concerns of self above concerns of morality something for
which I am ultimately responsible when, without the corrosive influence of other persons, my desires are “moderate”,
“tranquil”, and “undemanding”?” (Grenberg 2005, p. 35). If society makes me into a villain, I am not responsible for
my villainous nature, even if I am responsible for the villainies resulting from this nature.
85
Grenberg raises an objection on this point to Wood’s account of radical evil in Kant and the Ethics of
Humility, where she writes:
84
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For Kant argues in the Religion that the propensity to evil cannot have an origin in time because it
is a moral propensity, as opposed to a physical propensity (6:39). Moral propensities, Kant writes,
pertain to a human being’s power of choice as a moral being, whereas physical propensities pertain
to a human being’s power of choice as a natural being (6:31). The propensity to evil has to be a
moral propensity because it has its origins in our freedom, which would not be possible if it is a
physical propensity. Hence: “In [a physical propensity], there is no propensity to moral evil, for

The biggest problem for Wood is this: why is it that human beings, when in the presence of others, tend
toward this fear of their own worthlessness? Why not just maintain one’s happy and contended state in a
more communal setting? One could, perhaps, appeal to a quasi-Rousseauian account of scarcity of resources
to explain the development of fear amongst otherwise content beings in a social situation. But this is not
Wood’s, or Kant’s, story. It is, after all, not so much a fear for survival that is inspired on Kant’s account,
but a fear of worthlessness. Appeal to the mere presence and recognition of other happy and content beings
is similarly unsatisfying: happy and content beings encountering happy and content beings doesn’t seem to
demand the development of fear and competition among these bein gs in a social situation. If some of these
beings were to begin over-asserting themselves, Wood’s picture would follow. But why would even one
happy and content being, with nothing more than the desire for equality, feel motivated to over-assert herself?
Without a more extended reflection on the fact of human dependency, and the way it acts as a condition in
this process, this question has no answer. All we can say is that beings who, on their own, would be happy
and content, become unhappy, comparative, and competitive when put in a social situation; and that’s just
the way humans are socially (Grenberg 2005, pp. 33-34).
In this passage, the issue with Wood’s account of radical evil as unsociable sociability is that there is a gap
in the argument. For nowhere in the argument is it explained how the unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself
over others is able to gradually arise from the inclination to gain (equal) worth in the opinion of others: “… If everyone
else has the desire for equal worth, and indeed that natural happiness and contentment of which Wood and Kant have
spoken, the birth of this “constant anxiety” is unmotivated. It seems to come from nowhere. There is, then, a gap in
this social story of the origin of radical evil: we cannot explain in social terms alone, why it is that fear and anxiety
develop in social situations” (Grenberg 2005, p. 35). This presents a problem for Wood’s account of radical evil. In
fact, it seems more pressing than Grenberg makes it out to be. If this fear and anxiety were absent, the human being
never becomes unsociable, and there would be no unsociable sociability, and therefore no propensity to evil. Yet in
searching for a cause or reason for this fear and anxiety, we are confronted with the troubling prospect that there is
no suitable ground for this fear and anxiety but the propensity to evil itself, because they are vices that are grafted onto
the inclination to gain equal worth in the opinion of others (6:27). Insofar as a propensity is defined as the subjective
ground of the possibility of an inclination (6:29), and these vices of culture that are grafted onto competitiveness are
inclinations (6:27), it follows that these vices (of fear and anxiety) are grounded on the propensity to evil. But then
the propensity to evil cannot be explained by unsociable sociability, otherwise the argument becomes circular: the
propensity to evil is the cause or reason of fear and anxiety, which is the cause or reason for the inclination to gain
worth in the opinion of others becoming an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others, which is the
cause or reason for the unsociable sociability in human beings that Wood identifies as the sole and sufficient
explanation for the propensity to evil. Grenberg’s own s olution gives us the same result. She writes that human finitude
and dependence would fill the gap in Wood’s argument: “… Although inclinations themselves and the fact of human
dependency are not evil, surely it would make sense to expect unsocial sociability, that fear of one’s own worthlessness
in the sight of others, to find its footing in the propensities of an individual finite being. But Wood provides no such
account and, as such, his story of the development of radical evil is lacking” (Grenberg 2005, p. 35). The point is that
unsociable sociability presupposes something else, in this case finitude and human dependence, and therefore cannot
be the ultimate cause or reason for the human propensity to evil.

168
the latter must originate from freedom; a physical propensity (one based on sensory induceme nts)
to whatever use of freedom, be it for good or evil, is a contradiction. Hence a propensity to evil
can only attach to the moral faculty of choice” (6:31). Later on, Kant goes over the same argument
once again, but this time in terms of the distinction between an origin according to time and an
origin according to reason (6:39). If the propensity to evil had an origin in time, its determining
grounds lie in the state that precedes it in time. This would mean that the propensity to evil would
have a natural cause in an event in the world, thereby making the propensity to evil a physical
propensity (6:39-40). Hence: “To look for the temporal origins of free actions as free (as though
they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for
the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is
considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which
(just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the
representations of reason alone” (6:40). The problem with the unsociable sociability that Wood
wants to ascribe to human beings is that it gives the propensity to evil a temporal beginning. It is,
after all, a misuse of the original predisposition to humanity, and therefore cannot precede the
human being’s entrance into society, which has a beginning in time. 86 Therefore, Wood’s
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Wood addresses a closely-related objection to the idea that the propensity to evil lies in the unsociable
sociability of human beings. The objection points out that not every instance of moral evil can be traced to social
competitiveness (Wood 2009, p. 166). The sort of moral evils that are connected to social competitiveness involve
violations of our duties to others. This leaves violations of our duties to oneself unexplained by a propensity to evil
that is rooted in the social condition. In response, Wood writes: “We misunderstand Kant’s solution if we think that it
requires claiming that every individual instance of evil directly involves social competition. Particular violations of
duties to oneself as an animal being – cases of suicide, gluttony, or drunkenness, for instance – may have a social
aspect or they may not. (I may get drunk or kill myself because I have been humiliated by my social rivals, but I may
also violate the same duties from motives having nothing to do with social competition). The point is rather that all
such violations fundamentally exhibit the propensity to value one’s state or condition more than one’s person, and
Kant’s solution to the propensity problem is that social competitiveness is the sole and sufficient for that propensity –
whether or not social competitiveness is directly involved in its manifestation in a given case of evil choice” (Wood
2009, p. 167). Wood is certainly correct to insist that the propensity to evil is the ground for both the violations of
duties to others and the violations of duties to oneself. But his critics are right to suspect that there is something amiss
with the idea that social competitiveness is the sole and sufficient explanation for the propensity to evil. If social
competitiveness is the sole and sufficient explanation for the propen sity to evil, then if there is ever a human being
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unsociable sociability can only be a physical propensity, not a moral propensity, if it can even be
a propensity at all. And if Wood’s unsociable sociability can only be a physical propensity, and not
a moral propensity, then we cannot be morally responsible for it.
The thrust of this objection, therefore, is that Wood’s interpretation of radical evil as
unsociable sociability is inconsistent with Kant’s doctrine of freedom. Insofar as the propensity to
evil has to have an origin in reason rather than an origin in time, it has to be an intelligible deed,
and the choice of this propensity must be an exercise of the human being’s transcendental freedom.
This is inconsistent with Wood’s interpretation of radical evil as unsociable sociability because the
human being that is corrupted by his social conditions is a phenomenal being belonging to the
world of sense, not a noumenal being belonging to the world of understanding. As such,
transcendental freedom and unsociable sociability belong to two completely separate worlds, and
never the twain shall meet. But Wood dismisses this objection as being based on a misinterpreta tio n
of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism, as he says in the following passage: “This objection
is based, in my view, on some very fundamental errors about Kant’s treatment of the problem of
freedom and the role of transcendental idealism in resolving it. The function of Kant’s idea that
we might be free as members of the intelligible world is only to show that there is no contradictio n
in regarding our actions both as free and as subject to the causal mechanism of nature in the
sensible world” (Wood 2009, p. 165). For Wood, the concept of transcendental freedom and the
metaphysical position that it entails is supposed to be treated as a postulate, a useful fiction for
casting reasonable doubt on a transcendentally realist metaphysics in which everything is causally

that is not part of society, the propensity to evil must either be absent or be unexplained. Now there might be solid
anthropological reasons to think that human beings are always part of society, but it is not impossible to think of
human beings apart of society, and we cannot rule out that there might actually be human beings leading such a solitary
existence. And if this is the case, social competitiveness cannot be regarded as the sole and sufficient exp lanation for
the universal propensity to evil.
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determined in accordance with the laws of nature. Accordingly, there is no need to reify it into a
dualist metaphysics in which the things in themselves are actually believed to exist. Hence Wood
writes: “In assessing Kant’s compatibilism, it may help to remind ourselves that his theory of
timeless agency is put forward only as a means of exploiting the burden of proof in the free will
problem, which falls on those who would show that freedom is incompatible with determinis m.
Kant is not positively committed to his theory of the case as an account of the way our free agency
actually works” (Wood 1984, p. 99).87
Furthermore, Wood goes on to reject the metaphysical position of transcendental idealis m,
as a positive account of the way things are, as implausible: “If what bothers us about Kant’s theory
is that it seems too farfetched and metaphysical, then it may help at least a little to realize that once
the theory has served Kant as a device for showing that freedom and determinism cannot be proven
incompatible, he is just as content to dissociate himself from it and adopt a largely agnostic position
on how our freedom is possible” (Wood 1984, p. 99). But what are the aspects of transcendenta l
idealism that Wood considers too farfetched and metaphysical to be believable? It seems like the
aspect of transcendental idealism that Wood finds most problematic is the way it appeals to the
doctrine of timeless agency in order to defend freedom from the threat of causal determinis m.
According to the doctrine of timeless agency, it is possible for beings that do not exist in time to

Pereboom raises an interesting objection to Wood’s claim that Kant only means to exploit the burden of proof
in the free will problem (Wood 1999, p. 99). He points out that the burden of proof shifts depending on the seriousness
of the situation: “Kant may indeed have established that our being transcendentally free cannot be ruled out. However,
in a large range of cases, such as that of the malicious liar, or the last murderer on death row in the island soc iety, the
guidance that belief in our transcendental freedom would provide is more aptly described as on the side of the
prosecuting attorney. The epistemic standard that the prosecuting attorney must meet is not merely that his claims
cannot conclusively be ruled out” (Pereboom 2006, p. 564). To continue the legal analogy, in a murder case in which
the death penalty is on the table, the prosecuting attorney had better be able to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that
the accused is guilty (or that transcendental freedom is real). In a matter of such seriousness, Kant does not get to play
the defense attorney, as Wood argues here: “Kant’s role regarding freedom is somewhat like a defense attorney’s role
regarding his client. Because practical freedom is pres upposed by morality, we may assume that freedom is innocent
until proven guilty, that the burden of proof lies on those who would undermine our moral consciousness by claiming
that we are not free” (Wood 1999, p. 83). It would, after all, be perverse to demand that the accused prove himself
innocent in a murder case in which the death penalty is on the table.
87
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act in order to bring about temporal events. For Kant, the world of sense is determined by the laws
of cause and effect, such that every event is preceded by an event from which it follows without
exception, according to a rule. Insofar as a world represents the totality of appearances standing in
thoroughgoing causal relations with one another, it follows that there must be as many possible
worlds as there are possible configurations of appearances standing in thoroughgoing causal
relations with one another. The way a timeless choice acts as a cause for temporal events is by
selecting a certain subset of possible worlds from which the actual world is drawn, and this is what
happens when the noumenal self makes a timeless choice to select its intelligible character, insofar
as this is a choice that is compatible with only a subset of possible empirical selves (Wood 1984,
p. 91).88 Therefore, even though our empirical character acts in a way that is determined by the
laws of nature, Kant maintains that we have the ability to do otherwise, because we would have
ended up with a different empirical character, had we made a different timeless choice: “Of every
one of my misdeeds, it is true that I would have left it undone had I made a different timeless
choice. Hence it is in my power to leave any misdeed undone, despite the fact that in the actual
world it follows inescapably from what preceded it in time” (Wood 1984, p. 91). This is the aspect
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Pereboom proposes an alternative way in which the timeless choice made by the noumenal self is able to
determine the way the empirical world ends up being. Instead of a timeless choice restricting the number of possible
worlds from which the actual world can be drawn, he proposes a Molinist reading of Kantian idealism: “According to
the position of Luis de Molina on divine providence, God knows, etern ally, what every possible libertarian free
creature would choose in every possible circumstance, and with this knowledge, God is able to direct the course of
history with precision, partly in virtue of creating just those free creatures whose choices fit a preconceived divine
plan. On a version of this Molinist view adopted to Kant’s idealism, God would reconcile noumenal transcendental
freedom with phenomenal determinism by creating just those transcendentally free beings the appearances of whole
free choices conform to the deterministic laws that God intends for the phenomenal world” (Pereboom 2006, p. 557).
Because my timeless choice does not play any part in the selection of the actual world from a (restricted) subset of
possible worlds, Walkers worry might thereby be avoided, for it would no longer be true that “I can be blamed for the
First World War, and for the Lisbon earthquake that so appalled Voltaire. Gandhi is no less guilty than Amin of the
atrocities of the Ugandan dictator” (Walker 1979, p. 149). Pereboom admits that there are many who would find a
Molinist reading of Kant less than credible for the theological and idealistic presuppositions it makes (Pereboom 2006,
p. 558). But he writes: “… For the purposes of this discussion I don’t want to set the standard of credibility too high,
and it suffices that idealism and Molinism are not uncommonly accepted by people who have considered these views
ably and seriously” (Pereboom 2006, p. 558).
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of transcendental idealism that Wood considers implausible, as an “absurd metaphysical fantasy
that as free agents we are locked away in little monastic cells somewhere up there in the noumena l
world” (Wood 2009, p. 166).
The problem Wood has with the doctrine of timeless agency is that it seems in no way
incompatible

with temporal striving

and moral progress. Wood’s reasoning

in Kant’s

Compatibilism is as follows:
... There is no place in Kant’s theory for the idea that I may resist some passion or
inclination of mine tomorrow by struggling with it today, and by striving througho ut
the day to purify my motives and fortify myself for the crucial hour of decision.
The problem is not that I cannot imagine myself having all the thoughts and
performing all the actions that I think of as part of this process, for I certainly can.
The problem is that I cannot think of them as connected parts of an exercise of
agency through time. I can only think of them as results or products of timeless
agency, and not as the actual exercise of it. In time, there are only facta; yet trying
or striving is not a factum but a facere. It is this exercise of agency Kant’s theory
will not allow me to conceive as a temporal process (Wood 1984, p. 98).
The basic idea here is simple. Let us consider a straightforward example of moral progress from
bad to good, where the agent is bad at t 1 , neutral at t 2 , and good at t 3 . For the agent to undergo
moral progress, we cannot simply conceive of the agent in terms of merely having the moral
predicates “bad”, “neutral”, and “good”, because what matters is not simply that the agent has
these predicates, but also the way these predicates are connected to each other in the agent. It
matters here that the predicate “neutral” comes before the predicate “good” and after the predicate
“bad”, because an ordering where the agent is good at t 1 , neutral at t 2 , and bad at t 3 is not an
example of moral progress but of moral regress. Now Wood does not think that it is impossib le
for a noumenal agent to timelessly bring about these predicates “bad”, “neutral”, and “good” (or
the noumenal analogs thereof). But because a temporal process where one stage is the condition
for the next stage seems to be incompatible with the notion of a timeless agency, he thinks it is
impossible is for a noumenal agent to timelessly bring about the predicate “bad” followed by the

173
predicate “neutral” followed by the predicate “good” (or the noumenal analogs thereof). And if
Kant applies the doctrine of timeless agency to human agents, then this leaves them completely at
odds with the way they represent themselves as striving and progressing: “The absence [of trying
or striving] surely is a problem for dedicated Kantian moral agents, however, who must think of
themselves as struggling constantly with their unruly inclinations and striving throughout their
lives to make the idea of duty the sufficient motive of every action” (Wood 1984, p. 98).89
But it is unclear whether, in explaining his objection to the doctrine of timeless agency,
Wood is elucidating Kant’s position on the matter, follies and foibles all, or if he is reinterpreting
Kant on the matter, and excising the parts he finds too farfetched and metaphysical. Admitted ly,
we find Kant in the First Critique using the theory of timeless agency to show that freedom and
determinism cannot be proven to be incompatible, without committing himself to the theory as a
positive account of how our free agency really is. Hence we find Kant framing the issue in merely
hypothetical terms in the Dialectic of the First Critique, asking “Is it not rather possible that
although for every effect in appearance there is required a connection with its cause in accordance

To be fair, Wood’s position on noumenal agency might b e better described as agnostic. His interest in
freedom and its relation to morality is focused on Kant’s argument that freedom must be presupposed as a property of
the will of all rational beings (4:447-448). Hence he writes: “… The argument for freedom we have just seen is even
more basic than Kant’s arguments for incompatibilism. For they say that whatever we may or may not hold about the
compatibility of freedom and natural causality, we must presuppose our won freedom, as the capacity to act under
norms of reason, in order even to represent ourselves as competent to decide on rational grounds whether fatalism or
compatibilism is true. Our agreement or disagreement with Kant’s incompatibilism therefore should make no
difference to our acceptance of his argument that [freedom] is a necessary presupposition of all rational judgment”
(Wood 1999, p. 178). This is why Wood is able to write, after raising his objections to the idea of timeless agency, the
following: “In the end, solving the free will problem may not be a matter of “saving common sense” (for that may be
quite hopeless). Rather the solution may be a matter of saving as much of it as we can, and especially of saving those
parts of it which matter most to us. I believe Kant saw the situation in this way, and I suggest we may assume that he
decided the temporality of our agency is the necessary ransom that must be paid to the free will problem if our high
vocation as moral agents is to be preserved” (Wood 1984, pp. 100-101). And yet still be able to dismiss the objections
to his accout of radical evil from the standpoint of transcendental freedom so: “Nothing Kant says could justify
ascribing to him the absurd metaphysical fantasy that as free agents we are locked away in little monastic cells
somewhere up there in the noumenal world” (Wood 2009, pp. 165-166). And the reason is because he considers the
metaphysical position of transcendental idealism considerably less central to the practical side of Kant’s philosophy
than the practical freedom of the Groundwork or the progressive development of the human race of Kant’s
anthropology.
89
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with laws of empirical causality, this empirical causality itself, without the least interruption of its
connection with natural causes, could nevertheless be an effect of a causality that is not empiric a l,
but rather intelligible…” (A544/B572). But this isn’t the entire story. For in the Second Critique,
Kant takes himself to have proven that the transcendental freedom of this doctrine of timeless
agency to be more than merely possible, but also actual. This is the point of the deduction of
freedom in the Faktum Text, in which the Reciprocity Thesis, which shows that the concept of a
will determinable by the moral law and the concept of a free will reciprocally entail each other, is
used to prove that the will is transcendentally free. To do this, Kant appeals to the fact of reason,
which the moral law provides us, and this fact proves that our wills are wills for which the mere
lawgiving form of a maxim can serve as a law, and in so doing proves to us that our wills are free
wills.90 This allows Kant to conclude: “… And the moral law thus determines that which
speculative philosophy had to leave undetermined, namely the law for a causality the concept of
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In his analysis of the deduction of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork , Schönecker focuses on the
following passage: “But because the world of the understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too
of its laws, and is therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of
understanding) and must accordingly also be thought as such, it follows that I shall cogn ize myself as intelligence,
though on the other side as a being belonging to the world of sense, as nevertheless subject to the law of the world of
understanding, that is, of reason, which contains in the idea of freedom the law of the world of understanding, and
thus cognize myself as subject to the autonomy of the will; consequently the world of understanding must be regarded
as imperatives for me, and actions in conformity with these as duties” (4:453-454). In this passage, the world of
understanding is identified as the ground of the world of sense and also the ground of the laws of the world of sense.
The human being regards himself as a member of both the world of understanding and the world of sense. But because
the intelligible character of the human being is the ground of the empirical character of the human being, even though
the human being regards himself as a member of both the world of sense and the world of understanding, he
nevertheless takes himself to be subject to the laws of reason. This g ives us what Schönecker calls the ontoethical
principle: “Kant argues for the validity of the categorical imperative as a moral law for sensual-rational beings with
the superiority of the ontic status of the world of understanding . The human being as a thing in itself and hence the
‘eigentliche Selbst’ and its law is of higher ontic value than the human being as an appearance and this is why the law
of the world of understanding (the moral law) is binding upon the human being (as a categorical imperative) who is a
member both of the world of understanding and the world of sense” (Schönecker 2006, pp. 316-317). But if the
noumenal agent is just an “absurd metaphysical fantasy” (Wood 2009, pp. 165-166), then there is no ontoethical
principle. For there would be no sense in saying that the “human being as a thing in itself and its law” is of higher
ontic value than “the human being as an appearance and the laws of sense” when the former is a mere figment of the
imagination and only the latter is in any way real.
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which was only negative in the latter, and thus for the first time provides objective reality to this
concept” (5:47 – emphasis mine).
Nor does Kant seem to find the incompatibility of the doctrine of timeless agency with
trying and striving to be as problematic as Wood makes it out to be. Wood himself admits in Kant’s
Compatibilism that: “In some writings after 1793, Kant seems to recognize that his theory cannot
accommodate moral striving or moral progress, literally speaking. And he seems to want to employ
the notion of our noumenal “disposition” or “attitude” (Gesinnung) as a sort of timeless analogue
or substitute both for moral striving and moral progress” (Wood 1984, p. 98). Indeed, a prime
example of this can be found in the Religion, where Kant writes:
If by a single and unalterable decision a human being reverses the supreme ground
of his maxims by which he was an evil human being (and thereby puts on a “new
man”), he is to this extent, by principle and attitude of mind, a subject receptive to
the good; but he is a good human being only in incessant laboring and becoming;
i.e. he can hope – in view of the purity of the principle which he has adopted as the
supreme maxim of his power of choice, and in view of the stability of this princip le
– to find himself upon the good (though narrow) path of constant progress from bad
to better (6:48).
From this, we can see that Kant considers the doctrine of timeless agency to be compatible with
trying and striving after all. According to Kant’s account in the Religion, the moral progress of our
earlier agent as he goes from bad at t 1 to neutral at t 2 to good at t 3 takes place in the mode of sense.
Through it, a gradual reformation of our empirical character takes place: “Virtue, in this sense, is
accordingly acquired little by little, and to some it means a long habituation (in the observance of
the law), in virtue of which a human being, through gradual reformation of conduct and
consolidation of his maxims, passes from a propensity to vice to its opposite” (6:47). But in the
mode of thought, this moral progress is not represented as a process in which he goes from bad at
t 1 to neutral at t 2 to good at t 3 . That is, in the mode of thought, any change in the intelligib le
character is not represented as a gradual reformation, but is instead represented as a revolution in
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disposition (6:47). For this reason, Kant describes the gradual reformation of character in the mode
of sense in terms of a unity in the mode of thought: “For him who penetrates to the intelligib le
ground of the heart (the ground of all maxims of the power of choice), for him to whom this endless
progress is a unity, i.e. for God, this is the same as actually being a good human being (pleasing to
him); and to this extent the change can be considered a revolution” (6:48). The moral bent of the
human being’s fundamental maxim acts, in Wood’s words, as a sort of timeless analogue or
substitute for the gradual reformation of moral striving or moral progress that takes place in the
world of sense. And it is the human being’s possession of a good fundamental maxim in the
intelligible world that grounds his endless progress from bad to better in the world of sense. Thus,
Kant does not give up the positive account of free agency we find in the doctrine of timeless agency,
but instead he reinforces it by providing an analogue or substitute for trying and striving in the
noumenal realm. Rather, it seems that, because Wood has chosen to interpret the propensity to evil
as unsociable sociability, he is forced to deny the possibility of its being an intelligible deed
through the rejection of Kant’s moral metaphysics. But in doing so, Wood has parted ways with
Kant – he is no longer an interpreter of Kant but a revisionist bent on remaking Kant in his own
image.

Conclusion
What is the missing formal proof of the radical evil in human nature in the Religion? Every
attempt that has been surveyed in this chapter invariably has the same form: it begins with some
characteristic C that is universally present in human beings, and argues that the propensity to evil
is universally present in human beings because of C, and moral evil is universally present in human
beings because of this propensity to evil. But every attempt surveyed in this chapter fails. Either
this characteristic C is universally present in human beings, and the propensity to evil is universa lly
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present in human beings because of C, in which case the attempt fails because it makes the
propensity to evil analytically necessary, and not something the human being can be held
accountable for (6:32). Or this characteristic C is universally present in human beings, but C does
not guarantee the presence of the propensity to evil in human beings, in which case the attempt
fails because it would make the propensity to evil merely contingent, and why the propensity to
evil is innate remains unexplained. These failed attempts have all had the form of a progressive
argument – they attempt to provide a sufficient condition for the universal propensity to evil in the
characteristic C (Ameriks 2003, pp. 60-61). But perhaps a regressive argument, in which the
universal propensity to evil is given as a condition for the possibility of moral evil, might fare
better (Ameriks 2003, p. 60).91 This argument need not take the form of an empirica l
generalization, as Wood conjectured in Kant’s Moral Religion (Wood 1970, pp. 219-226). It is not
necessary to demonstrate that every human being deviates from the law in order to establish a
universal propensity to evil in the human species. For the deviation need only be possible for a
human being in order to establish an actual propensity to evil in the individual human being. And
since deviation from the moral law is possible for every human being, an actual propensity to evil
is established to be in every human being, and the propensity to evil is thereby demonstrated to be

It might be helpful to introduce a distinction from Kant’s Pre-Critical philosophy here: “An antecedently
determining ground is one, the concept of which precedes that which is determined. That is to say, an antecedently
determining ground is one, in the absence of which that which is determined would not be intelligible. A
consequentially determining ground is one which would not be posited unless the concept which is determined by it
had not already been posited from some other source. You can also call the former the reason why, or the ground of
being or becoming, while the latter can be called the ground that, or the ground of knowing” (1:392). If it is said that
there is evil in the world, and the condition for its possibility is a universal propensity to evil, then the propensity is
established as the antecedently determining ground for the evil in the wo rld. It is the reason for the evil’s being in the
world. Conversely, this evil in the world is a consequentially determining ground for the propensity. It is how we know
that there is a universal propensity to evil. Therefore, a regressive argument for the universal propensity to evil uses
the existence of evil in the world as a consequentially determining ground. By contrast, in an argument like Allison’s,
the finitude of human beings is used as the antecedently determining ground to establish the universal propensity to
evil. It is the reason why the propensity can exist. And while the propensity is a consequentially determining ground
for the finitude of human beings, Allison does not appeal to it to establish the fact that human beings are finite
creatures, but to entirely other grounds. This is why Allison’s argument, and other arguments like it, are progressive
arguments for the universal propensity to evil.
91
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universal. The missing formal proof of the radical evil in human nature in the Religion was exactly
where it purported to be all along, but we could not see it, because we wrongly believed that the
argument in question could only have a progressive form, and dismissed without due consideratio n
the argument with a regressive form as an empirical generalization.
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CONCLUSION

This is an essay about radical evil. And the issue that occupies every essay about radical
evil is the problem of radical evil. It is the problem that arises when we follow Kant in saying that
radical evil is universal and that radical evil is a product of our free choice. For, the standard
objection goes, these two characteristics are at odds with each other. If radical evil is a
characteristic that is present in the entire human species, or indeed ascribed to the species as part
of its nature (6:32), then radical evil no longer seems to be something the individual human being
can have any say in choosing. But Kant cannot allow such a result to stand, because a radical evil
that is not a product of our free choice cannot be something for which we are morally responsible.
If radical evil is the product of our free choice, then it would be up to every human being to adopt
or refrain from adopting radical evil, and the odds that the same choice would be universa lly
adopted by every individual human being is infinitesimal. The solution that the problem of radical
evil demands from us is not a metaphysical one. The logical incompatibility of natural necessity
and freedom already has a solution in the metaphysics of transcendental idealism – Kant’s solution
to this is to consider the empirical objects and the laws that govern them as appearances, rather
than as things in themselves, so that an effect “can therefore be regarded as free in regard to its
intelligible cause, and yet simultaneously, in regard to appearances, as their result according to the
necessity of nature” (A537/B565). But instead, the problem of radical evil is this: given that the
intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and its laws, the universal propensity
to evil in human nature has to have an intelligible cause, in the form of a reason why every human
being chooses as he does. The solution to the problem of radical evil is to make sense of the
noumenal choice of evil in the context of Kant’s moral-psychological framework.
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Yet the fact that the problem of radical evil is the primary issue surrounding radical evil
can only mean that the nature of radical evil is not an issue. Kant describes radical evil in two
ways. First as a propensity: “By propensity (propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the
possibility of an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is
contingent for humanity in general” (6:29). Then as fundamental maxim: “Now, the term “deed”
can in general apply just as well to the use of freedom through which the [fundamental] maxim
(either in favor of, or against, the law) is adopted in the power of choice, as to the use of which the
actions themselves (materially considered, i.e. as regards the objects of the power of choice) are
performed in accordance with that maxim” (6:31). And these descriptions are unproblematica lly
used to refer to one and the same thing, radical evil. Radical evil is the propensity to evil, and this
means the same thing as being the evil fundamental maxim of a human being. Kant is responsible
for this attitude with respect to radical evil. Throughout the Religion, we find passages such as
these, where the two terms are used interchangeably: “… We are only talking of a propensity to
genuine evil, i.e. moral evil, which, since it is only possible as the determination of a free power
of choice and this power for its part can be judged good or evil only on the basis of its maxims,
must reside in the subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the
moral law” (6:29). But a propensity is the subjective ground of an inclination, in contrast to a
fundamental maxim, which is the subjective ground of a maxim, and a maxim and an inclina tio n
are by no means the same thing. Prima facie, a propensity to evil and a fundamental maxim that is
evil, as the subjective grounds of two distinct things, must themselves be two distinct things. Thus,
the fact that the nature of radical evil is not an issue, despite being identified as both a propensity
and a maxim, is an issue.
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The issues this essay deals with can therefore be broken down into three theses:
1. The propensity to evil has been misidentified with the evil fundamental maxim.
2. Kant’s argument for the universality of radical evil has been misunderstood.
3. The nature of radical evil in the noumenal realm has been taken for granted.
The propensity to evil has been misidentified with the evil fundamental maxim. For
the most part, the literature has followed Kant in unproblematically treating the propensity to evil
and the evil fundamental maxim as one and the same thing. This is evident in the case of Alliso n,
who writes in his a priori proof of radical evil the following: “… Since evil has already been
located in the subordination within a maxim of moral requirements to those of self-love, it follows
that by a propensity to evil must be understood the meta-maxim to order the incentives in just this
way in the adoption of an agent’s first-order maxims” (Allison 2002, p. 340). The analysis of the
propensity to evil takes place in metaphysical terms as an intelligible act (either for or against the
law) through which the fundamental maxim is chosen. At the end of this reductive analysis, the
only thing that remains is the evil fundamental maxim, and all talk of a propensity to evil refers to
this evil fundamental maxim. The opposite is true in the case of Wood. He writes in his
anthropological proof of radical evil: “Nothing Kant says could justify ascribing to him the absurd
metaphysical fantasy that as free agents we are locked away in little monastic cells somewhere up
there in the noumenal world. Even in the first Critique, intelligible freedom is explicitly described
as an intelligible faculty that belongs to the human being as an appearance – hence as a part of
nature or the world of sense, not a faculty belonging to a separate, noumenal being” (Wood 2009,
p. 166). Instead, intelligible freedom is reduced to a mere posit, something that Kant considers
impossible to actually disprove, but whose existence he was largely agnostic towards (Wood 1984,
p. 99). Absent this intelligible freedom, there is no intelligible act (either for or against the law),
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through which the fundamental maxim is chosen. At the end of Wood’s reductive analysis, the
only thing that remains is a propensity to evil, and all talk of an evil fundamental maxim is for the
sake of the metaphysical thought-experiment that is transcendental idealism.
The issue here is fundamentally an issue about the separation of worlds. The propensity to
evil, as an innate disposition, does not pre-exist the original predispositions to good, but is instead
grafted onto them, like a shoot grafted onto a tree (6:28). These original predispositions belong to
the possibility of human nature (6:28). Without the predisposition to animality, the human being
would lack an animal nature, and would no longer be a rational animal. And without the
predisposition to humanity, the human being would lack a rational nature, and would no longer be
a rational animal. The human being is an appearance. Animals, rational or otherwise, are not things
in themselves. The human being has to be assigned a place in the sensible world, and so too the
propensity to evil that attaches itself to him, because to do otherwise would be to extend our
cognition of the human being beyond the boundaries of sense. But the fundamental maxim belongs
to the intelligible world. It is produced through “an intelligible deed, cognizable through reason
alone apart from any temporal condition” (6:31). If the fundamental maxim is brought into the
sensible world, then the use of freedom (either in favor of, or against, the law) that brings it about
would have to be an event in time, which takes place in accordance with the law of cause and
effect. This would be to give the origin of evil in human nature an origin according to time (6:34).
And this Kant denies: “If an effect is referred to a cause which is however bound to it according
to the laws of freedom, as is the case with moral evil, then the determination of the power of choice
to the production of this effect is thought as bound to its determining ground not in time but merely
in the representation of reason; it cannot be derived from some preceding state or other, as must
always occur, whenever the evil action is referred to its natural cause as event in the world” (6:39).
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If we consider the propensity to evil and the evil fundamental maxim as one and the same thing,
then we either bring the propensity into the intelligible world or bring the maxim into the sensible
world, in which case either “the cognition we have of the human being through experience ” of a
propensity to evil is possible apart from the appearances (it isn’t) or an origin according time could
be given for the origin of evil in human nature (it can’t).
Kant’s argument for the universality of radical evil has been misunderstood. Kant
provides “a multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human deeds parades before us”
as proof that the human being is by nature evil. The purpose of these examples has been
misunderstood by the literature on radical evil. A standard response is Allison’s, who wrote: “…
But clearly, even if for the sake of argument one accepts Kant’s appeal to some rather selective
anthropological evidence, the most that this evidence can show is that evil is widespread, not that
there is a universal propensity to it” (Allison 1990, p. 154). These interpreters dismiss the
anthropological evidence that Kant provides as a bad attempt at an empirical generalization. And
since the anthropological evidence is only enough to prove that the propensity to evil is
widespread, and not universal, the empirical generalization fails, and they take it upon themselves
to come up with a formal proof that Kant has neglected to provide. A more sympathetic response
would be Wood’s in Kant’s Moral Religion, in which he wrote: “When Kant says that man is evil
“by nature”, he does not mean to explain evil, but only to point out the universality of evil in man.
Kant thus looks for evidence supporting the claim that all men, without exception, exhibit a
propensity to evil; and he finds such evidence in “the multitude of crying examples which
experience of the actions of men puts before our eyes” (Wood 1970, p. 225). The younger Wood
also interprets Kant’s proof that the human being is by nature evil as an empirical generaliza tio n
from the anthropological evidence he provides (Wood 1999, p. 287). But he thinks that the
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anthropological evidence is enough to prove that the propensity to evil is universal. This did not
last very long. By the time of Kant’s Ethical Thought (1999), Wood had backed away from the
position of his younger self, and joined the ranks of the interpreters who consider the
anthropological evidence to only be enough to prove that the propensity to evil is widespread, but
not that it is universal. The two approaches both assume that Kant provides the anthropologica l
evidence in support of an empirical generalization. The problem is that the proof that the human
being is by nature evil is not an empirical generalization at all.
Kant actually provides the anthropological evidence to disprove rival theories of human
nature. These theories claim that human nature is good, contra Kant’s claim that human nature is
evil. The Romantics followed Rousseau in claiming that human beings are good in the state of
nature. And it is they who Kant is referring to when he says, “… We wish to draw our examples
from that state in which many a philosopher especially hoped to meet the natural godliness of
human nature, namely from the so-called state of nature” (6:33). The anthropological evidence
Kant provides of the “unprovoked cruelty in the ritual murders of Tofoa, New Zealand, and the
Navigator Islands” serve as counter-examples that disprove the theory that human beings are good
in the state of nature (6:33). The Enlightenment thinkers contemporary to Kant took the opposite
stance. They claimed that human beings are good in the civilized state. And it is they who Kant is
referring to when he says: “If we are however disposed to the opinion that we can have a better
cognition of human nature in its civilized state (where its predispositions can be more fully
developed), we must then hear out a long melancholy litany of charges against mankind ”
(6:33).The anthropological evidence Kant presents of what he calls the “vices of culture and
civilization” serve as counter-examples that disprove the theory that human beings are good in the
civilized state (6:33). Kant’s point in presenting this anthropological evidence is to show that the
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competing theories that claim that human nature is good are wrong. And because Kant is also an
ethical rigorist, it follows from his ethical rigorism that human nature can only ever be either good
or evil. Therefore, by providing anthropological evidence falsifying the competing theories that
claim that human nature is good, Kant indirectly provides support for his own theory that human
nature is evil. This argument is not airtight, because Kant might not have falsified every competing
theory that claims that human nature is good with his anthropological evidence, but neither is this
an empirical generalization. It is a deductive argument, along the lines of Popper’s principle of
falsification (Popper 1959, p. 19).
Furthermore, the “missing” formal proof for the universality of the evil in human nature is
not actually missing, but right where we’d expect it to be in the Religion. It makes use of the same
anthropological evidence that has been dismissed as insufficient for proving the universality of the
evil in human nature. Recall the definition Kant gives of a propensity: “By propensity (propensio)
I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire,
concupiscentia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general” (6:29). A
propensity to evil is therefore the subjective ground for the possibility of an evil inclination, by
which Kant means the inclination to subordinate the moral incentive to other incentives that are
not moral (6:36). Kant is not making the claim here that the inclination to subordinate the moral
incentive to other incentives that are not moral is a logical possibility for human beings. Per The
only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God, this would be the
formal element of possibility, “namely, agreement with the law of contradiction, [which] is
cancelled by that which contradicts itself” (2:79). He is claiming that the inclination to subordinate
the moral incentive to other incentives that are not moral is a real possibility for human beings. It
is the material element of possibility that Kant is after here, where something is possible only
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because “it presupposes something real, whether it be one thing or many” (2:79). The propensity
to evil, as the subjective ground for the possibility of an evil inclination, is that reality in the human
being which must be presupposed for evil deeds to be metaphysically or nomologically possible
for him. The propensity to evil is therefore the condition for the possibility of an evil deed. And
because the anthropological evidence proves that evil deeds are possible for every human being,
this subjective ground for the possibility of an evil deed must be actually present in every human
being, which is to say that there is a universal propensity to evil in human beings. The
anthropological

examples

are not insufficient

evidence

for an unpromising

empirica l

generalization. They are what allow Kant to echo the words of an English parliamentarian and
declare that moral evil is a real possibility for every man (6:38). And if this is true, then the
propensity to evil must be universal, or as Kant rhetorically puts it: “If this is true (and everyone
can decide by himself), if nowhere is a virtue which no level of temptation can overthrow, if
whether the good or evil spirit wins us over depends on which bids the most and affords the
promptest pay-off, then, what the Apostle says might indeed hold true of human beings universa lly,
“There is no distinction here, they are all under sin – there is none righteous (in the spirit of the
law), no, not one” (6:38-39).
The nature of radical evil in the noumenal realm has been taken for granted. In the
Religion, Kant explains the way in which an incentive can be made to coexist with the absolute
spontaneity of the power of choice (6:24). We are told that the human being naturally incorporates
both the moral and the nonmoral incentive into his maxim (6:36). The material of every maxim is
therefore identical (6:36). The moral bent of a maxim therefore has to do with its form, as Kant
explains in the following passage: “Hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil,
must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his maxim (not in
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the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim): which of the two
he makes the condition of the other” (6:36). If he subordinates the nonmoral incentive, then his
maxim is a good maxim. But if it is the moral incentive that is subordinated, then his maxim is an
evil one. The problem is that there is almost nothing in this account of maxims that is applicable
to our choice of the fundamental maxim. The fundamental maxim is produced through an
intelligible deed, which makes it “cognizable through reason alone apart from any temporal
condition” (6:31). It is therefore the complete opposite of our regular maxims, which are “sensible,
empirical, given in time” (6:31). But every incentive besides the incentive of reason (the moral
incentive) is empirical, and belongs to the sensible world. They are therefore absent from the
intelligible world, which is where the intelligible deed that produces the fundamental maxim takes
place. This means that it is not the case that the moral incentive and the nonmoral incentive are
both present in the fundamental maxim. But absent the nonmoral incentive, there would be nothing
under which the moral incentive can be subordinated, and because there must be a subordinatio n
of the moral incentive in order for a maxim to be considered as evil, the choice of a fundame nta l
maxim that is evil becomes impossible as a result. Yet Kant insists that we are morally responsible
for the evil of our nature, and this is only possible of we actually made the choice that determined
our fundamental maxim as evil.
If there is such a thing as an evil fundamental maxim, its formation cannot involve any
reference to sensible incentives that simply do not exist in the intelligible realm where the deed
takes place. The only material we have to work with is the moral incentive, which we are bound
to incorporate into our maxim, in accordance with the laws governing the intelligible realm
(4:446). It follows that the mere act of incorporating the moral incentive into our fundame nta l
maxim does not make it good, because otherwise an evil fundamental maxim would have to be
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dismissed as an impossibility. Instead, there must be space for freedom in the act of incorporatio n
itself, insofar as it is up to each of us to decide how we want the moral incentive incorporated into
our respective fundamental maxims. If the moral incentive is wholeheartedly incorporated into the
fundamental maxim, then the human being’s commitment to the moral law is absolute, and it
would be impossible for him to be swayed by incentives that are not moral when he enters into the
sensible world. But if the moral incentive is grudgingly incorporated into the fundamental maxim,
then the human being is committed to the moral law only insofar as he is lacking in alternatives,
and once he enters into the sensible world, he casts aside the moral law in favor of satisfying his
newfound sensibilities. The difference between these two cases lies in their moral strength. This
moral strength is necessary to maintain an absolute commitment to the moral law. But even those
who are unable to maintain their commitment to the moral law due to their weakness have moral
strength to some degree or the other. As Kant asserts in the Second Critique: “… But ask him
whether, if his prince demanded, on the pain of the same immediate execution, that he give false
testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy under a plausible
pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love of life, however great it may be. He
would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without
hesitation that it would be possible for him” (5:30). Kant intends for this passage to demonstrate
an individual’s awareness of his own freedom, because he is aware of what he ought to do, and
through it becomes aware of the power he has to do the right thing, even though his every
inclination is to do the opposite. This is what virtue is: the capacity and considered resolve to
withstand what opposes the moral disposition in us (6:380). And even the most reprobate human
being has a little bit of virtue in him, as the above passage demonstrates.
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Because the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and its laws, the
selection of an evil fundamental maxim in the intelligible world produces the propensity to evil in
the sensible world. It does so by grafting itself to the phenomenal structures that belong with
necessity to the human being. In his discussion of the predisposition to animality, which Kant
describes as a mechanical self-love, we are told that this predisposition is responsible for our drive
for self-preservation, for the propagation of the species through the sexual drive, and the instinct
for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten (6:26). These three can be corrupted to
produce the vices of the savagery of nature, which “are called the bestial vices of gluttony, lust and
wild lawlessness” (in relation to other human beings)” (6:27). These are vices of excess, in which
the natural drives of the predisposition of animality are not properly reined in, but allowed to run
wild. The choice of an evil fundamental maxim results in a lack of moral strength, without which
the natural drives of the predisposition to animality cannot be controlled. This moral weakness
leads to frailty, or “the general weakness of the human heart in complying with the adopted
maxims” (6:29). And in his discussion of the predisposition to humanity, which Kant describes as
a comparative self-love, we are told that “out of this self-love originates the inclination to gain
worth in the opinion of others, originally, of course, merely equal worth: not allowing anyone
superiority over oneself; bound up with the constant anxiety that others might be striving for
ascendancy; but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over
others” (6:27). This represents the slide from self-love to self-conceit, which is what would happen
naturally if morality is not in control. The choice of an evil fundamental maxim results in a lack
of moral strength, without which the gradually arising of an unjust desire to acquire superiority for
oneself would arise out of our comparative self-love. And this moral weakness with respect to the
predisposition to humanity results in depravity, which “can also be called the perversity of the
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human heart, for it reverses the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice”
(6:30).
Thus, the problem of radical evil is a problem because of the way the propensity to evil
has been identified with the evil fundamental maxim. Because of it, we have difficulty even
formulating our problem with radical evil. If what we mean by the problem of radical evil is “How
do we know the propensity to evil is universal?”, then we must search for our answer in the sensible
world and its laws. The answer to this problem of radical evil has to do with the moral evil that is
a real possibility for every man. This possibility for moral evil has to be grounded in the
appearances as a propensity to evil, and because every man can possibly commit moral evil, it
follows that every man must actually possess this propensity to evil. The propensity to evil is
therefore a synthetic a priori fact about our phenomenal natures, and our cognition of it stems from
inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of the anthropological evidence that we have. But
we can also mean by the problem of radical evil “Why do human beings choose the propensity to
evil?”, and here we are asking about the reasons for human actions, and not the phenomena l
conditions of human action. This takes us to the intelligible world that is the ground of the sensible
world and its laws. In making the noumenal choice for his fundamental maxim, the human being
has only the moral incentive for his material, and any free exercise of his power of choice has to
take place within the bounds of this restriction. There is no way to avoid incorporating the mor al
incentive into his fundamental maxim, but the way we can choose to incorporate it is another
matter entirely. Every human being incorporates the moral incentive, but it “takes” to a greater or
lesser degree. And this determines the moral strength he has to resist tests to his moral character.
The problem of evil is obscured by the fact that it is operating at both the phenomenal level and
the noumenal level, and giving the moral-psychological reasons for the propensity to evil do
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nothing to address the demand for the phenomenal conditions necessitating the propensity to evil
that motivate the questions about its universality, and vice versa.
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